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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
Acquisitions are one of the most studied areas in corporate finance research. Still, many 
questions about acquisitions are unanswered and regularly debated in the literature. One of these 
questions is whether acquisitions create bidder shareholder value and what factors are related to 
value creation (Golubov et al., 2015). Value creation was already discussed as early as 1983 when 
Jensen and Ruback state in their seminal article: “Finally, knowledge of the sources of takeover 
gains still eludes us” (Jensen and Ruback, 1983, p. 47), and it remains largely unexplained until 
today. Researchers usually evaluate value creation from a shareholder perspective by measuring 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) during the acquisition announcement (Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2011b). However, to date, the literature can explain only a small part of the variation 
in bidder CARs. Using a list of different deal and firm characteristics, researchers such as Moeller 
et al. (2004), Masulis et al. (2007), Harford et al. (2012) and Golubov et al. (2015) show that these 
commonly used factors explain less than 10% of the variation in bidder returns. Although Golubov 
et al. (2015) find that unobserved, time-invariant, firm-specific factors alone explain as much of 
the variation as the traditionally used factors, value creation seems not to be related to Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) changes, characteristics of the management team or industry 
membership. 
Not only do the sources of value creation remain a puzzle, but there is also the widespread 
belief that many acquisitions destroy shareholder value (see, e.g., Moeller et al., 2005; 
Malmendier and Tate, 2008). In corporate finance, acquisitions are among the most important 
events for a firm (Fuller et al., 2002). Although acquisitions that destroy shareholder value might 
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harm the firm and its shareholders, successful acquisitions can translate into higher sustainable 
shareholder value, better operating performance and higher synergies (Schwert, 2000; Bao and 
Edmans, 2011; Golubov et al., 2012; Harford et al., 2012). Therefore, acquisitions belong to the 
group of the most important decisions a CEO makes (Bao and Edmans, 2011). Lehn and Zhao 
(2006) even show that CEOs that make value reducing acquisitions are more likely to be replaced 
after the acquisition than CEOs that were responsible for value creating acquisitions or CEOs that 
cancelled potential value reducing acquisitions.  
Value destruction in acquisitions might be due to irrationalities of the bidder management 
and agency costs between managers and shareholders: Managers, who are actively involved in 
the selection of targets and day-to-day operations of the firm, tend to be better informed than 
shareholders about the acquisition. Shareholders usually care about the value of their shares, while 
value creation is not always the main goal of managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). Value 
destruction that is motivated by agency costs is related to concepts such as the free cash flow 
hypothesis (Jensen, 1986), managerial envy (Goel and Thakor, 2010) and management 
entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). Jensen (1986) argues that managers of firms with 
excess free cash flow tend to invest in negative NPV acquisitions instead of paying out the cash 
to shareholders. Lang et al. (1991) find support for Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis, as their 
study shows that managers personally profit from value-destroying acquisitions. Such 
acquisitions increase power, compensation and prestige of managers. Goel and Thakor (2010) 
argue that the managers of smaller firms envy their peers who get paid more because they are in 
charge of larger firms. Therefore, managers of smaller firms want to increase the size of their 
firms by acquisitions that might not increase shareholder value. Masulis et al. (2007) demonstrate 
that in firms with strong anti-takeover provisions, the managers, who are protected from the 
market of corporate control, are likely to engage in empire building. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) 
argue that managers entrench themselves in an attempt to reduce the likelihood of being replaced 
and to extract higher wages by making manager-specific acquisitions. Harford et al. (2012) find 
that entrenched managers choose targets with low synergy potential and overpay for their targets. 
The interest of researchers in acquisitions is understandable considering not only the 
elusive nature of sources of value creation, the importance of acquisitions in corporate finance 
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and the relevance of agency conflicts but also the sheer volume of acquisition activity. Figure 1.1 
depicts worldwide, North American and European acquisition activity during the period from 
2000 to 2015. Worldwide acquisition activity has its peaks in 2007 and 2015 with US$ 5.3 trillion 
and US$ 5.0 trillion, respectively. North American activity fluctuates between US$ 0.5 trillion 
and US$ 1.9 trillion. There has been a massive increase in European acquisition activity in terms 
of volume. Compared to the 1980s and 1990s, the European acquisition volume has come close 
to North American levels. In 2007, acquisition activity reached even higher levels in Europe than 
in North America. 
Figure 1.1: Acquisition volume  
This figure presents acquisition volume of worldwide, North American and European acquisitions between 2000 and 
2015. Source: SDC Platinum. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 depicts North American and European acquisition activity in relation to the 
respective GDP. On average, acquisition volume equals 7.6% and 5.2% of GDP for North 
America and Europe, respectively. Thus, in the field of corporate finance, acquisitions are a 
crucial source of resource redistribution within an economy (Golubov et al., 2012). 
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Figure 1.2: Acquisition volume in percent of GDP 
This figure presents acquisition volume in percent of GDP for North America and Europe between 2000 and 2015. 
Source: SDC Platinum and the World Bank. 
 
 
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
The first article, presented in Chapter 2, builds on the question outlined above regarding 
the factors that contribute to shareholder value creation in acquisitions and asks whether financial 
advisors (investment banks that give advice to their clients in acquisitions) are related to bidder 
value creation. Early theoretical models suggest that advisors, which act as financial 
intermediaries, are able to reduce transaction costs (Benston and Smith, 1976), asymmetric 
information costs (Leland and Pyle, 1977) and agency costs (Easterbrook, 1984; Titman and 
Trueman, 1986) as well as to produce valuable information (Campbel and Kracaw, 1980). To 
date, researchers have focused only on the US market, and empirical evidence yields inconclusive 
results on the question of whether advisors help bidders to create shareholder value. The United 
Kingdom (UK) market tends to have better developed stock markets, better protection of minority 
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and majority shareholders, higher disclosure rules, higher market and regulatory transparency and 
higher competition for potential targets than the Continental European (CE) market. Although US 
data require that corporate governance and regulatory characteristics remain relatively fixed, the 
European market provides the opportunity to study how advisors are related to bidder value 
creation in different regimes. I find that advisors create value only in acquisitions in which both 
the bidder and the target are located in the UK. The results are economically relevant, as bidders 
using advisors appear to create 1.1 percentage points higher CARs in UK–UK acquisitions than 
bidders with advisors in CE–CE acquisitions. Differences in corporate governance and regulatory 
regimes across European countries cannot explain this result.  
Moreover, I use the European Takeover Directive (ETD) as an exogenous shock to the 
acquisition market in a difference-in-difference (DiD) research design to address the question 
whether advisors matter for bidder value creation. The ETD should harmonize European 
acquisition regulation and increase acquisition bid efficiency (McCahery and Renneboog, 2003), 
but it is criticized for being vague and discretionary (Humphery-Jenner, 2012). Indeed, my 
findings support the conjecture that the ETD decreases shareholder value after its implementation. 
The results of the DiD analysis indicate that advisors are valuable to European bidders. It appears 
that bidders profit from advisor advice in environments that increase acquisition complexity and 
legal uncertainty. The results are robust to country-level legal and corporate governance (CG) 
controls. 
The article “Do investment banks create value for their clients? Empirical evidence from 
European acquisitions” is single-authored. It was presented at the Finance Seminar in Hohenheim, 
Germany (2016) and at the Research Seminar Series at Texas A&M University, United States 
(2016). The article currently has a revise and resubmit at the journal European Financial 
Management. 
Chapter 3 presents an article that also addresses the role that advisors play in acquisitions, 
but it focuses on the North American market. Because of the convincing theoretical evidence that 
argues that advisors should matter for bidder value creation and the fact that Servaes and Zenner 
(1996) do not document this expected association empirically, researchers have started to focus 
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on advisor quality. This leads to the question of whether high-quality advisors create more 
shareholder value than lower quality advisors. 
Specifically, in this article we ask whether high-quality advisors are associated with higher 
acquisition announcement returns, long-term returns and synergies. The results of existing 
empirical studies that address the relation between advisor quality and value creation are mixed. 
Kale et al. (2003) and Golubov et al. (2012) provide evidence of a positive relation for tender 
offers and public targets, respectively. Most other studies, however, rather document a negative 
or insignificant relation between advisor quality and value creation (Bowers and Miller, 1990; 
Michel et al., 1991; Rau, 2000; Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003; Ismail, 2010). What most of these 
studies have in common is that they rely on advisors’ occurrences in the financial press or advisor 
market share to capture advisor quality. However, Bao and Edmans (2011) show that market share 
is not a good predictor of advisor quality. We develop a novel measure of advisor quality, which 
captures whether an advisor has won an award of excellence and shed some light into the 
inconclusive empirical evidence for the relationship between advisor quality and value creation. 
Because the awards are given to those investment banks that are supposed to provide the highest 
quality services, it is plausible to expect that they are positively related to value creation. Despite 
their popularity in the investment banking industry, these awards have been ignored by academic 
researchers. 
Using this novel measure, we consistently find a positive relationship between advisor 
quality and value creation. Bidders advised by high-quality advisors tend to realize three 
percentage points higher CARs than other bidders. They also seem to outperform in the long term 
by reaching 0.4 percentage points higher monthly alphas in the 60-month period that follows the 
acquisition. Moreover, they are associated with higher synergies, and winners are also able to 
capture a larger part of the total synergies for their clients. Our results hold when we control for 
the endogeneity of advisor-bidder matching. We also find results that support the view that high-
quality advisors put more effort into acquisitions in which they face high reputational exposure. 
We do not find such consistent results when we employ the commonly used quality measure based 
on the league table position. 
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
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The article “Superstar financial advisors: Do they deliver superior value to their clients?” 
is co-authored with Tereza Tykvová. The initial idea and research question comes from Johannes 
Kolb, who also collected the required data and executed most of the empirical analysis. Both 
authors presented at various conferences, and Johannes Kolb prepared the initial version of the 
paper. Tereza Tykvová supported the entire process and contributed substantially to improving 
the working paper version and incorporating the feedback received during conferences and from 
journal submissions. The article was presented at conferences such as the International 
Conference of the French Finance Association in Liège, Belgium (2016), the FMA Annual 
Meeting in Las Vegas, United States (2016) and the Finance Seminar in Hohenheim, Germany 
(2015). 
Chapter 4 looks from a different angle on the value of acquisitions. The article focuses on 
a financial innovation — the Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC) — that combines 
acquisitions with initial public offerings (IPOs) to enable firms a fast and cheap listing at a public 
stock exchange. 
SPACs are cash shells that buy private operating firms to which they confer a public-
listing status. The purpose of this article is to shed light on SPACs from the perspective of their 
potential targets, i.e., private companies aiming to achieve a public listing. We find that private 
operating firms indeed tend to use SPACs as an alternative way to get listed, particularly in years 
with weak IPO activity and volatile markets, such as 2008 and 2009. In these two years, 
approximately 31% of firms went public through an SPAC acquisition rather than through an IPO. 
Our results from the analysis of 127 SPAC acquisitions and 1,128 IPOs during the wave of “new-
generation” SPACs starting in 2003 lend support to the conjecture that in particular small and 
levered firms with low growth opportunities tend to use this vehicle. SPAC acquisitions also may 
be fueled by the cash-out motives of existing shareholders. Venture capitalists and private equity 
investors tend to refrain from using SPAC acquisitions as an exit route. 
Moreover, we examine whether SPAC sponsors pick firms that appear to be of low quality 
but have hidden potential. Tracking long-term abnormal returns, we find that SPAC firms are 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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associated with severe underperformance in comparison to the market, the industry and 
(comparable) IPO firms. Thus, the results do not support the “hidden potential” proposition. 
The article “Going public via special purpose acquisition companies: Frogs do not turn 
into princes” is co-authored with Tereza Tykvová. Although the initial idea for the research 
project comes from Tereza Tykvová, the research question was developed jointly by the authors. 
Data collection and empirical analyses were done by Johannes Kolb, who presented at various 
conferences and prepared the initial version of the paper. Tereza Tykvová supported the entire 
process and contributed substantially to joint revisions and to the preparation of the published 
version. The article was presented at several conferences such as the Annual Meeting of the 
German Finance Association in Wuppertal, Germany (2013), the Financial Management 
Association European Conference in Maastricht, the Netherlands (2014), the Annual Meeting of 
the European Financial Management Association in Rome, Italy (2014) and the WHU Research 
Seminar in Finance and Accounting in Vallendar, Germany (2015). It is published in the Journal 
of Corporate Finance (see, Kolb and Tykvová, 2016). 
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes, gives a brief summary and outlines avenues for further 
fruitful research.  
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Chapter 2  
Do investment banks create value for their clients? 
Empirical evidence from European acquisitions 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Most firms are not frequent bidders, and many managers may lack the skills that are 
necessary to initiate and execute value-creating acquisitions. Moreover, executives who decide to 
acquire another firm are under high pressure, as this choice is important for the future of the firm, 
the shareholders and for the executive’s career. In a successful acquisition synergies might be 
created, whereas in an unsuccessful acquisition, the firm is lead into financial, operative and 
strategic difficulties, which might eventually lead to bankruptcy (Bao and Edmans, 2011).  
Little acquisition know-how might be one of the reasons why many managers rely on 
intermediaries that are experienced and skilled in executing acquisitions; namely, investment 
banks that act as financial advisors. In terms of value, advisors are involved in approximately 75% 
of all European acquisitions between 2000 and 2015, which equals a fee income of about US$ 85 
billion because fees are approximately 1% of the acquisition value1 (see, e.g., McLaughlin, 1990; 
McLaughlin, 1992). Servaes and Zenner (1996) argue that advisors provide valuable services to 
their clients because they reduce transaction costs, information asymmetries and agency costs. 
Advisors might be able to screen the market, identify promising targets, negotiate favorable terms 
at a lower cost and more efficiently than bidders that execute an acquisition without an advisor 
(in-house acquisition). Furthermore, as repeated players in the acquisition market, advisors might 
                                                 
1 Source: SDC Platinum 
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be able to build up and maintain their reputation by offering consistently high-quality services 
(Golubov et al., 2012). In opposition to this theoretical proposition, there is an ongoing debate in 
the empirical literature on the question of whether advisors help bidders to create shareholder 
value and whether they are worth their money. While the bulk of the literature documents an 
insignificant or even negative association between bidder value creation and either advisor 
involvement (Servaes and Zenner, 1996; Wang and Whyte, 2010) or advisor quality (Bowers and 
Miller, 1990; Michel et al., 1991; Rau, 2000; Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003; Ismail, 2010), only two 
studies document a positive relation between bidder value creation and advisor quality (Kale et 
al., 2003; Golubov et al., 2012). 
Motivated by the conflicting empirical evidence, I investigate the role that bidder advisors 
play in Europe. Europe seems to be an interesting testing ground for this question for two main 
reasons. First, I analyze whether the value that advisors offer to their clients differs between the 
UK2 and CE. Whereas US data require that corporate governance and regulatory characteristics 
remain relatively fixed, the European market provides the opportunity to study how advisors are 
related to bidder value creation in different regimes. The UK is characterized by a market-based 
system that relies on case law and focuses on the effective protection of shareholder rights. In CE, 
the blockholder-based system, which is based on codified law and focuses on the protection of 
stakeholders such as creditors and employees, is prevalent (Martynova and Renneboog, 2011b). 
This leads, inter alia, to better developed stock markets, to better protection of minority and 
majority shareholders, to higher disclosure rules, to higher market and regulatory transparency 
and to higher competition for potential targets in the UK compared to CE (Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2004). Indeed, Alexandridis et al. (2010) show that, due to intense competition for 
targets in the UK, bidders have to pay higher premiums, which makes it challenging for them to 
create shareholder value. 
Second, the implementation of a major regulatory reform in Europe in 2006 – namely, the 
ETD – offers the opportunity to assess whether advisors matter for bidder value creation using a 
DiD research design. The ETD was implemented to harmonize European acquisition regulation, 
                                                 
2 UK includes Great Britain and Ireland. 
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to foster consolidation among European firms (Clarke, 2009) and to increase acquisition bid 
efficiency (McCahery and Renneboog, 2003). The main goal was to stimulate acquisition activity 
that creates shareholder value. In contrast to regulators’ aims, the ETD is criticized for being 
vague and discretionary (Humphery-Jenner, 2012). Because EU member states can decide to opt-
out during the implementation process and to maintain current national practices (Moschier and 
Campa, 2009), harmonization of acquisition regulation did not take place. The lack of 
harmonization and the vague character of the regulatory framework increase legal uncertainty. 
Due to the mandatory bid rule and the minimum price rule, the ETD makes it more difficult, costly 
and time-consuming to acquire European targets (Humphery-Jenner, 2012). It seems that 
acquisition complexity increases as a result of the ETD. Empirical evidence suggests that the ETD 
decreases shareholder wealth after its implementation (Humphery-Jenner, 2012; Drobetz and 
Momtaz, 2016). Because theory predicts that advisors reduce information asymmetries, 
transaction costs and agency costs (Servaes and Zenner, 1996), they might be particularly valuable 
to bidders that are highly affected by the consequences of the ETD in the period after its 
implementation. 
In my sample of 2969 inter-European acquisitions from 2001 to the third quarter of 2015, 
bidders create shareholder value on average, as the mean 3-day bidder CAR is significantly 
different from zero at the 1% level. It seems that the corporate governance and regulatory 
characteristics of the bidder country explain differences in shareholder value creation between 
UK and CE bidders. Without controlling for these characteristics, CE bidders appear to create 
more value in domestic and in cross-border acquisitions than UK bidders.  
The results suggest that advisors create shareholder value for their clients when the bidder 
and the target are both located in the UK but not when either party is located in CE. The results 
are economically nontrivial, as bidders using advisors appear to create 1.14 percentage points 
higher CARs in UK-UK acquisitions than bidders with advisors in CE-CE acquisitions. The 
difference translates into a higher bidder CAR of US$ 25.4 million for a mean-sized bidder. The 
results seem to be robust towards different variable definitions and sample specifications and 
towards potential endogeneity and causation concerns. To address issues related to the 
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endogenous choice to use an advisor in an acquisition, I use a propensity score matching (PSM) 
approach.  
Further results support the conjecture that the ETD decreases shareholder value after its 
implementation. For the DiD analysis, I divide EU member states into two different samples. The 
treated sample includes EU member states that made significant changes to their acquisition 
regulation in response to the ETD. The control sample includes EU member states that opted-out 
of the most important statutes and therefore did not make any significant changes. In line with my 
expectations, the results suggest that treated bidders that use an advisor do not experience losses 
in shareholder value, whereas treated bidders that do not use an advisor do experience significant 
losses in comparison to the control sample. A mean-sized bidder seems to realize US$ 26.50 
million lower shareholder value due to the ETD, in comparison to a control sample. As the 
introduction of the ETD is an exogenous shock to the European acquisition market, the DiD 
research design in combination with a PSM should alleviate potential endogeneity and selection 
bias concerns. 
I contribute to the literature in several ways. Empirical evidence on European acquisition 
activity is limited, despite a massive increase in this activity during recent years. I extend the 
limited amount of research that examines the European market after the end of the 5th takeover 
wave. To my knowledge, no other studies – besides those of Humphery-Jenner (2012), Dissanaike 
et al. (2016) and Drobetz and Momtaz (2016) – examine the European acquisition market after 
the 5th takeover wave. Over the last 15 years, the European market has become equally important 
than the US market in terms of volume. In Figure 2.1, I depict yearly volumes of US and European 
acquisitions. Aggregated acquisition activity in the US between 2001 and 2015, with US$ 15.01 
trillion, is higher than that in Europe, with US$ 12.52 trillion. However, compared to the 1980s 
and 1990s, the European acquisition volume has come close to US levels. In 2007, acquisition 
activity reached even higher levels in Europe than in the US.  
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Figure 2.1: European and US acquisition volume 
This figure presents the volume of acquisitions announced in Europe and the US during 2001–2015. The data come 
from SDC Platinum. 
 
 
This is the first study to examine the question of whether advisors help bidders to create 
shareholder value in European acquisitions. Whether advisors matter for bidder value creation in 
acquisitions has been analyzed only for the US market to date (Bowers and Miller, 1990; Michel 
et al., 1991; Servaes and Zenner, 1996; Rau, 2000; Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003; Kale et al., 2003; 
Ismail, 2010; Golubov et al., 2012). I use the fact that Europe is divided into different corporate 
governance and regulatory regimes in order to learn more about the role that advisors play in 
acquisitions. All the existing studies, with the exception of Servaes and Zenner (1996) and Wang 
and Whyte (2010), look at advisor quality instead of advisor involvement. Research that looks at 
advisor quality has to be viewed with the restriction that it is unclear how to measure advisor 
quality appropriately (Bao and Edmans, 2011; Sibilkov and McConnell, 2014). Therefore, I 
consider only the choice to use an advisor or to execute an acquisition without an advisor.  
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Finally, focusing on the time period between 2001 and the third quarter of 2015, I include 
the effects of a recent major European regulation. The ETD has been discussed since the 1980s, 
but due to large differences in national regulations across EU member states, agreement on a final 
statute was not reached until April 2004 (Clarke, 2009). The implementation deadline was set to 
May 2006. In the law literature, an extensive discussion on the pros and cons of the ETD takes 
place (Goergen et al., 2005; Clarke, 2009; Davies et al., 2010; McCahery and Vermeulen, 2010) 
but empirical evidence on the question of whether and how this reform creates shareholder value 
has received only minor attention (Humphery-Jenner, 2012; Dissanaike et al., 2016; Drobetz and 
Momtaz, 2016). With this article, I intend to add to this literature. 
This article proceeds in the following way. Chapter 2.2 develops the theoretical basis for 
the empirical analysis and reviews the literature. Chapter 2.3 describes the data screening 
procedure, the sample and gives summary statistics. Chapter 2.4 presents the results on the role 
that advisors play in European acquisitions by comparing the UK with CE and executing a DiD 
analysis. In Chapter 2.5, I discuss the results, and Chapter 2.6 concludes. 
 
2.2 The role of advisors, Europe and the European takeover directive 
 
2.2.1 Advisors 
According to Servaes and Zenner (1996), advisors play an important role in acquisitions, 
and their services can be split into three main tasks. First, advisors reduce transaction costs, as 
they may be able to select and value targets and structure acquisitions at a lower cost than bidders 
without advisors. If acquisitions are of a complicated nature, such as large, cross-border, hostile 
and stock acquisitions, one would expect that bidders rely on the services of an advisor. Second, 
advisors alleviate information asymmetries between bidders and targets. Servaes and Zenner 
(1996) argue that bidders that acquire diversified targets acquire only assets and not the entire 
firm or are not the only bidder for a specific target are more likely to use an advisor. Third, 
advisors mitigate agency conflicts between corporate insiders (managers) and outsiders 
(shareholders). Due to managers’ behavioral biases, such as empire building (Jensen, 1986; Lang 
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et al., 1991), entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) or hubris (Roll, 1986), shareholders might 
not trust the decisions of the management team. In these situations, managers would rather 
increase their own private benefits instead of maximizing shareholder wealth. Managers may 
profit from a third party that certifies the value of an acquisition. Since advisors are repeated 
players in the acquisition market, they should be able to build up and protect their reputation over 
time by consistently offering high-quality services (Bao and Edmans, 2011; Golubov et al., 2012). 
Advisors might fulfill a signaling role and provide third-party certification (see, e.g., Allen et al., 
2004) if they accept acquisitions that create value and reject acquisitions that are motivated by 
dubious motives. Thomas (1995) shows that as agency conflicts increase, the need for certification 
through advisors in acquisitions increases. 
However, empirical literature that analyzes the relation between advisor involvement and 
shareholder value creation is scarce, and the results of existing research are counterintuitive. 
Servaes and Zenner (1996) do not find evidence that the involvement of advisors increases 
shareholder value in US acquisitions. Wang and Whyte (2010) even find a negative relation 
between advisor involvement and bidder value creation when managerial rights are relatively 
strong. Another related stream of literature considers not only the involvement of advisors in 
acquisitions but also looks at the quality of the advisor, distinguishing between high-quality and 
lower-quality advisors. Earlier studies measure quality according to the prestige of the advisor 
name (Bowers and Miller, 1990; Michel et al., 1991; Servaes and Zenner, 1996), and in more 
recent studies, authors use measures that are related to advisor market shares to assess their quality 
(Rau, 2000; Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003; Kale et al., 2003; Ismail, 2010; Golubov et al., 2012).  
It seems that empirical evidence on the relation between bidder CARs and advisor quality 
is mixed at best. Two studies suggest that high-quality advisors offer more value to their clients 
than lower-quality advisors. Kale et al. (2003) argue that high-quality advisors are associated with 
higher bidder CARs in tender offers than are lower-quality advisors. Golubov et al. (2012) 
indicate that high-quality advisors help their clients to create more shareholder value and higher 
synergies than lower-quality advisors in public acquisitions. However, many studies document 
that there is either a negative (Michel et al., 1991; Rau, 2000; Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003; Ismail, 
2010) or no association (Bowers and Miller, 1990; Servaes and Zenner, 1996) between proxies 
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for advisor market shares or advisor prestige and bidder value creation. A challenge in this 
literature stream is to measure advisor quality correctly, which might also explain the mixed 
findings, as most studies rely on some measure of advisor market shares. The results of Bao and 
Edmans (2011) suggest that some advisors might consistently outperform others, but market share 
seems to be a poor measure of advisor quality. 
Hence, in this article, I focus only on whether the bidder hires any advisor for an 
acquisition or executes the acquisition in-house without using an advisor. 
 
2.2.2 Corporate governance and regulatory characteristics 
A broad stream of literature suggests not only that bidder value creation is influenced by 
deal and bidder characteristics but also that corporate governance and regulatory characteristics 
play a role (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Alexandridis et al., 2010; 
Martynova and Renneboog, 2011b). These characteristics differ between the UK and CE. 
La Porta et al. (1998) report that, for well-functioning and well-developed financial 
markets, strong legal investor protection is crucial. The UK market is characterized by high 
disclosure and a well-developed and liquid equity market (La Porta et al., 1998; Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2011b), as well as has a high degree of shareholder protection compared to CE (La 
Porta et al., 1997). Not only majority shareholders but also minority shareholders are better 
protected (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). The ownership structure of the typical UK firm is 
more dispersed than of the typical CE firm, where ownership and control are more concentrated 
(Faccio and Lang, 2002; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). Indeed, Faccio and Masulis (2005) 
show that 63% of CE public firms have one large shareholder that controls more than 20% of the 
votes. The UK seems to have a higher transparency of legal regulations (Goergen and Renneboog, 
2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2011a) and higher accounting standards than CE. Rossi and 
Volpin (2004) argue that an investor-friendly legal environment featuring such aspects as stronger 
shareholder protection and high accounting standards, which increase disclosure and make it 
easier to identify targets, lead to high M&A volumes.  
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2.2.3 The role of advisors in the UK and CE 
Alexandridis et al. (2010) argue that, in the UK, where acquisition volume is high, bidders 
must bid aggressively and pay high premiums. Due to the competition between bidders for targets 
and potential overpayment, bidder value creation is limited. Identifying synergetic targets in such 
an environment requires good screening and valuation skills. Moreover, Goergen et al. (2005) 
argue that, due to stricter UK acquisition regulation, target shareholders are better protected from 
expropriation by the bidder and are able to extract higher premiums. In order to negotiate 
favorable acquisition terms for the bidder, negotiation power is crucial in such an environment. 
Empirical results from Goergen and Renneboog (2004), Rossi and Volpin (2004) and Martynova 
and Renneboog (2011b) indicate that bidders indeed have to pay higher premiums when they 
acquire targets located in the UK than when they acquire targets in CE and that UK bidders realize 
lower CARs than CE bidders. Since theory and some empirical evidence predict that advisors are 
good at identifying, valuing and negotiating favorable acquisition terms (Servaes and Zenner, 
1996; Golubov et al., 2012), they might be more valuable in the UK. Alternatively, advisors might 
be more valuable in CE, as synergetic targets in CE are difficult to identify and value due to lower 
transparency, lower accounting standards and lower disclosure rules. Moreover, Bebchuk and Roe 
(1999) show that acquisitions in regimes with concentrated ownership, such as those in CE, are 
less successful because negotiations with blockholders are required. Blockholders might demand 
high premiums in order to be compensated for their loss of private benefits. Thus, advisors might 
provide valuable support in these negotiations. 
According to Servaes and Zenner (1996), advisors are expected to reduce asymmetric 
information costs. Forte et al. (2010) examine the probability of European targets to hire an 
advisor and find that complexity plays a role. Since information asymmetries might be particularly 
high in acquisitions across different regimes, advisors could be more valuable in cross-regime 
acquisitions than in acquisitions within one regime. Alternatively, asymmetric information might 
be more costly when the (uninformed) bidder and the target operate both in a competitive regime 
due to (too) high premiums that have to be paid in order to successfully acquire a target. Therefore, 
advisors could create more value in acquisitions by reducing asymmetric information costs 
involving both parties from the UK instead of one UK and one CE party. 
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Finally, Servaes and Zenner (1996) argue that advisors reduce agency costs. However, it 
is unclear in which regime advisors are more valuable to bidders. On one hand, they might create 
more value in the UK because agency costs are especially expensive in a competitive environment 
in which (empire building) bidders tend to overpay. However, the involvement of advisors could 
also be more valuable in CE, as shareholders are less protected and are in need of a third party 
that certifies the value of an acquisition. 
Overall, whether advisors are more valuable to bidders in acquisitions in the UK, in CE or 
across both regimes must be determined by the empirical analysis. 
 
2.2.4 European Takeover Directive 
In Europe, different national systems of acquisition regulation hinder the development of 
a common acquisition market, and policy makers have felt the need to harmonize legislation 
within the EU member states (Moschier and Campa, 2009) to stimulate acquisition activity that 
increases shareholder value. 
The ETD, also known as “directive 2004/25/EC”, was introduced on April 21, 2004, and 
EU member states had until May 20, 2006, to implement it. In fact, EU member states waited 
until the deadline to implement the new rules.3 By introducing minimum standards for acquisition 
regulation, the ETD intends to establish a consistent regulatory framework within the EU member 
states. The ETD applies for all (public target) firms that are incorporated in a member state and/or 
that securities are traded on the stock exchange of a member state. The most important concepts 
of the ETD are as follows (see, e.g., European parliament and the council, 2006; Slaughter and 
May, 2006; Gleiss Lutz, 2014):  
(a) Minority shareholders should be protected and all shareholders should be treated 
equally during a bid. To prevent creeping acquisitions, the bidder is required to make a 
bid for all outstanding shares if its share ownership exceeds a certain threshold (mandatory 
                                                 
3 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/NIM/?uri=CELEX:32004L0025 
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bid rule). Moreover, based on the minimum price rule, the bidder has to offer minority 
shareholders an “equitable price” for their shares (the price has to be equal to the highest 
price that the bidder paid for target shares over a six- to twelve-month period). 
(b) Target shareholders should have enough information about the bid and sufficient time 
after the bid to make an informed decision. 
(c) The target board should publicly react to the bid and illustrate its opinion about it and 
its consequences for employment and the location of the target. 
(d) The target board shall act in the interest of all shareholders and the company as a whole. 
(e) The target board shall be neutral and should allow shareholders to decide on a bid. 
(f) The bid must not create false markets in the securities for any of the involved parties, 
i.e., artificial increases or decreases in share prices. 
(g) Before making a bid, the bidder must make sure that it is able to pay any cash 
considerations and that it has enough financial means to implement the acquisition. 
(h) The target should not be distracted from its day-to-day operations due to the bid for 
longer than reasonable. 
(i) When the bidder reaches a certain ownership threshold, i.e., between 90% and 95%, it 
is allowed to squeeze-out minority shareholders. 
Each bid has to be supervised by a competent authority that is appointed by each EU 
member state individually and that has considerable scope for decision making. Moreover, the 
minimum standards are undermined by the opt-out and national derogation clauses. EU member 
states are given the possibility to opt-out of certain provisions and are granted flexibility when 
implementing the minimum requirements to maintain the current national practices (Gatti, 2005; 
Slaughter and May, 2006; Moschier and Campa, 2009). 
Since its introduction, the ETD has been subject to criticism by academics and 
practitioners. For a detailed and extensive overview, see Gatti (2005), Clarke (2009), Moschier 
and Campa (2009), Davies et al. (2010) and McCahery and Vermeulen (2010). The main points 
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include the following: First, because there are different interest groups among EU member states, 
political compromises had to be made, which led to a dilution of the original intention of the ETD 
(McCahery and Vermeulen, 2010). Second, many expressions are problematic because they are 
too vaguely defined and are discretionary (Humphery-Jenner, 2012). For example, the concept of 
“acting in concert” determines whether several parties are associated in regard to calculating the 
control threshold for the mandatory bid rule (see (a) above). However, the definition of “acting in 
concert” is not harmonized across different EU member states (European commission, 2012). 
Third, because of the opt-out clause, regulators missed the opportunity to establish a level playing 
field for European acquisitions (Gleiss Lutz, 2014) and failed to reach harmonization across EU 
member states. This might lead to increased acquisition complexity and uncertainty regarding the 
rules that apply, especially when targets underlie different jurisdictions because they are 
incorporated and listed in different countries (Slaughter and May, 2006). Fourth, the decision 
power of the supervisory authority on the actual terms of the bid and a too great ownership 
threshold for squeeze-out increase uncertainty regarding the acquisition process and outcome. The 
supervisory authority has discretion over how to interpret takeover rules on a case-to-case basis. 
Additionally, published documents related to the bid underlie clearance by the supervisory 
authority (European parliament and the council, 2006; Law360, 2013). Moreover, the ownership 
threshold to squeeze-out minority shareholders is not harmonized across EU member states and 
might be too high in some EU member states for the bidder to achieve full control over the target. 
Fifth, the mandatory bid rule provides targets with an effective defense against bidders that do not 
have the intention to acquire full control of the target, and the rule might therefore hinder bids 
(Marccus Partners and Centre for European Policy Studies, 2012). The mandatory bid rule in 
combination with the minimum price rule might make it more costly and time-consuming to 
acquire a European target (see (a) above). 
Overall, the outlined criticism can be interpreted in such a way that argues that the ETD 
increases legal uncertainty and acquisition complexity and makes it more difficult, costly and 
time-consuming to acquire targets in EU member states. Existing evidence indeed suggests that 
the ETD negatively influences bidder value creation (see, e.g., Humphery-Jenner, 2012; Drobetz 
and Momtaz, 2016), instead of increasing shareholder wealth. 
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Due to the opt-out clause, some EU member states are more strongly affected by the ETD 
than others (Marccus Partners and Centre for European Policy Studies, 2012). Based on the 
location of the target, this circumstance can be used for the DiD analysis to classify acquisitions 
into a treated sample and a control sample. Bidders that acquire targets located in an EU member 
state that is highly affected by the ETD might profit from advisors. 
 
2.3 Sample and summary statistics 
From SDC Platinum, I gather inter-European acquisitions announced between January 1st 
2001, and October 31st 2015. Similar to Martynova and Renneboog (2011b), I include all 28 EU 
member countries, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. Bidders have to be publicly listed at a 
European stock exchange, and targets may have a public, private or subsidiary status. I consider 
completed and withdrawn acquisitions with an acquisition value larger than US$ 1 million in 
which a change of control takes place. I exclude bankruptcy acquisitions, divestitures, going 
private transactions, leveraged buyouts, management buyouts, liquidations, repurchases, 
restructuring transactions, reverse takeovers and privatizations. These screening criteria are 
common in this stream of literature (see, e.g., Masulis et al., 2007; Golubov et al., 2012; Harford 
et al., 2012; Golubov et al., 2015). I complement my sample with bidder characteristics from 
Compustat Global and retrieve stock prices and indices, which are adjusted for stock splits and 
dividends, from Datastream. Further, I drop all acquisitions that involve financial institutions (SIC 
codes between 6000 and 6999). I do this because financial institutions have different 
characteristics than corporate firms.4 I require that the acquisition value exceeds 1% of the bidder 
market capitalization 11 days prior to the announcement and drop all acquisitions in which the 
same bidder acquires several firms on the same day (see, e.g., Golubov et al., 2015). This is 
important because otherwise, it is difficult to isolate the bidder returns for a specific acquisition 
(Fuller et al., 2002). After having dropped all acquisitions for which deal or bidder characteristics 
                                                 
4 In the robustness tests in Table 2.6, I show that the exclusion or inclusion of financial institutions does not matter. 
The results are similar in both cases. 
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are not available, I end up with a final sample of 2969 acquisitions. The (country-level) corporate 
governance characteristics come from Martynova and Renneboog (2011a) and are based on the 
seminal research of La Porta et al. (1998) but are more broadly defined and updated. These indices 
vary over time and are adjusted in the years 2000 and 2005. Martynova and Renneboog (2011a) 
construct these indices with the help of 150 lawyers from over 32 European countries. These 
indices reflect the quality of a country’s corporate governance regulation and quantify the 
regulation mitigating the conflicts of interest between (1) management and shareholders, (2) 
majority and minority shareholders and (3) creditors and shareholders. To be consistent with prior 
research, I scale the indices within the [1;10] interval (see, e.g., Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). 
Since the enforcement of regulation also depends on the power of courts, I use the rule of law 
index from the World Bank (WB), which is rescaled within the [0;1] interval, and multiply it with 
each (country-level) corporate governance index. Further (country-level) corporate governance 
and country characteristics, such as anti-corruption, financial development, competition, GDP 
growth, and GNI per capita, come from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank. These indices vary on a yearly basis. Information on the involvement of advisors in an 
acquisition comes from SDC Platinum.  
Table 2.1 illustrates the sample composition. Overall, the sample includes bidders and 
targets from 28 and 29 different countries, respectively. Most of the bidders are located in the UK 
(1741), followed by Sweden (240), France (161) and Norway (119). Similarly, most targets are 
from the UK (1604), Sweden (194), Germany (178) and France (164). UK bidders (targets) make 
up 61% (56%) and CE bidders 39% (44%) of the sample. Advisors are used by 30% of all UK 
bidders and 34% of all CE bidders. In terms of acquisition volume, 60% of UK bidders and 76% 
of CE bidders hire advisors for their acquisitions.  
2.3 Sample and summary statistics 
23 
Table 2.1: Sample composition 
Country   Bidder   Target   Bidder advisor   
    N %  N %  N % (number) % (value)   
United Kingdom   1741 58.6  1604 54.0  533 30.6 81.2   
Austria   13 0.4  11 0.4  4 30.8 65.8   
Belgium   32 1.1  34 1.1  12 37.5 94.6   
Bulgaria        1 0.0          
Croatia   1 0.0  3 0.1  1 100.0 100.0   
Cyprus   2 0.1  4 0.1          
Czech Republic        10 0.3          
Denmark   40 1.3  58 2.0  16 40.0 98.4   
Estonia   1 0.0    0.0          
Finland   85 2.9  79 2.7  23 27.1 81.1   
France   161 5.4  164 5.5  73 45.3 91.0   
Germany   104 3.5  178 6.0  34 32.7 87.1   
Greece   14 0.5  16 0.5  3 21.4 62.1   
Hungary   1 0.0  4 0.1  1 100.0 100.0   
Iceland   7 0.2  2 0.1  4 57.1 87.9   
Italy   104 3.5  109 3.7  36 34.6 86.5   
Latvia   1 0.0  6 0.2          
Lithuania   4 0.1  6 0.2  2 50.0 45.1   
Luxembourg   8 0.3  5 0.2  1 12.5 0.1   
Netherlands   64 2.2  95 3.2  33 51.6 91.4   
Norway   119 4.0  119 4.0  30 25.2 93.1   
Poland   51 1.7  53 1.8  16 31.4 45.5   
Portugal   13 0.4  19 0.6  4 30.8 96.9   
Republic of Ireland   63 2.1  50 1.7  13 20.6 39.7   
Romania   1 0.0  4 0.1          
Slovak Republic   1 0.0  3 0.1          
Slovenia   4 0.1  3 0.1  1 25.0 6.6   
Spain   66 2.2  91 3.1  29 43.9 94.2   
Sweden   240 8.1  194 6.5  57 23.8 78.5   
Switzerland   28 0.9  44 1.5  11 39.3 94.7   
UK and Ireland (UK)   1804 60.8  1654 55.7  546 30.3 60.4   
Continental Europe (CE)   1165 39.2  1315 44.3  391 33.6 76.2   
Total   2969    2969    937 31.6 74.8   
This table depicts absolute and relative numbers of bidders and targets by country. It shows the share of acquisitions 
in which a bidder advisor is involved in terms of number and value by country. 
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Table 2.2 presents sample summary statistics (medians and means) for the full sample, 
UK bidders and CE bidders. I use t-tests to compare differences in means between UK and CE 
bidders for advisor, corporate governance, country, regulation, deal and bidder characteristics, 
which are all defined in Table 2.10. The variable advisor indicates whether a bidder uses the 
services of an advisor during an acquisition. The dummy takes the value of 1 if SDC Platinum 
reports the involvement of at least one advisor. One might be concerned that the involvement of 
advisors could be wrongly reported and missed by the database provider. Discussions with 
representatives of Thomson Reuters make me, however, confident that it is in the interest of not 
only Thomson Reuters but also the advisor to report correctly. Advisors want to make sure that 
they get credit for the acquisitions they advise and that the league tables are constructed in a way 
that correctly reflects their involvement. League tables are advisor rankings based on market 
shares. Additionally, Derrien and Dessaint (2017) report that advisors follow the construction of 
league tables closely and on a regular basis. It seems that bidders from CE are more likely to use 
advisors (34%) than bidders from the UK (30%). The difference is significant at the 10% level. 
Corporate governance characteristics appear to vary between CE and UK bidders, as 
differences in means for all of these variables are significant at the 1% level and support the 
conjecture that the UK market is better developed than the CE market. Shareholders and minority 
shareholders seem to be better protected in the UK than in CE. The mean protection indices equal 
7.02 and 6.08 for the UK and only 3.81 and 4.30 for CE, respectively. Additionally, creditors with 
a mean index value of 3.13 appear to be better protected in the UK than in CE, with an index value 
of 2.88. The quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence, seem to be higher in the UK than in CE, as the mean rule of 
law index equals 1.68 and 1.53, respectively. In terms of country characteristics, it appears that 
the UK has better control of corruption than CE. The financial development variable explicitly 
proxies for the development of financial markets and financial institutions in a country 
(Svirydzenka, 2016). The UK market seems to be significantly better developed than the CE 
market. The competition variable indicates that, in the UK, the competition for targets is greater 
than in CE. The difference in means is significant at the 1% level. It appears that the mean GDP 
growth in the UK is 2.21% and that of CE is only 1.84%. The mean GNI per capita in the full 
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sample equals US$ 10.57 thousand, and there seem to be no significant differences between both 
regimes. In terms of regulation, 59% (53%) of all acquisitions are executed in CE (the UK) after 
the effective date of the ETD. 
The corporate finance literature usually evaluates the value creation of acquisitions from 
a shareholder perspective by measuring abnormal returns during the acquisition announcement 
(Martynova and Renneboog, 2011b). I rely on the standard event study framework and use the 
market model to calculate CARs using an event window of 3 days (Brown and Warner, 1985; 
MacKinlay, 1997). In line with Alexandridis et al. (2010), I apply the corresponding country 
value-weighted market index return from Datastream. If this market index is not available, I use 
the S&P 350 Europe instead. Positive 3-day CARs with a mean of 1.50% suggest that European 
acquisitions create bidder value on average. These CARs are significantly different from zero at 
the 1% level. This is supported by existing literature (see, e.g., Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; 
Martynova and Renneboog, 2011b; Humphery-Jenner, 2012; Drobetz and Momtaz, 2016). It 
seems that, since the dot.com bubble, returns to European bidder shareholders increased because 
studies that focus on the period prior to 2001 report generally lower but still positive CARs (see, 
e.g., Campa and Hernando, 2004; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 
2011b). With a mean 3-day CAR of 1.76%, CE bidders seem to create more shareholder value 
than UK bidders, with a mean CAR of 1.33%. However, the difference is not significant. Eighty-
two percent of UK bidders execute domestic rather than cross-border acquisitions. CE bidders 
acquire a target within their country in only 55% of all cases. This difference is significant at the 
1% level. In the UK, 98% of all acquisitions are of a friendly nature and are successful, whereas 
in CE, 95% of all acquisitions are of a friendly nature and successful. Means are significantly 
different at the 1% level. UK (CE) bidders pay for 28% (24%) of all acquisitions in cash only, 5% 
(12%) of all acquisitions in stock only and 34% (26%) of all acquisitions in stock and other means 
of payment. Differences in means are significant at least at the 5% level. Twelve percent of all 
acquisition targets in the sample are public, and CE bidders acquire more public targets and 
execute more tender offers than UK bidders. The average acquisition value equals US$ 243.92 
million, where CE bidders acquire larger firms (US$ 492.01 million) than UK bidders (US$ 83.71 
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million). The difference is significant at the 1% level. There are no significant differences 
regarding both focused vs. diversifying acquisitions and relative acquisition value. 
With a mean size of US$ 4819.97 million, the average CE bidder is significantly larger 
than the average UK bidder, with a mean size of US$ 551.93 million. Compared to CE bidders, 
UK bidders seem to have a significantly lower sigma, which tends to be used as a proxy for 
information asymmetry (Dierkens, 1991). With a book-to-market ratio of 3.00, CE bidders seem 
to be lower valued than UK bidders, with a book-to-market ratio of 0.88. The difference in means 
is significant at the 1% level. It appears that CE bidders are higher-levered than UK bidders. In 
the full sample, the mean leverage equals 19.89%, and the average leverage of UK bidders and 
CE bidders equals 18.37% and 22.23%, respectively. The difference in means is significant at the 
1% level. In order to control for managerial empire building behavior (see, e.g., Jensen, 1986), I 
include the variable free cash-flow-to-assets. However, the difference in means between UK and 
CE bidders is not significant, which is similar for the runup variable.  
The results in Table 2.2 indicate that the characteristics of UK bidders are different than 
those of CE bidders, and thus, the univariate results should be noted with care. Evidence suggests 
that size, complexity and other deal and bidder characteristics influence shareholder value creation 
(Fuller et al., 2002; Moeller et al., 2004; Masulis et al., 2007); therefore, it is important to control 
for these characteristics in multivariate regressions. 
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics 
    Full sample (1)   UK (2)   CE (3)   t-test (2)-(3) 
Variable Unit          median         mean          N                     median         mean          N                     median         mean          N            t-value 
Advisor characteristics                             
Advisor dummy 0.00 0.32 2969           0.00 0.30 1804           0.00 0.34 1165           1.88* 
Corporate governance characteristics 
  
                          
Shareholder rights ratio 6.96 5.76 2969           6.96 7.02 1804           3.72 3.81 1165           -87.80*** 
Minority shareholder rights ratio 5.98 5.38 2969           5.98 6.08 1804           4.15 4.30 1165           -59.31*** 
Creditor rights ratio 3.08 3.03 2969           3.08 3.13 1804           1.90 2.88 1165           -4.68*** 
Rule of law ratio 1.67 1.62 2969           1.66 1.68 1804           1.76 1.53 1165           -10.21*** 
Country characteristics                             
Anti-corruption ratio 0.76 0.75 2969           0.76 0.77 1804           0.81 0.72 1165           -7.97*** 
Financial development ratio 0.89 0.85 2969           0.91 0.91 1804           0.76 0.75 1165           -52.63*** 
Competition US$ million(ln) 5.00 5.06 2969           5.78 5.53 1804           4.22 4.33 1165           -14.82*** 
GDP growth % 2.59 2.07 2969           2.59 2.21 1804           2.16 1.84 1165           -4.88*** 
GNI per capita US$ thousand 10.63 10.57 2969           10.63 10.56 1804           10.67 10.57 1165           0.62 
Regulation characteristics                             
ETD dummy 1.00 0.56 2969           1.00 0.53 1804           1.00 0.59 1165           3.42*** 
Deal characteristics                             
CAR country [-1;+1] % 0.75 1.50 2969           0.64 1.33 1804           0.98 1.76 1165           1.61 
Domestic dummy 1.00 0.72 2969           1.00 0.82 1804           1.00 0.55 1165           -15.51*** 
Friendly acquisition dummy 1.00 0.97 2969           1.00 0.98 1804           1.00 0.95 1165           -3.16*** 
Completed acquisition dummy 1.00 0.97 2969           1.00 0.98 1804           1.00 0.95 1165           -4.43*** 
Cash only acquisition dummy 0.00 0.27 2969           0.00 0.28 1804           0.00 0.24 1165           -2.58** 
Stock only acquisition dummy 0.00 0.08 2969           0.00 0.05 1804           0.00 0.12 1165           6.43*** 
Partial stock acquisition dummy 0.00 0.31 2969           0.00 0.34 1804           0.00 0.26 1165           -4.99*** 
Public status dummy 0.00 0.12 2969           0.00 0.09 1804           0.00 0.16 1165           5.14*** 
                              
Tender offer dummy 0.00 0.08 2969           0.00 0.07 1804           0.00 0.10 1165           2.56** 
Focused acquisition dummy 1.00 0.59 2969           1.00 0.58 1804           1.00 0.60 1165           0.99 
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Table 2.2 (continued): Summary statistics            
Acquisition value US$ million 13.48 243.92 2969           11.97 83.71 1804           16.86 492.01 1165           2.93*** 
Relative acquisition value ratio 0.09 0.37 2969           0.08 0.38 1804           0.09 0.34 1165           -0.49 
Bidder characteristics                             
Size US$ million 201.15 2226.66 2969           113.78 551.93 1804           489.10 4819.97 1165           6.00*** 
Runup % 0.94 4.89 2969           1.60 5.70 1804           0.27 3.64 1165           -1.22 
Sigma % 2.09 2.52 2969           2.04 2.40 1804           2.18 2.71 1165           4.45*** 
Book-to-market ratio 0.42 1.71 2969           0.34 0.88 1804           0.70 3.00 1165           5.54*** 
Leverage % 17.70 19.89 2969           16.46 18.37 1804           20.07 22.23 1165           5.49*** 
Free cash-flow-to-assets % 2.49 -5.66 2969           2.64 -8.30 1804           2.27 -1.58 1165           0.94 
This table presents sample summary statistics and the results of the t-tests I run to compare advisor, corporate governance, country, regulation, deal and bidder 
characteristics between UK and CE bidders. All variables are defined in Table 2.10.*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
2.4 Results 
29 
2.4 Results 
 
2.4.1 Bidder value creation in the UK and CE 
Based on the discussion in Chapter 2.2, I expect that bidder value creation differs between 
the UK and CE. In Table 2.3, I regress 3-day bidder CARs on the UK bidder variable (a dummy 
that equals 1 if the bidder is incorporated in the UK and 0 otherwise) and further corporate 
governance, country, regulation, deal and bidder characteristics, from which I expect that they 
influence bidder value creation. Because I am interested in the value creation of the bidder, 
corporate governance and country characteristics are included for the country in which the bidder 
is incorporated. An exception is the competition variable, which reflects the competition for 
targets in the country in which the target is incorporated. I include year and industry fixed effects 
(FE) in all specifications and cluster standard errors at the bidder level.  
In Specification 1, the coefficient on UK bidder is negative and significant at the 5% level 
and supports the conjecture that UK bidders realize 0.67 percentage points lower CARs than CE 
bidders. The coefficient on the ETD variable is significant and negative, which indicates that, 
after the implementation of the ETD, bidders create less shareholder value than before the 
implementation.5 In line with Humphery-Jenner (2012) and Drobetz and Momtaz (2016), the 
results indicate that the ETD comes at the cost of bidder shareholders. As reported by Conn et al. 
(2005) and Moeller et al. (2005), domestic acquisitions seem to be associated with higher CARs, 
which might contribute to the difficulties in realizing expected synergies in cross-border 
acquisition. The market might discount the CARs at the announcement due to cultural differences 
(Martynova and Renneboog, 2011b). The coefficient on the interaction term between public and 
partial stock is negative and significant and indicates that bidders that acquire public targets using 
stock as payment method realize lower CARs than bidders that acquire subsidiary targets in a 
partially stock financed acquisition (reference category). This effect is in line with previous 
                                                 
5 The results regarding the ETD in this and subsequent analyses are robust to the choice of a different reference 
category and the exclusion of two years in the year fixed effects. 
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findings (Golubov et al., 2015). In contrast, private acquisitions that are partially stock financed 
seem to be positively related to bidder value creation. In line with Rosen (2006), it seems that 
runup is negatively related to bidder CARs. Sigma appears to have a positive effect on bidder 
value creation, which is in line with the findings of Golubov et al. (2015).  
In Specifications 2 to 4, I present stepwise regressions in which I include corporate 
governance indices for shareholder rights, minority shareholder rights and creditor rights 
separately. None of these variables are significant, but the variables, shareholder rights and 
minority shareholder rights turn the main variable of interest – UK bidder – insignificant. This 
suggests that the difference in CARs between UK and CE bidders from Specification 1 is due to 
the varying levels of shareholder protection in both regimes. Once the different levels of 
shareholder protection are incorporated into the analysis, the difference in CARs seems to 
disappear. In Specification 5, I include all corporate governance characteristics at the same time 
and include further country variables that might explain differences in bidder value creation 
between the UK and CE (see, e.g., Martynova and Renneboog, 2008; Humphery-Jenner, 2012). 
The positive and significant coefficient on the anti-corruption variable shows that bidders that are 
incorporated in countries with better protection against corruption tend to realize more 
shareholder value. Financial development and competition seem to be unrelated to bidder value 
creation, and the main result remains similar.  
2.4 Results 
31 
Table 2.3: Bidder location and CARs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable Bidder CAR [-1;+1] 
UK bidder -0.6669** -0.5654 -0.3688 -0.6612** -0.1856 
  (0.3091) (0.5000) (0.4079) (0.3090) (0.5610) 
UK target 0.1360 0.1389 0.1549 0.1403 0.2291 
  (0.3255) (0.3262) (0.3261) (0.3260) (0.3505) 
Shareholder rights   -0.0330     0.0158 
    (0.1334)     (0.1483) 
Minority shareholder rights     -0.1779   -0.2766 
      (0.1574)   (0.1800) 
Creditor rights       -0.0481 -0.1181 
        (0.1026) (0.1201) 
Anti-corruption         4.1873*** 
          (1.1809) 
Financial development         -1.0583 
          (1.9786) 
Competition         -0.0394 
          (0.0645) 
GDP growth 0.0596 0.0576 0.0608 0.0626 -0.0542 
  (0.0947) (0.0948) (0.0946) (0.0956) (0.1066) 
GNI per capita 0.5077 0.5464 0.6748 0.5987 -0.4856 
  (0.3932) (0.4234) (0.4169) (0.4324) (0.6763) 
ETD -1.7554** -1.7544** -1.7762** -1.7514** -1.7697** 
  (0.7003) (0.7010) (0.7015) (0.7013) (0.7067) 
Domestic 0.7836*** 0.7840*** 0.7673*** 0.7788*** 0.7745*** 
  (0.2634) (0.2634) (0.2638) (0.2629) (0.2623) 
Public x Cash -0.2060 -0.2045 -0.1749 -0.2063 -0.1598 
  (0.6231) (0.6230) (0.6212) (0.6237) (0.6176) 
Public x Part. stock -3.1259*** -3.1325*** -3.1590*** -3.1349*** -3.1311*** 
  (0.6514) (0.6536) (0.6516) (0.6533) (0.6532) 
Private x Cash 0.1209 0.1200 0.1111 0.1165 0.1036 
  (0.2771) (0.2770) (0.2775) (0.2770) (0.2788) 
Private x Part. stock 1.0298*** 1.0288*** 1.0211*** 1.0245*** 0.9527*** 
  (0.3378) (0.3376) (0.3376) (0.3377) (0.3381) 
Subsidiary x Cash 0.5545 0.5504 0.5689 0.5528 0.4627 
  (0.7955) (0.7962) (0.7965) (0.7962) (0.7908) 
Focused acquisition 0.0435 0.0441 0.0424 0.0428 0.0708 
  (0.2241) (0.2242) (0.2241) (0.2240) (0.2277) 
Tender offer -0.5186 -0.5186 -0.5146 -0.5194 -0.5374 
  (0.5766) (0.5766) (0.5755) (0.5772) (0.5753) 
Friendly acquisition -0.0152 -0.0161 0.0133 -0.0210 -0.1021 
  (0.6272) (0.6274) (0.6294) (0.6265) (0.6324) 
Completed acquisition 1.1639 1.1651 1.1655 1.1560 1.2000* 
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Table 2.3 (continued): Bidder location and CARs 
  (0.7197) (0.7195) (0.7196) (0.7207) (0.7212) 
Relative acquisition value 0.0470 0.0488 0.0516 0.0485 0.0713 
  (0.0947) (0.0951) (0.0948) (0.0946) (0.0966) 
Size -0.0048 -0.0048 -0.0044 -0.0047 -0.0036 
  (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0054) 
Book-to-market 0.0166 0.0160 0.0150 0.0161 0.0084 
  (0.0212) (0.0213) (0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0212) 
Leverage 0.7909 0.7875 0.7683 0.7953 0.8795 
  (0.7339) (0.7341) (0.7309) (0.7336) (0.7350) 
Runup -0.9283** -0.9266** -0.9230** -0.9250** -0.9354** 
  (0.3756) (0.3757) (0.3758) (0.3761) (0.3724) 
Sigma 31.7551** 31.6775** 31.6253** 31.6753** 29.5757** 
  (12.5387) (12.5617) (12.5176) (12.5308) (12.4509) 
Free cash-flow-to-assets 0.0086 0.0085 0.0084 0.0085 0.0094 
  (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0150) 
Constant -6.7100 -6.9629 -7.6273* -7.4704* 2.8053 
  (4.1643) (4.2804) (4.2124) (4.4308) (5.8448) 
Year and industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
N 2969 2969 2969 2969 2969 
R-sq 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
This table presents coefficients from OLS regressions with the dependent variable bidder announcement CAR [-
1;+1]. In addition to dummies for the bidder and target location, Specification (1) includes country, regulation, deal, 
and bidder characteristics. In Specifications (2) to (4), I add corporate governance variables in stepwise regressions. 
Specification (5) includes all variables. All variables are defined in Table 2.10. Standard errors clustered on the bidder 
level are provided in parentheses. I winsorize CARs at the 1% level. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively 
 
 
2.4.2 The role of advisors in UK and CE acquisitions 
Table 2.4 presents the first part of the main results. I include the advisor variable (a dummy 
that equals 1 if at least one bidder advisor is reported and 0 otherwise) in the multivariate 
regressions to evaluate whether the involvement of advisors matters (Specification 1) and whether 
the value of bidder advisors differs between the UK and CE (Specifications 2 to 6). Moreover, I 
construct variables that capture possible combinations between bidders, targets and the different 
regimes. The dummy UK-UK (CE-CE) equals one for acquisitions that involve targets and 
bidders from the UK (CE) and zero otherwise. The UK-CE variable captures the combination of 
a UK target and a CE bidder and the CE-UK variable the combination of a CE target and a UK 
bidder. The reference category in all the regressions is CE-CE. 
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In Specification 1, the coefficient on the advisor variable is positive and significant at the 
10% level, which indicates that advisors help their clients to create more shareholder value than 
acquisitions that are executed in-house. This effect is also economically important, as advisor 
involvement leads to a higher bidder CAR of 0.53 percentage points (given a mean CAR of 
1.50%). This stands in contrast to evidence from the US market, where Servaes and Zenner (1996) 
and Wang and Whyte (2010) find no relation between bidder value creation and the involvement 
of an advisor. Moreover, it seems that acquisitions involving targets and bidders from the UK 
create lower CARs than when both the bidder and the target are from CE. Additionally, the CE-
UK variable appears to be negatively related to bidder CARs. In the following specifications, I 
use interaction terms between the advisor dummy and target-bidder-regime combinations in order 
to better understand the role of advisors and to utilize the differences across European regimes. 
Specification 2 is the base regression. In Specifications 3 to 5, similar to Table 2.3, I include 
corporate governance characteristics one-by-one and all the variables together with additional 
country characteristics in Specification 6. Across all specifications, it seems that advisors are 
particularly important in acquisitions that involve UK targets and UK bidders, as the coefficient 
on the interaction term ‘advisor x UK-UK’ is positive and significant. The economic effect is also 
nontrivial: for a mean-sized bidder, advisors seem to create 1.14 percentage points higher CARs 
in UK-UK acquisitions than in CE-CE acquisitions, which translates into a higher bidder CAR of 
US$ 25.38 million. Moreover, the results suggest that advisors do not matter when one party is 
based in CE or when both the target and bidder are based in CE. According to the negative and 
significant signs of the UK-UK and CE-UK variables in Specification 2, acquisitions involving 
bidders from the UK realize lower CARs than acquisitions that involve bidders from CE, when 
both do not use advisors. As expected, once I control for differences in corporate governance in 
Specifications 3 to 6, the differences in CARs between the different regimes disappear when no 
advisor is involved. However, the interaction term ‘advisor x UK-UK’ remains significant.   
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Table 2.4: Advisor involvement and bidder CARs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable Bidder CAR [-1;+1] 
Advisor 0.5349* -0.0707 -0.0657 -0.0374 -0.0678 0.0582 
  (0.2810) (0.4143) (0.4156) (0.4156) (0.4154) (0.4208) 
Advisor x UK-UK   1.1417** 1.1389** 1.1132** 1.1405** 1.0178* 
    (0.5336) (0.5340) (0.5344) (0.5341) (0.5393) 
UK-UK -0.5067* -0.8636** -0.7482 -0.5323 -0.8528** -0.2492 
  (0.2896) (0.3351) (0.5341) (0.4384) (0.3364) (0.5993) 
Advisor x UK-CE   -0.1801 -0.1817 -0.2610 -0.1850 -0.2378 
    (0.9890) (0.9896) (0.9898) (0.9900) (0.9889) 
UK-CE -0.1639 -0.0849 -0.0738 -0.0235 -0.0774 0.1137 
  (0.5378) (0.7354) (0.7398) (0.7396) (0.7378) (0.7577) 
Advisor x CE-UK   0.1715 0.1686 0.1379 0.1669 0.0779 
    (0.8233) (0.8241) (0.8245) (0.8242) (0.8258) 
CE-UK -0.8297* -0.9244* -0.8068 -0.6018 -0.9163* -0.3525 
  (0.4310) (0.5223) (0.6910) (0.5974) (0.5243) (0.7381) 
Shareholder rights     -0.0364     0.0095 
      (0.1347)     (0.1492) 
Minority shareholder rights       -0.1817   -0.2824 
        (0.1580)   (0.1803) 
Creditor rights         -0.0510 -0.1162 
          (0.1027) (0.1203) 
Anti-corruption           4.1608*** 
            (1.1879) 
Financial development           -0.9203 
            (1.9999) 
Competition           -0.0411 
            (0.0649) 
GDP growth 0.0631 0.0553 0.0531 0.0569 0.0584 -0.0555 
  (0.0951) (0.0951) (0.0951) (0.0950) (0.0960) (0.1068) 
GNI per capita 0.5482 0.5175 0.5607 0.6905* 0.6143 -0.4630 
  (0.3968) (0.3945) (0.4261) (0.4182) (0.4358) (0.6786) 
ETD -1.7434** -1.7919** -1.7906** -1.8116*** -1.7876** -1.7988** 
  (0.7011) (0.6990) (0.6998) (0.7002) (0.7001) (0.7053) 
Domestic 0.6916** 0.6733** 0.6768** 0.6624** 0.6688** 0.6997** 
  (0.3330) (0.3325) (0.3334) (0.3322) (0.3314) (0.3328) 
Public x Cash -0.3901 -0.3285 -0.3284 -0.3008 -0.3295 -0.3068 
  (0.6318) (0.6293) (0.6293) (0.6272) (0.6298) (0.6243) 
Public x Part. stock -3.3490*** -3.4254*** -3.4338*** -3.4645*** -3.4358*** -3.4458*** 
  (0.6579) (0.6576) (0.6603) (0.6575) (0.6599) (0.6609) 
Private x Cash 0.1387 0.1579 0.1568 0.1479 0.1533 0.1376 
  (0.2781) (0.2780) (0.2779) (0.2785) (0.2779) (0.2797) 
Private x Part. stock 1.0133*** 1.0254*** 1.0241*** 1.0163*** 1.0197*** 0.9470*** 
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Table 2.4 (continued): Advisor involvement and bidder CARs 
  (0.3374) (0.3368) (0.3365) (0.3366) (0.3367) (0.3371) 
Subsidiary x Cash 0.5681 0.5994 0.5942 0.6105 0.5974 0.4987 
  (0.7990) (0.8006) (0.8015) (0.8014) (0.8014) (0.7964) 
Focused acquisition 0.0347 0.0511 0.0515 0.0494 0.0503 0.0756 
  (0.2247) (0.2245) (0.2246) (0.2245) (0.2244) (0.2275) 
Tender offer -0.6594 -0.6542 -0.6554 -0.6533 -0.6556 -0.6899 
  (0.5863) (0.5842) (0.5842) (0.5830) (0.5849) (0.5826) 
Friendly acquisition 0.0680 0.0075 0.0070 0.0390 0.0016 -0.0653 
  (0.6308) (0.6281) (0.6284) (0.6307) (0.6274) (0.6324) 
Completed acquisition 1.1307 1.1602 1.1615 1.1588 1.1517 1.1899 
  (0.7247) (0.7270) (0.7268) (0.7275) (0.7281) (0.7304) 
Relative acquisition value 0.0416 0.0502 0.0521 0.0546 0.0517 0.0734 
  (0.0940) (0.0938) (0.0940) (0.0938) (0.0937) (0.0952) 
Size -0.0061 -0.0039 -0.0039 -0.0035 -0.0037 -0.0030 
  (0.0053) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0053) 
Book-to-market 0.0177 0.0157 0.0151 0.0142 0.0152 0.0077 
  (0.0211) (0.0212) (0.0213) (0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0211) 
Leverage 0.7114 0.7184 0.7144 0.6943 0.7230 0.8005 
  (0.7383) (0.7383) (0.7385) (0.7351) (0.7380) (0.7385) 
Runup -0.9288** -0.9128** -0.9109** -0.9079** -0.9093** -0.9209** 
  (0.3767) (0.3754) (0.3755) (0.3757) (0.3759) (0.3727) 
Sigma 32.6118** 31.8814** 31.8002** 31.7756** 31.7992** 29.8324** 
  (12.6561) (12.5600) (12.5780) (12.5405) (12.5506) (12.4677) 
Free cash-flow-to-assets 0.0078 0.0061 0.0060 0.0059 0.0060 0.0070 
  (0.0148) (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0152) 
Constant -7.2837* -6.7271 -7.0152 -7.7025* -7.5374* 2.5510 
  (4.2202) (4.1925) (4.3241) (4.2418) (4.4898) (5.8733) 
Year and industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 2969 2969 2969 2969 2969 2969 
R-sq 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
This table presents coefficients from OLS regressions with the dependent variable bidder announcement CAR [-
1;+1]. The main independent variable is a dummy that captures whether a bidder uses an advisor in an acquisition 
(Specification (1)). Specifications (2) to (6) include interaction terms between the advisor dummy and target-bidder-
regime variables. In Specifications (2) to (5), I include corporate governance variables in stepwise regressions, and 
Specification (6) includes all variables. All variables are defined in Table 2.10. Standard errors clustered on the bidder 
level are provided in parentheses. I winsorize CARs at the 1% level. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
2.4.3 Endogeneity in advisor-bidder matching 
It may be that the matching between advisors and bidders is non-random and, thus, OLS 
estimations will be inconsistent and biased. Authors of similar studies that examine the effects of 
Chapter 2 Do investment banks create value for their clients? Empirical evidence from European acquisitions 
36 
advisors on bidder value creation suggest using a Heckman two-stage regression approach to 
address this problem (Fang, 2005; Golubov et al., 2012). This method is based on the seminal 
paper by Heckman (1979). However, the implementation of a two-stage regression in my setup is 
complicated because I use three different interaction terms. This would require at least three valid 
exclusion criteria, which are very hard to identify. Alternatively, one can use a PSM (Li and 
Prabhala, 2007), which is the approach I follow. Although PSM is a very popular approach to 
address endogeneity, its drawback is that the matching can be done only on observable 
characteristics.  
In Table 2.5, I evaluate the probability of hiring an advisor (Specifications 1 to 4) and 
present the results for the matched sample (Specification 5). I use a logit regression to regress the 
advisor variable on corporate governance, country, regulation, deal and bidder characteristics and 
show marginal effects for better interpretation. In Specification 1, I use only characteristics as 
controls, which are likely to be determined not by the advisor but rather by the bidder before the 
acquisition. In Specification 2, I add the domestic variable, and in Specification 3, I use the whole 
set of controls. The results enforce the notion of the descriptive statistics, as the UK-UK and CE-
UK variables are negative and significant. It seems that UK bidders are less likely to hire advisors 
than CE bidders, irrespective of the location of the target. If a UK bidder acquires a UK target, 
the bidder is 14.62% less likely to use an advisor than a CE bidder that acquires a CE target. If 
the UK bidder acquires a target in CE, it is even less likely (19.82%) to use an advisor. A potential 
explanation for this surprising finding could be that CE bidders are less experienced since they 
operate in a market that is less developed and, thus, rely more on the expertise of specialized 
agents. Therefore, in Specification 4, I include the experience variable, which reflects the 
acquisition experience the bidder has accumulated over the five years prior to the acquisition 
announcement. The negative and significant coefficient on the experience variable indicates that 
bidders with more acquisition experience are less likely to hire an advisor for the acquisition. 
However, it does not explain the differences between UK and CE bidders, as the coefficients on 
the UK-UK and CE-UK variables remain negative and significant. Other results indicate that 
bidders are more likely to hire advisors for acquisitions that appear to be more complex if one 
interprets certain factors as proxies for complexity, such as high minority shareholder protection 
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in the bidder country, large bidder size, high bidder leverage, public target status, stock payment, 
tender offer and a hostile attitude. Due to cultural differences and a time-consuming process, 
cross-border/domestic, which is also used as proxy for acquisition complexity, (see, e.g., Conn et 
al., 2005), is surprisingly not significant. 
I use a probit regression to estimate the probability that an advisor is hired by the bidder 
using bidder characteristics identified as important based on the results in Specification 4; this 
process allows me to calculate the propensity score needed for the matching procedure. I use size, 
leverage, sigma, experience, industry and the year of the acquisition announcement to calculate 
the propensity score and match acquisitions that involve no bidder advisor to acquisitions that 
involve bidder advisors based on this score (without replacement). This reduces the sample size 
to 1872 acquisitions. The variables I use for matching are excluded from the final regression. The 
results are depicted in Specification 5 of Table 2.5. The ‘advisor x UK-UK’ variable remains 
significant and positive, which indicates that the results shown in Table 2.4 are reliable.6  
                                                 
6 When I use all bidder characteristics during the matching procedure, the main result is similar. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) 
Dependent variable Advisor   Bidder CAR [-1;+1] 
Advisor          0.0959 
           (0.4484) 
Advisor x UK-UK          1.3713** 
           (0.5917) 
UK-UK -0.1462*** -0.1476*** -0.1499*** -0.1538***  -0.9366 
  (0.0490) (0.0496) (0.0457) (0.0457)  (0.7352) 
Advisor x UK-CE          -0.4577 
           (1.1045) 
UK-CE 0.0082 0.0113 -0.0518 -0.0479  0.5977 
  (0.0472) (0.0491) (0.0429) (0.0426)  (0.9014) 
Advisor x CE-UK          0.2590 
           (0.9037) 
CE-UK -0.1982*** -0.1947*** -0.1466*** -0.1473***  -0.7269 
  (0.0567) (0.0592) (0.0533) (0.0532)  (0.8551) 
Shareholder rights 0.0250* 0.0248* 0.0232* 0.0242*  0.1424 
  (0.0142) (0.0143) (0.0132) (0.0131)  (0.1710) 
Minority shareholder rights 0.0280* 0.0283* 0.0253* 0.0254*  -0.3794* 
  (0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0151) (0.0153)  (0.2225) 
Creditor rights 0.0031 0.0031 0.0006 0.0013  -0.1470 
  (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0102) (0.0101)  (0.1413) 
Anti-corruption -0.1002 -0.1001 -0.1228 -0.1180   2.3443* 
  (0.1070) (0.1070) (0.0970) (0.0960)   (1.2855) 
Financial development 0.2887* 0.2860* 0.1144 0.1220   -1.4592 
  (0.1705) (0.1699) (0.1469) (0.1468)   (2.0501) 
Competition     0.0286*** 0.0289***   -0.0765 
      (0.0047) (0.0047)   (0.0763) 
GDP growth -0.0044 -0.0044 -0.0030 -0.0025  0.0548 
  (0.0078) (0.0077) (0.0070) (0.0069)  (0.0796) 
GNI per capita -0.1491*** -0.1481*** -0.1168** -0.1176**  0.6291 
  (0.0570) (0.0570) (0.0532) (0.0525)  (0.6351) 
ETD 0.0051 0.0053 -0.0125 -0.0149  -0.3064 
  (0.0517) (0.0517) (0.0482) (0.0480)  (0.3436) 
Domestic   0.0052 -0.0429* -0.0441*  1.1582*** 
    (0.0266) (0.0239) (0.0239)  (0.3584) 
Public x Cash     0.2502*** 0.2511***  -0.6695 
      (0.0494) (0.0497)  (0.5998) 
Public x Part. stock     0.3260*** 0.3271***  -3.2015*** 
      (0.0418) (0.0418)  (0.6698) 
Private x Cash     -0.0168 -0.0156  0.2521 
      (0.0199) (0.0199)  (0.3610) 
Private x Part. stock     0.0313 0.0297  0.7279* 
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      (0.0217) (0.0216)  (0.4072) 
Subsidiary x Cash     0.0247 0.0206  0.3681 
      (0.0614) (0.0610)  (1.0950) 
Focused acquisition     0.0122 0.0121  -0.1380 
      (0.0173) (0.0173)  (0.2739) 
Tender offer     0.2754*** 0.2745***  -0.9958* 
      (0.0433) (0.0437)  (0.5391) 
Friendly acquisition     -0.1303** -0.1365**  -0.2319 
      (0.0532) (0.0534)  (0.7108) 
Completed acquisition     0.0780 0.0784  1.3069* 
      (0.0546) (0.0547)  (0.7398) 
Relative acquisition value                      0.0040            0.0028 0.2588 
      (0.0044) (0.0043)  (0.1977) 
Log(size) 0.0163*** 0.0163*** 0.0052** 0.0054**    
  (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0023) (0.0024)    
Book-to-market 0.0006* 0.0006* -0.0000 0.0002  -0.0124 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0011)  (0.0389) 
Leverage 0.1233** 0.1235** 0.1182** 0.1215**    
  (0.0580) (0.0580) (0.0582) (0.0617)    
Runup 0.0022 0.0022 -0.0008 -0.0023  -1.0556*** 
  (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0169) (0.0172)  (0.3939) 
Sigma -1.8110** -1.8212** -1.4835* -1.7069**    
  (0.8419) (0.8495) (0.7578) (0.7856)    
Free cash-flow-to-assets 0.0031 0.0031 0.0018 0.0017  0.4729 
  (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0021)  (0.9312) 
Experience       -0.0731***    
        (0.0225)    
Constant          -5.1386 
           (5.6374) 
Year and industry FE YES YES YES YES  NO 
N 2969 2969 2969 2966  1872 
Pseudo R-sq / R-sq 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.19  0.07 
In Specifications (1) to (4), this table presents marginal effects from logit regressions. The dependent variable is a 
dummy that equals 1 for acquisitions in which a bidder hires an advisor and 0 otherwise. Specification (5) depicts the 
results of an OLS regression using a propensity score matched sample, where the dependent variable is bidder 
announcement CAR [-1;+1]. All variables are defined in Table 2.10. Standard errors clustered on the bidder level are 
provided in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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2.4.4 Robustness 
In order to strengthen the previously shown results, I provide several robustness checks in 
this chapter and show the results in Table 2.6. First, I test the robustness to different methods to 
calculate CARs. In Specification 1, I use CARs, which are calculated using the MSCI Europe 
index instead of country indices, and in Specification 2, I use a binary classification for bidder 
value creation. I define a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bidder CAR is positive and equals 
0 otherwise. In both specifications, the ‘advisor x UK-UK’ interaction term is positive and 
significant. In Specification 3, I cluster standard errors based on 4-digit SIC codes instead of using 
bidder-level clustering. In Specification 4, I include acquisitions that involve financial firms, 
which might be particularly important in the UK. This increases the sample size to 3149 
observations. The results in Specifications 3 and 4 remain similar. 
In Chapter 2.2, I argue that both regimes – UK and CE – are different regarding corporate 
governance and regulatory characteristics, which might influence bidder value creation and the 
value that advisors offer in acquisitions. Thus, the use of the appropriate variables that proxy for 
corporate governance is crucial. In Specifications 5 to 7, I use alternative corporate governance 
and country variables, which are similar to those used by Humphery-Jenner (2012). In 
Specification 5, I use a governance index from the World Bank. I calculate this equally weighted 
index based on six different governance measures retrieved from the World Bank – namely, 
governance effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, political stability, corruption and voice 
and accountability. The index is positive but not significant. The interaction term ‘advisor UK-
UK’ remains positive and significant. In Specification 6, in addition to the World Bank 
governance index, I use alternative country variables, which I also retrieve from the World Bank. 
In particular, I use market capitalization to GDP, market turnover, unemployment rate, FDI to 
GDP and trade imbalance. In Specification 7, I use the Anti-Director Rights Index (ADRI) 
compiled by Spamann (2010) instead of the corporate governance indices from Martynova and 
Renneboog (2011a). Still, the results are similar to the main regression. Since the World Bank 
governance and country indices and the Spamann index are not available for all of my sample 
countries, the sample size decreases to 2637, 1886 and 1828 observations in Specifications 5 to 
7, respectively.  
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The previously used target-bidder-regime variable combinations can be decomposed 
further, which might provide more insights on the role that advisors play in acquisitions. The 
literature reports that the distinction between domestic and cross-border acquisition might be 
important regarding bidder value creation and acquisition motives (Martynova and Renneboog, 
2008; Kuipers et al., 2009). So far, my classifications capture only acquisitions within and across 
regimes, but it might be that acquisitions within one regime are also cross-border acquisitions. To 
account for that, I create the following variables and include them and their interactions with the 
advisor variable in Specification 8: domestic acquisitions with a UK target and a UK bidder (DO-
UK-UK), cross-border acquisitions with a UK target and a UK bidder (CB-UK-UK)7, cross-
border acquisitions with a UK target and a CE bidder (UK-CE), cross-border acquisitions with a 
CE target and a UK bidder (CE-UK), and cross-border acquisitions with a CE target and a CE 
bidder (CB-CE-CE). Domestic acquisitions with a CE target and a CE bidder (DO-CE-CE) 
represent the reference category. The only significant interaction term is ‘advisor x DO-UK-UK’, 
which is positive. This might suggest that advisors are indeed helpful in acquisitions that involve 
UK targets and UK bidders and that the cross-border vs. domestic factor does not matter regarding 
the additional value that advisors provide.  
In addition, there is substantial heterogeneity across CE countries. In all previous analyses, 
corporate governance and country characteristics vary on a country level, but I subsumed these 
countries into one category (CE). To account for the above-mentioned heterogeneity, I include 
dummy variables that reflect the legal origin of the respective bidder and target countries in the 
regression specification. CE countries can be categorized into the French, German and 
Scandinavian legal origins, whereas the new succession countries make up another group and are 
the reference category in the regression (see, e.g., La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Drobetz and 
Momtaz, 2016).8 The results are shown in Specification 9 and remain similar. 
                                                 
7 UK includes Great Britain and Ireland. 
8 French legal origin countries: Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain; German 
legal origin countries: Austria, Germany, Switzerland; Scandinavian legal origin countries: Denmark, Finland, 
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Overall, the results in Table 2.6 suggest that the main findings are robust to different 
sample adjustments and alternative variables.  
                                                 
Iceland, Norway, Sweden; new succession countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia. 
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Table 2.6: Robustness tests 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  CAR alt. 
 
Cluster alt. Sample alt. Country / CG alt. Regions alt. 
Advisor -0.0738 0.0029 0.0582 -0.0291 0.0774 -0.0874 0.1553 -0.0584 0.0984 
  (0.4168) (0.0340) (0.3724) (0.4110) (0.4304) (0.4582) (0.4822) (0.5425) (0.4261) 
Advisor x UK-UK 1.1207** 0.0739* 1.0178** 0.9224* 1.1688** 1.6666*** 1.4944**   0.9814* 
  (0.5363) (0.0424) (0.4935) (0.5281) (0.5547) (0.6444) (0.6609)   (0.5441) 
UK-UK -0.2597 -0.1352** -0.2492 -0.2422 -0.2222 0.1741 -1.0168*   0.1925 
  (0.6012) (0.0548) (0.4960) (0.5853) (0.6393) (1.0076) (0.5357)   (1.7876) 
Advisor x DO-UK-UK               1.1777*   
                (0.6411)   
DO-UK-UK               -0.5146   
                (0.6420)   
Advisor x CB-UK-UK               0.3323   
                (1.7144)   
CB-UK-UK               -0.1258   
                (1.0509)   
Advisor x UK-CE -0.0937 -0.0769 -0.2378 -0.0971 0.2013 -0.1360 -0.5287 -0.1368 -0.3106 
  (1.0054) (0.0943) (1.0102) (0.9789) (0.9930) (1.0301) (1.0514) (1.0356) (0.9912) 
UK-CE 0.1033 0.0779 0.1137 -0.0048 -0.2892 -0.0363 0.0706 -0.7222 0.5036 
  (0.7787) (0.0598) (0.6778) (0.7479) (0.7576) (0.8472) (0.8639) (0.7589) (0.9972) 
Advisor x CE-UK 0.2353 0.0684 0.0779 0.3358 0.1021 -0.0274 -0.2580 0.1804 0.0051 
  (0.8338) (0.0695) (0.8546) (0.8152) (0.8718) (0.9588) (0.9717) (0.8938) (0.8324) 
CE-UK -0.3992 -0.1594** -0.3525 -0.4355 -0.5358 -0.1189 -1.4033* -1.2505* -0.2555 
  (0.7374) (0.0666) (0.6610) (0.7273) (0.7936) (1.1041) (0.7673) (0.7379) (1.9148) 
Advisor x CB-CE-CE               0.2925   
                (0.7551)   
CB-CE-CE               -1.0018**   
                (0.4559)   
Bidder French LO                 -0.0042 
                  (1.4727) 
                    
Bidder German LO                 0.2204 
                  (1.6815) 
Bidder Scandinavian LO                 -0.1073 
                  (1.6250) 
Target French LO                 0.1213 
                  (0.7647) 
                    
Target German LO                 0.4438 
                  (0.7554) 
Target Scandinavian LO                 0.7178 
                  (0.7825) 
Shareholder rights 0.0165 0.0375*** 0.0095 0.0032 -0.0347 -0.5421   0.0305 -0.0045 
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  (0.1514) (0.0139) (0.1352) (0.1470) (0.1614) (0.3528)   (0.1518) (0.1549) 
Minority shareholder rights -0.3253* -0.0123 -0.2824 -0.2871 -0.1714 0.1991   -0.2979 -0.3059 
  (0.1819) (0.0186) (0.1724) (0.1807) (0.1906) (0.3081)   (0.1811) (0.2132) 
                    
Creditor rights -0.0958 -0.0231** -0.1162 -0.0758 -0.0556 0.0758   -0.1171 -0.1019 
  (0.1220) (0.0105) (0.1359) (0.1182) (0.1314) (0.2151)   (0.1207) (0.1272) 
Governance index (WB)         2.0857 -14.4117* -2.0276     
          (6.1922) (7.9179) (4.1413)     
ADRI (Spamann)             0.1040     
              (0.2648)     
Anti-corruption 4.0110*** 0.2707** 4.1608*** 4.2512*** 2.7477 6.4034*   4.3649*** 3.7336** 
  (1.1786) (0.1072) (1.2260) (1.1656) (2.5741) (3.5931)   (1.2099) (1.5363) 
Financial development -0.8059 -0.1129 -0.9203 -0.5060 -0.6443     -0.6663 -0.6647 
  (2.0006) (0.1960) (1.8677) (1.9886) (2.3715)     (2.0231) (2.3738) 
Competition -0.0292 0.0022 -0.0411 -0.0669 -0.0482     -0.0353 -0.0389 
  (0.0656) (0.0052) (0.0637) (0.0624) (0.0664)     (0.0647) (0.0654) 
GDP growth -0.0400 0.0093 -0.0555 -0.0617 -0.0215     -0.0699 -0.0592 
  (0.1079) (0.0082) (0.0964) (0.1045) (0.1088)     (0.1082) (0.1074) 
GNI per capita -0.5213 -0.0470 -0.4630 -0.7298 -0.5647     -0.5627 -0.6369 
  (0.6885) (0.0594) (0.6194) (0.6533) (0.7829)     (0.6912) (0.8855) 
Market cap to GDP           0.0038 0.0037     
            (0.0059) (0.0050)     
Market turnover           -0.0049 -0.0086*     
            (0.0047) (0.0050)     
Unemployment rate           -0.0321 -0.0467     
            (0.0847) (0.0900)     
FDI to GDP           3.6635 5.3813     
            (3.6557) (3.7387)     
Trade Imbalance           -3.1574 -2.0244     
            (3.4122) (3.5495)     
ETD -1.9078*** -0.0616 -1.7988*** -1.9589*** -1.8033** -2.0393*** -2.0600*** -1.8056** -1.8136** 
  (0.7135) (0.0559) (0.6685) (0.6796) (0.7027) (0.7756) (0.7917) (0.7048) (0.7100) 
Domestic 0.7291** 0.0455 0.6997** 0.5786* 0.6524* 0.5211 0.4133 0.0000 0.6716* 
  (0.3322) (0.0292) (0.3339) (0.3237) (0.3507) (0.4238) (0.4454) (.) (0.3439) 
Public x Cash -0.3637 -0.0757 -0.3068 -0.2942 -0.3649 -0.8005 -0.7442 -0.3095 -0.3145 
  (0.6280) (0.0587) (0.6252) (0.6187) (0.6402) (0.7065) (0.7264) (0.6250) (0.6257) 
Public x Part. stock -3.4035*** -0.2179*** -3.4458*** -3.4051*** -3.0818*** -2.8996*** -2.9360*** -3.4530*** -3.4742*** 
  (0.6556) (0.0547) (0.5623) (0.6603) (0.6960) (0.8109) (0.8256) (0.6597) (0.6616) 
Private x Cash 0.1455 0.0011 0.1376 0.1072 0.2660 0.3345 0.5053 0.1578 0.1417 
  (0.2824) (0.0243) (0.2789) (0.2770) (0.2900) (0.3302) (0.3395) (0.2805) (0.2809) 
Private x Part. stock 0.9438*** 0.0450* 0.9470*** 0.8804*** 1.1416*** 1.0534*** 1.1328*** 0.9475*** 0.9386*** 
  (0.3401) (0.0231) (0.3095) (0.3228) (0.3466) (0.4035) (0.4077) (0.3385) (0.3363) 
Subsidiary x Cash 0.4674 -0.0460 0.4987 0.7537 0.5727 0.1969 -0.0429 0.5221 0.4980 
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  (0.7717) (0.0839) (0.8520) (0.8209) (0.8851) (1.0917) (1.1770) (0.7998) (0.7978) 
Focused acquisition 0.0860 0.0031 0.0756 0.0698 0.0627 0.0188 -0.0697 0.0780 0.0708 
  (0.2291) (0.0186) (0.2212) (0.2213) (0.2391) (0.2831) (0.2893) (0.2276) (0.2288) 
Tender offer -0.7394 -0.0484 -0.6899 -0.7638 -0.6951 -0.4840 -0.5168 -0.6870 -0.6945 
  (0.5789) (0.0501) (0.5655) (0.5841) (0.6085) (0.6863) (0.7029) (0.5814) (0.5810) 
Friendly acquisition -0.1862 0.0780 -0.0653 -0.2166 0.0905 0.4035 0.3589 -0.0610 -0.0865 
  (0.6378) (0.0529) (0.5234) (0.6209) (0.6325) (0.6904) (0.7083) (0.6288) (0.6343) 
Completed acquisition 0.9576 0.0310 1.1899* 1.2799* 1.4566* 1.2248 1.3183 1.2065* 1.2172* 
  (0.7376) (0.0574) (0.7049) (0.7321) (0.7753) (0.8977) (0.9132) (0.7293) (0.7313) 
Relative acquisition value 0.0800 -0.0059 0.0734 0.0647 0.0999 0.0924 0.1349 0.0756 0.0785 
  (0.0954) (0.0051) (0.0994) (0.0874) (0.0995) (0.1480) (0.1713) (0.0951) (0.0957) 
Log(size) -0.0025 -0.0000 -0.0030 -0.0022 -0.0025 -0.0042 -0.0137** -0.0028 -0.0033 
  (0.0046) (0.0004) (0.0055) (0.0049) (0.0059) (0.0067) (0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0053) 
Book-to-market 0.0048 0.0027** 0.0077 0.0067 -0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0115 0.0071 0.0066 
  (0.0206) (0.0011) (0.0228) (0.0194) (0.0218) (0.0330) (0.0382) (0.0211) (0.0210) 
Leverage 0.8988 0.0807 0.8005 0.9264 1.3505* 0.9087 0.4452 0.7709 0.8415 
  (0.7576) (0.0504) (0.6670) (0.7181) (0.7953) (1.0689) (1.0679) (0.7377) (0.7401) 
Runup -0.9192** -0.0775*** -0.9209*** -0.9825*** -0.8739** -1.1873*** -1.1600** -0.9223** -0.9166** 
  (0.3752) (0.0189) (0.3492) (0.3667) (0.4116) (0.4406) (0.4538) (0.3733) (0.3727) 
Sigma 28.5607** -0.7009 29.8324** 34.1085*** 48.7027*** 55.3974** 55.0842** 29.9675** 29.2042** 
  (12.2220) (0.4450) (12.4428) (12.5843) (15.6327) (22.2950) (22.9587) (12.5428) (12.5421) 
Free cash-flow-to-assets -0.0039 -0.0021*** 0.0070 0.0072 1.5023* 1.5361 1.5984 0.0064 0.0067 
  (0.0157) (0.0008) (0.0131) (0.0145) (0.8795) (1.2070) (1.2154) (0.0151) (0.0152) 
Constant 3.4965 0.7407 2.5510 4.9192 1.1156 7.1021 0.2174 3.9946 4.2942 
  (5.9929) (0.5222) (5.4591) (5.6544) (6.4637) (5.4513) (4.1790) (5.8957) (7.8032) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 2969 2969 2969 3149 2637 1886 1828 2969 2969 
R-sq 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07 
This table presents coefficients from OLS regressions with the dependent variable bidder announcement CAR [-
1;+1]. Specifications (1) and (2) use different variables and methods to calculate CARs. In Specification (3), I cluster 
standard errors differently, and in Specification (4), I extend the sample to include financial firms. In Specifications 
(5) to (7), I use alternative corporate governance and country characteristics. Specification (8) further breaks down 
the target-bidder-regime variables, and Specification (9) accounts for the heterogeneity of CE countries. All variables 
are defined in Table 2.10. Standard errors clustered on the bidder level are provided in parentheses. I winsorize CARs 
at the 1% level. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
2.4.5 Difference in difference analysis 
Humphery-Jenner (2012) finds that EU bidders, in comparison to a control sample of non-
EU bidders, realize lower bidder returns after the implementation of the ETD. I expect to find 
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similar results for my sample. However, if advisors are able to reduce transaction, asymmetric 
information and agency costs in acquisitions (as suggested by Servaes and Zenner (1996)), I 
expect that bidders that are highly affected by the ETD and that use an advisor create more 
shareholder value than bidders that are highly affected by the ETD but do not use an advisor. 
In the spirit of Humphery-Jenner (2012), I execute a DiD analysis using the ETD as an 
exogenous shock to the acquisition market. The ETD seems to qualify as an exogenous shock 
because the ETD was not driven by market pressure but rather by the idea of “European 
integration” (Dissanaike et al., 2016). As the parallel trend assumption is crucial for the validity 
of a DiD research design, there might be concerns that the parallel trend assumption does not hold 
when one compares bidders located in the EU with bidders located in non-EU countries. 
Therefore, I divide European countries into a treated and a control sample. This is based on a 
report, which was asked for by the European Commission and was executed by a consortium of 
law firms and the Center for European Policy studies (CEPS) to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
ETD in 2012. Since EU member states could decide which rules to implement and could use the 
opt-out clause, some EU member states made significant changes (treated sample) and others 
made not significant changes (control sample) to the national acquisition regulation (Marccus 
Partners and Centre for European Policy Studies, 2012). The 2007 EU accession countries 
(Bulgaria, Romania) are excluded from the analysis. Because the ETD is aimed mostly at the 
target’s shareholders and stakeholders, a bidder is classified as treated based on the country in 
which the target is located (see Chapter 2.2.4). The breakdown into both samples with the average 
bidder CARs per country before and after the implementation of the ETD are depicted in Table 
2.7. The parallel trend assumption postulates that the outcome variable in the treated and control 
sample would follow the same trend, had the treatment been absent. In my sample, this would 
mean that the bidder CARs of the treated and control sample would have followed similar trends 
in absence of the ETD. I argue that, in my research design, this is likely to be the case, as only 
bidders and targets that are located in developed European countries are included in the analysis. 
Second, because there might be corporate governance, country and industry characteristics that 
drive differing trends (Humphery-Jenner, 2012) and might be correlated with both the bidder CAR 
and ETD implementation intensity, I include corporate governance, country, year and industry 
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characteristics into the regression. Finally, I execute the DiD analysis using propensity score 
matching to make sure that the treated and control samples are as similar as possible. 
 
Table 2.7: Sample composition of the treated and control sample 
  Total    Before   After 
  N % CAR (%)   N % CAR (%)   N % CAR (%) 
Treated sample                       
Belgium 34 37.36 0.71   15 30.61 0.40   19 45.24 0.95 
Cyprus 4 4.40 -2.40     0.00     4 9.52 -2.40 
Czech Republic 10 10.99 -0.32   4 8.16 -0.83   6 14.29 0.02 
Finland 79 86.81 1.97   41 83.67 1.30   38 90.48 2.71 
France 164 180.22 0.91   72 146.94 2.27   92 219.05 -0.16 
Greece 16 17.58 2.69   4 8.16 1.20   12 28.57 3.18 
Hungary 4 4.40 0.01   1 2.04 -1.28   3 7.14 0.44 
Ireland-Rep 50 54.95 1.27   29 59.18 2.87   21 50.00 -0.93 
Italy 109 119.78 0.24   45 91.84 -0.08   64 152.38 0.47 
Luxembourg 5 5.49 -0.92     0.00     5 11.90 -0.92 
Netherlands 95 104.40 1.33   44 89.80 1.75   51 121.43 0.97 
Poland 53 58.24 2.75   6 12.24 4.21   47 111.90 2.56 
Portugal 19 20.88 0.53   12 24.49 1.49   7 16.67 -1.13 
Slovak Rep 3 3.30 0.41   1 2.04 2.10   2 4.76 -0.43 
Spain 91 3.09 1.28   49 3.74 2.28   42 2.57 0.12 
Total treated 736 24.97 1.15   323 24.64 1.66   413 25.23 0.75 
Control sample                       
Austria 11 0.50 0.30   3 0.30 1.53   8 0.65 -0.17 
Denmark 58 2.62 2.80   23 2.33 4.61   35 2.86 1.61 
Germany 178 8.05 1.28   73 7.39 0.70   105 8.58 1.68 
Norway 119 5.38 2.57   46 4.66 3.52   73 5.96 1.97 
Romania 4 0.18 -0.37   2 0.20 3.94   2 0.16 -4.67 
Sweden 194 8.77 2.90   76 7.69 2.71   118 9.64 3.02 
Switzerland 44 1.99 0.86   18 1.82 -1.15   26 2.12 2.26 
United Kingdom 1604 72.51 1.43   747 75.61 1.37   857 70.02 1.48 
Total control 2212 75.03 1.62   988 75.36 1.56   1224 74.77 1.67 
Total sample 2948   1.50   1311   1.58   1637   1.44 
This table presents the sample composition of treated bidders and non-treated bidders. I show absolute and relative 
numbers of bidders and their CARs by country for the period before and after the ETD’s implementation deadline. 
 
In Table 2.8, I provide the results of univariate analyses comparing the means of the treated 
sample and the control sample to determine whether they are different from zero and whether the 
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means of both samples differ between the pre- and post-implementation periods. I show 3-day 
bidder CARs for the entire period, for the period before the implementation and that after the 
implementation of the ETD. Treated bidder CARs are significantly lower after the implementation 
of the ETD (0.74%) than before implementation (1.66%). This is similar for the subsample of 
treated bidders that do not use an advisor. In both cases, differences are significant at the 5% level. 
However, treated bidders that use an advisor do not seem to realize significantly lower CARs after 
the implementation than in the time period before implementation. Additionally, bidders from the 
control sample (and subsamples thereof) seem not to realize significantly different CARs between 
the period before the implementation and the period after the implementation of the ETD. 
This analysis provides initial evidence that the ETD influences bidder value creation of 
treated bidders negatively compared to the control sample. Moreover, it appears that treated 
bidders that use advisors are not as strongly influenced by the negative consequences of the ETD 
than treated bidders that do not use advisors. These initial results call for a closer investigation 
using a DiD research design. 
 
Table 2.8: Summary statistics of the treated and control sample 
  Total   Treated sample    Control sample 
      Total With advisor Without advisor  Total With advisor Without advisor 
All 1.50***   1.15*** 0.57* 1.45***  1.62*** 1.56*** 1.65*** 
Before 1.59***   1.66*** 0.80 2.12***  1.56*** 1.57*** 1.55*** 
After 1.43***   0.74*** 0.39 0.93***  1.67*** 1.56*** 1.72*** 
Before-after 0.16   0.91** 0.41 0.59**  -0.11 0.01 -0.17 
This table presents sample summary statistics and the results of the t-tests I run to compare mean CARs (in %) of the 
total, treated and control samples and subsamples thereof. I test whether the mean CARs of the treated and the control 
sample are different from zero and whether the means of both samples differ between the pre- and post-ETD 
implementation period. All variables are defined in Table 2.10. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
In Table 2.9, I regress the dependent variable – 3-day bidder CAR – on the main variable 
of interest, which is an interaction term between treated and ETD. Treated is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the target is incorporated in an EU member state that made significant changes 
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in acquisition regulations due to the ETD and zero otherwise. ETD is a dummy variable equaling 
one for the time period after the implementation of the ETD and 0 for the time period before the 
implementation of the ETD. I add further control variables, such as corporate governance, 
country, deal and bidder characteristics, to the regression. I use year and industry fixed effects 
and cluster standard errors on 4-digit SIC codes. 
In Specification 1, I show the results for the total sample. The interaction term ‘treated x 
ETD’ is significant and negative, which indicates that treated bidders9 create less shareholder 
value than non-treated bidders. This effect is also economically significant, as a mean-sized 
bidder, in comparison to the control sample, seems to realize a US$ 26.50 million lower 
shareholder value. In Specification 2, I use treated bidders that hire an advisor to construct the 
interaction term. As conjectured previously in this chapter, it appears that advisors matter for 
bidder value creation because the interaction term ‘advisor treated x ETD’ is not significant. It 
seems that treated bidders that hire advisors do not create less shareholder value than the control 
sample. This is again different for treated bidders that do not use advisors, as these bidders create 
less shareholder value compared to the control sample (see Specification 3). 
Again, endogeneity due to (1) non-random advisor bidder matching and (2) differences 
between treated bidders and non-treated bidders might influence the results. Thus, I execute a 
PSM to account for both possibilities. First, I use a similar approach as Humphery-Jenner (2012) 
and ensure that non-treated bidders are as similar as possible to treated bidders by executing a 
radius type matching. With a probit model, I estimate the probability that a bidder is a treated firm 
and receives treatment using the bidder characteristics of size, book-to-market ratio, leverage and 
relative transaction value (Humphery-Jenner, 2012). Next, I calculate the propensity score and 
drop all observations of the control sample, which are in the top and bottom 5%. I do this for the 
periods before and after the ETD implementation separately. Second, I ensure that the bidders that 
use advisors are similar to bidders that do not use advisors and follow the matching approach 
outlined in Chapter 2.4.3. I again match on size, leverage, sigma, experience, industry and year 
of the acquisition announcement and use one-to-one matching without replacement of the treated 
                                                 
9 Treated bidders are bidders that acquire targets in treated countries. 
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bidders that do not use advisors with treated bidders that hire advisors.10 This process reduces the 
sample to 1716 observations. Specifications 4 to 6 show the results that are similar to the results 
in Specifications 1 to 3.  
                                                 
10 When I use all bidder characteristics during the matching procedure, the main result is similar. 
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Table 2.9: Difference in difference research design 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
  Total sample   Matched sample 
Treated 0.3973       0.5700     
  (0.4523)       (0.6067)     
ETD -1.5100** -1.7184** -1.5698**   0.5484 0.2116 0.3071 
  (0.7010) (0.6937) (0.6938)   (0.4426) (0.4017) (0.4064) 
Treated x ETD -1.1950**       -1.7468***     
  (0.5112)       (0.6599)     
Advisor treated   0.0364       -0.0658   
    (0.6113)       (0.6583)   
Advisor treated x ETD   -0.7905       -1.1197   
    (0.7174)       (0.7569)   
Non-advisor treated     0.6070       1.1602 
      (0.5075)       (0.7353) 
Non-advisor treated x ETD     -1.1468*       -1.6830* 
      (0.6071)       (0.8635) 
Shareholder rights 0.0215 -0.0028 0.0074   0.1100 0.0665 0.0937 
  (0.1322) (0.1322) (0.1309)   (0.1789) (0.1823) (0.1770) 
Minority shareholder rights -0.2900 -0.2443 -0.2601   -0.5995*** -0.5286** -0.5331** 
  (0.1847) (0.1806) (0.1849)   (0.2285) (0.2208) (0.2288) 
Creditor rights -0.1305 -0.1254 -0.1194   -0.1933 -0.1779 -0.1795 
  (0.1235) (0.1247) (0.1224)   (0.1856) (0.1902) (0.1850) 
Anti-corruption 3.8723*** 4.0083*** 4.0523***   2.6326 2.7521* 2.9624* 
  (1.2437) (1.2369) (1.2345)   (1.6571) (1.6611) (1.6681) 
Financial development -1.8573 -1.6123 -1.5997   -1.4547 -1.1212 -1.1659 
  (1.9973) (2.0013) (1.9902)   (2.4305) (2.4615) (2.4005) 
Competition -0.0319 -0.0276 -0.0268   -0.0916 -0.0861 -0.0768 
  (0.0611) (0.0602) (0.0611)   (0.0900) (0.0887) (0.0896) 
GDP growth -0.0530 -0.0679 -0.0511   0.0716 0.0565 0.0661 
  (0.1014) (0.1021) (0.1012)   (0.0915) (0.0924) (0.0919) 
GNI per capita -0.5315 -0.4725 -0.5066   0.4856 0.5085 0.5607 
  (0.6814) (0.6789) (0.6800)   (0.7642) (0.7661) (0.7523) 
Domestic 0.7639*** 0.7667*** 0.8111***   1.1751*** 1.1551*** 1.2828*** 
  (0.2622) (0.2600) (0.2584)   (0.3523) (0.3400) (0.3394) 
Public x Cash -0.1490 -0.1215 -0.1724   -0.1774 -0.1027 -0.1947 
  (0.6272) (0.6286) (0.6328)   (0.6990) (0.6960) (0.7037) 
Public x Part. stock -3.1535*** -3.1277*** -3.1589***   -3.0312*** -2.9907*** -2.9992*** 
  (0.6326) (0.6349) (0.6362)   (0.7156) (0.7184) (0.7209) 
Private x Cash 0.1392 0.1286 0.1451   0.2527 0.2471 0.2697 
  (0.2731) (0.2739) (0.2731)   (0.3722) (0.3733) (0.3716) 
Private x Part. stock 0.9713*** 0.9741*** 0.9626***   0.9636* 0.9813* 0.9606* 
  (0.3328) (0.3330) (0.3331)   (0.5418) (0.5417) (0.5452) 
Subsidiary x Cash 0.4454 0.4327 0.4935   -0.0508 -0.0690 0.0301 
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  (0.7667) (0.7742) (0.7661)   (0.9581) (0.9683) (0.9538) 
Focused acquisition 0.0370 0.0453 0.0329   -0.2666 -0.2501 -0.2737 
  (0.2340) (0.2341) (0.2341)   (0.3695) (0.3702) (0.3706) 
Tender offer -0.5248 -0.5065 -0.5089   -0.9562 -0.9351 -0.9255 
  (0.5964) (0.5976) (0.5999)   (0.6379) (0.6365) (0.6447) 
Friendly acquisition -0.0764 -0.1144 -0.0543   -0.3522 -0.4286 -0.2980 
  (0.6467) (0.6455) (0.6408)   (1.1397) (1.1291) (1.1202) 
Completed acquisition 1.1385 1.1655 1.1260   1.2601 1.3550 1.2265 
  (0.7267) (0.7274) (0.7334)   (0.8847) (0.8779) (0.8844) 
Relative acquisition value 0.0753 0.0752 0.0704   0.0916 0.0881 0.0704 
  (0.0990) (0.0989) (0.0982)   (0.2651) (0.2681) (0.2663) 
Size -0.0042 -0.0038 -0.0043         
  (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0055)         
Book-to-market 0.0073 0.0078 0.0077   -0.0028 -0.0010 0.0001 
  (0.0217) (0.0216) (0.0216)   (0.0586) (0.0592) (0.0590) 
Leverage 0.8383 0.8558 0.7949         
  (0.7527) (0.7536) (0.7534)         
Runup -0.9411** -0.9405** -0.9455**   -1.2016* -1.1814* -1.2188* 
  (0.3666) (0.3683) (0.3673)   (0.6430) (0.6454) (0.6462) 
Sigma 28.7705** 29.0978** 29.2679**         
  (12.8237) (12.7473) (12.8274)         
Free cash-flow-to-assets 0.0077 0.0086 0.0079   1.2971 1.2740 1.2370 
  (0.0149) (0.0148) (0.0146)   (1.2731) (1.2471) (1.2491) 
Constant 4.2079 3.2946 3.3769   -2.4104 -3.0606 -4.1751 
  (6.1476) (5.9939) (6.0709)   (7.2392) (7.0698) (6.9582) 
Year and industry FE YES YES YES   NO NO NO 
N 2948 2948 2948   1716 1716 1716 
R-sq 0.07 0.07 0.07   0.05 0.05 0.05 
This table presents DiD analyses with the dependent variable bidder announcement CAR [-1;+1]. The main 
independent variable is an interaction term between the treated and ETD variables, and I control for corporate 
governance, country, deal and bidder characteristics in all specifications. The specifications show the results for the 
total sample and a matched sample in Specifications (1) to (3) and (4) to (6), respectively. All variables are defined 
in Table 2.10. Standard errors clustered on the 4-digit SIC code level are provided in parentheses. I winsorize CARs 
at the 1% level in Specifications (1) to (3). *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
2.5 Discussion 
Chapter 2.2 left the question open to the empirics of whether advisors are more valuable 
in the UK, in CE or across both regimes. Although in all regressions, I control for differences in 
corporate governance and regulatory characteristics, the results suggest that advisors provide 
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value to UK bidders that acquire UK targets only. Potential explanations could be related to the 
fact that the UK market has a higher (regulatory) transparency than the CE market (Martynova 
and Renneboog, 2011a), which motivates advisors to work harder because their performance is 
relatively more visible. Indeed, Rhee and Valdez (2009) report a strong link between external 
visibility and reputational exposure. Golubov et al. (2012) and Liu et al. (2014) show that advisors 
apply more resources and create more bidder value in acquisitions that potentially help to increase 
the advisors’ reputational exposure and future fee income.  
The results of the DiD research design indicate that advisors’ skills are valuable to bidders 
that acquire targets that are highly affected by the ETD. Table 2.9 shows that, once a treated bidder 
hires an advisor, it does not create less shareholder value after the ETD implementation than the 
control sample. However, if the treated bidder does not use an advisor, the acquisition creates less 
shareholder value after the implementation of the ETD. As laid out in Chapter 2.2, it seems that 
the ETD increases legal uncertainty and acquisition complexity and makes acquisitions more 
costly, difficult and time-consuming. In such a situation, advisor skills appear to be valuable to 
their clients.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
In the empirical corporate finance literature, an intensely debated question is whether 
advisors are worth their money and whether they help bidders to create shareholder value in 
corporate acquisitions. Theoretical argumentation supports these notions, as advisors should 
reduce transaction, asymmetric information and agency costs (Servaes and Zenner, 1996). 
However, empirical evidence from the US market yields contrasting results. 
In order to advance that discussion, I analyze the role that advisors play in Europe and 
whether they help bidders in European acquisitions to create shareholder value. Moschier and 
Campa (2009) argue that differences between the US and Europe exist not only because of a better 
harmonization of law in the US but also because European firms are different regarding 
institutional characteristics and corporate structures. This suggests that research results from the 
US might not be generalizable to Europe. Moreover, Europe is characterized by two distinct 
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regimes (UK vs. CE), which have different corporate governance and regulatory characteristics. 
Thus, focusing on Europe might add another dimension to the discussion on whether advisors 
provide value to their clients. 
My results suggest that advisors help to create shareholder value only when the bidder and 
the target are both located in the UK. It seems that advisors’ services are particularly valuable in 
a transparent environment in which the service quality of advisors is highly visible. Moreover, 
using the ETD as an exogenous shock to the acquisition market in a difference-in-difference 
research design, my results suggest that advisors are helpful in a complex and legally uncertain 
environment. 
The study also contributes to the ongoing discussion in the media that criticizes bankers 
for being compensated too extensively (The Economist, 2012) and to claims from inside the 
banking system that profits for investment banks are more important than the interests of the bank 
clients (The New York Times, 2012). My results, however, seem to support the conjecture that 
investment banks play an important and valuable role in the acquisition market.  
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Table 2.10: Variable definitions 
Variable name Unit Definition Source 
Advisor characteristics       
Advisor dummy 1 for acquisitions in which the bidder is advised by an advisor and 0 
otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
Region       
UK bidder (target) dummy 1 for bidders (targets) which are incorporated in the UK or Ireland and 
whose primary stock exchange is UK or Ireland and 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum, Datastream 
UK-UK (CE-CE) dummy 1 for acquisitions that involve targets and bidders both from the UK (CE) 
and 0 otherwise.  
SDC Platinum, Datastream 
UK-CE (CE-UK) dummy 1 for acquisitions that involve targets from the UK (CE) and bidders from 
CE (the UK) and 0 otherwise.  
SDC Platinum, Datastream 
DO-UK-UK (CE-CE) dummy 1 for domestic acquisitions in the UK (CE) and 0 otherwise.  SDC Platinum, Datastream 
CB-UK-UK (CE-CE) dummy 1 for cross-border acquisitions in the UK (CE) and 0 otherwise.  SDC Platinum, Datastream 
Bidder French (German, 
Scandinavian) LO 
dummy 1 for bidders that are located in a country that has a French (German, 
Scandinavian) law origin and 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum, Datastream 
Target French (German, 
Scandinavian) LO 
dummy 1 for targets that are located in a country that has a French (German, 
Scandinavian) law origin and 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum, Datastream 
Corporate governance characteristics   
Shareholder rights # Shareholder rights protection index (re-scaled between 1 and 10) multiplied 
by rule of law (re-scaled between 0 and 1). 
Martynova and Renneboog 
(2011b) 
Minority shareholder 
rights 
# Minority shareholder rights protection index (re-scaled between 1 and 10) 
multiplied by rule of law (re-scaled between 0 and 1). 
Martynova and Renneboog 
(2011b) 
Creditor rights # Creditor rights protection index (re-scaled between 1 and 10) multiplied by 
rule of law (re-scaled between 0 and 1). 
Martynova and Renneboog 
(2011b) 
Rule of law # Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence.  
The World Bank 
Governance index (WB) # Equally weighted index based on six different governance measures 
(governance effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, political stability, 
corruption and voice & accountability). 
The World Bank 
ADRI (Spamann)   Anti-director rights index. Spamann (2010) 
Country characteristics       
Anti-corruption # Captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
"capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
The World Bank 
Financial development # Captures the development of the financial markets and financial institutions 
in the bidder country. The index ranges from 0 to 1, is calculated by 
Katsiaryna Svirydzenka and published in a IMF working paper (see, 
Svirydzenka, 2016). 
International Monetary 
Fund 
Competition US$ (log) Natural logarithm of the acquisition volume in the target 2-digit SIC industry 
in the target country per year (see, e.g., Humphery-Jenner, 2012). 
SDC Platinum 
GDP growth % Bidder country annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth. The World Bank 
GNI per capita US$ Bidder country gross national income (GNI) per capita. The World Bank 
Market cap to GDP # Bidder country market capitalization of all firms divided by the GDP. The World Bank 
Market turnover # Bidder country average turnover of all stocks. The World Bank 
Unemployment rate % Bidder country unemployment rate. The World Bank 
FDI to GDP # Bidder country amount of foreign direct investments divided by the GDP. The World Bank 
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Table 2.10 (continued): Variable definitions 
Trade imbalance # Bidder country amount of imports minus the amount of exports divided by 
the sum of imports and exports. 
The World Bank 
Regulation characteristics     
ETD dummy 1 for acquisitions announced after the implementation deadline (May 20, 
2006) of the ETD (European Takeover Directive) and 0 otherwise. 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex
:32004L0025 
Treated dummy 1 for bidders that acquire targets from a country that made significant 
changes to their national acquisition regulation due to the ETD and 0 
otherwise. 
Marccus Partners and 
Centre for European Policy 
Studies (2012) 
(Non-)advisor treated dummy 1 for bidders that do (not) use an advisor and acquire targets from a country 
that made significant changes to their national acquisition regulation due to 
the ETD and 0 otherwise. 
Marccus Partners and 
Centre for European Policy 
Studies (2012) and SDC 
Platinum 
Deal characteristics       
CAR country [-1;+1] % Cumulative abnormal announcement return of the bidder stock during a 3-
day event window. I calculate CARs using the market model. Market returns 
come from the corresponding country's Datastream value-weighted market 
index return (see, e.g., Alexandris et al, 2010). 
Datastream 
Domestic dummy 1 for acquisitions within a country and 0 for cross-border acquisitions. SDC Platinum 
Friendly acquisition dummy 1 for friendly acquisitions and 0 for hostile acquisitions. SDC Platinum 
Completed acquisition dummy 1 for completed acquisitions and 0 for withdrawn acquisitions. SDC Platinum 
Cash only  acquisition dummy 1 for cash only acquisitions and 0 for all other acquisitions. SDC Platinum 
Stock only acquisition dummy 1 for stock only acquisitions and 0 for all other acquisitions. SDC Platinum 
Partial stock acquisition dummy 1 for partial stock acquisitions and 0 for all other acquisitions. SDC Platinum 
Public status dummy 1 for public targets and 0 otherwise. SDC Platinum 
Tender offer dummy 1 for tender offers and 0 otherwise. SDC Platinum 
Focused acquisition dummy 1 if the bidder and the target are in the same industry according to the 2-digit 
SIC code and 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
Acquisition value US$ million Total value of the acquisition. SDC Platinum 
Relative acquisition value % Total acquisition value divided by the bidder market value of equity 88 
trading days prior to the acquisition announcement. 
SDC Platinum, Datastream 
Bidder characteristics       
Size US$ million Bidder market value of equity 88 trading days prior to the acquisition 
announcement. 
Datastream 
Runup % Market-adjusted buy-and-hold return of the bidder stock from 205 to 6 days 
prior to the acquisition announcement. I use the S&P 350 value-weighted 
index. 
SDC Platinum, Datastream 
Sigma # Standard deviation of market-adjusted daily bidder stock returns from 205 to 
6 days prior to the acquisition announcement. I use the S&P 350 value-
weighted index. 
SDC Platinum, Datastream 
Book-to-market # Bidder book value of total equity at the end of the fiscal year prior to the 
acquisition announcement divided by the bidder market value of equity 88 
trading days prior to the acquisition announcement. 
Datastream, Compustat 
Leverage % Sum of the bidder long-term debt and the bidder debt in current liabilities 
(total financial debt) divided by the bidder book value of total assets at the 
end of the fiscal year prior to the acquisition announcement. 
Compustat 
Free cash-flow-to-assets # Bidder free cash flow (Compustat item) divided by bidder total assets. Compustat 
Experience dummy 1 if the bidder successfully acquired at least one other firm during the last 
five years prior to the current acquisition announcement and 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
In this table, I define the variables I use and provide the sources from which I derive them. 
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Chapter 3  
Superstar financial advisors: Do they deliver superior 
value to their clients? 
 
“Awarding best global house on the basis of league table position is like awarding 
restaurant of the year to McDonald’s.” (Euromoney, 2011a) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Between 2000 and 2013, North American acquisition activity reached annual volumes 
between 4% and 15% of the GDP, and its total volume amounted to more than US$ 15 trillion. 
Investment banks are important intermediaries in the acquisitions market. They advised bidders 
which made up 82% of the acquisition volume during this period.11 Servaes and Zenner (1996) 
argue that investment banks may create value as advisors by reducing transaction costs, 
asymmetric information costs and agency costs. This article investigates whether high-quality 
advisors are associated with a higher value creation for bidders than lower-quality advisors. We 
compare announcement and long-term returns as well as synergies. In addition, we are interested 
in how the value that is created by high-quality advisors in acquisitions is related to their 
reputational exposure. 
                                                 
11 Source: SDC Platinum 
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Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we shed light onto the inconclusive 
empirical evidence for the relationship between bidder value creation and bidder advisor quality. 
Bowers and Miller (1990) and Servaes and Zenner (1996) do not find any relationship between 
advisor quality and value creation. Michel et al. (1991), Rau (2000), Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) 
and Ismail (2010) results indicate that if there is a relationship between advisor quality and the 
value that they create, it is negative rather than positive. Contrary to this, the findings of Golubov 
et al. (2012) indicate that high-quality advisors create more value than lower quality advisors. 
However, this is only the case in public acquisitions, not in private and subsidiary ones. Finally, 
Kale et al. (2003) find a positive link between the creation of value through tender offers and 
advisor quality.  
Second, we contribute to the discussion on how advisor quality should be measured. The 
early research (Bowers and Miller, 1990; Michel et al., 1991; Servaes and Zenner, 1996) related 
advisor quality to frequent occurrences in the financial press. Since 2000, empirical studies 
typically employ league tables, which rank advisors on the basis of their market shares to construct 
proxies for advisor quality (Rau, 2000; Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003; Kale et al., 2003; Ismail, 2010; 
Golubov et al., 2012). Bao and Edmans (2011) argue that advisor market share is not a good 
predictor of value creation, and they demonstrate that the relationship between advisor market 
share and bidder CARs at the announcement is negative.  
There is empirical evidence that casts serious doubt about whether advisor market share 
is related to value creation, and we believe that it is worth looking for an alternative measure of 
advisor quality. We propose a quality measure that indicates whether an advisor has won an award 
of excellence from one of the two world leading financial market magazines, Euromoney or 
GlobalFinance, in the period preceding an acquisition. These magazines claim that when they 
choose winners, they not only consider market shares, but they also include other quality criteria 
(GlobalFinance, 2014).  
According to Clive Horwood, Euromoney editor, these awards “remain the benchmark for 
the industry” (Euromoney, 2011b). The recipients—investment banks—publicize the distinction. 
For example, they state that “the recognition we have received from leading publications in the 
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financial industry speaks volumes for our track record as a global business,”12 “our passion to 
perform has been rewarded internationally,”13 “we have achieved leadership positions”14 and 
“these awards are a testament to our fully integrated global platform and world-class talent.”15 
Winners are periodically announced in press releases and in magazines with large circulation. The 
awards are widely regarded as “the most prestigious awards in global financing publishing,” 
(DailyNation, 2015), while the award ceremonies, where high-profile executives collect the 
awards personally as representatives of the winners, are viewed as “Oscar night for banks” 
(FinBuzz, 2015).  
Despite their popularity in the investment banking industry, these awards have thus far 
been ignored by academic researchers. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to introduce 
this measure and to investigate whether bidders realize greater synergies and a more favorable 
stock market reaction at the acquisition announcement when they involve winners and, if so, 
whether the outperformance endures in the long term.  
Third, we add to the literature that argues that advisors allocate different levels of effort 
to different acquisitions. Liu et al. (2014) claim that advisors channel their resources into 
acquisitions that are more likely to generate future fee income. These are acquisitions that involve 
bidders which have a high probability of becoming serial acquirers. Derrien and Dessaint (2017) 
conclude that investment banks actively manage their league table position and therefore put more 
effort into acquisitions that more strongly affect their league table position. Golubov et al. (2012) 
argue that advisors focus on generating value in public acquisitions (and less so in private or 
subsidiary ones) because such acquisitions are associated with greater reputational exposure. We 
follow a similar line of argumentation as Golubov et al. (2012) but capture differences in 
                                                 
12 http://www.gbm.hsbc.com/about-us/awards/2015 (accessed July 20, 2016) 
13 https://www.db.com/en/content/company/Current-Awards.htm (accessed July 20, 2016) 
14 https://www.jpmorgan.com/pages/jpmorgan/gcb/awards (accessed July 20, 2016) 
15 http://newsroom.bankofamerica.com/press-releases/awards-and-recognition/bank-america-merrill-lynch-earns-
top-honors-euromoney-awards (accessed July 20, 2016) 
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reputational exposure by the differences in bidder analyst coverage instead of target company 
status. We expect that advisors exert more effort when their clients are covered by analysts 
because such clients’ deals are associated with greater reputational exposure. If greater effort 
results in greater value creation, we should expect greater value creation for bidders with analyst 
coverage compared to their counterparts that are not covered by analysts.    
The results of our investigations, which are based on a sample of 2674 North American 
acquisitions, show that there is a positive relationship between advisor quality, which is captured 
by a time-varying winner dummy, and shareholder value creation around the announcement of an 
acquisition. The magnitude of the coefficient is economically nontrivial, as the CARs of bidders 
which are advised by winners are on average three percentage points higher than the CARs of 
bidders which are advised by non-winners; hereby, we control for the time invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity among winners by employing winner fixed effects. Our results further indicate that 
winners are associated with greater total synergies and that winner clients are able to capture a 
larger part of these synergies compared to the clients of non-winners. We also find that winners 
tend to create more shareholder value and greater total synergies in acquisitions in which they 
face greater reputational exposure.  
Our findings also hold when we take into account endogeneity with regard to advisor–
bidder matching. Endogenous switching models indicate that bidders which are advised by non-
winners would have improved their CARs by almost four percentage points had they used the 
advice of winners. As an exclusion restriction, we use the variable scope, which was proposed by 
Golubov et al. (2012), that reflects whether a bidder had used advice of a winner in acquisitions, 
equity issues or debt issues during the previous five years. This variable does not consider the 
relationship between a bidder and a specific advisor but between a bidder and any winner. It seems 
unlikely that this relationship could be linked to the bidder CAR in a particular acquisition. At the 
same time, we expect the variable scope to be positively related to the probability that a bidder 
chooses a winner. In the robustness section, we use propensity score matching as an alternative 
approach to deal with a non-random match between bidders and advisors. The results are not 
driven by outliers since we winsorize CARs at the 1% level. 
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The new quality measure that captures whether an advisor won an award in the period 
preceding the acquisition seems to reflect the quality of advisors better than measures that are 
based exclusively on the advisor’s market share. When we replicate our models with a quality 
measure that is based on market share, we do not find any positive relationship between this 
measure and value creation. This brings into question the common practice of using the advisor 
market share or the appearance of the advisor name in the financial press as a proxy for advisor 
quality, and it brings to the fore other relevant factors that should be considered. Our results that 
are related to the likelihood that an advisor wins an award are in line with the claims of the 
awarding institutions. We find that this likelihood is not only associated with advisor market share 
but that the creation of synergies, the fraction of acquisitions that are successfully completed and 
acquisition premia during the pre-nomination period all play a role.  
In the long term, our results from a calendar-time approach indicate that bidders which are 
advised by winners outperform bidders which are advised by non-winners 12, 36 and 60 months 
after the acquisition. In these three periods, a hedged portfolio, which consists of a long position 
in a portfolio that contains the clients of winners and of a short position in a portfolio that contains 
the clients of non-winners, realizes a statistically significant monthly alpha of 0.60, 0.57 and 0.40 
percentage points.  
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: in Chapter 3.2 we describe the role 
of advisors in acquisitions and measures of advisor quality that were used in the prior literature. 
Chapter 3.3 presents our data and summary statistics. In Chapter 3.4 we analyze the relationship 
between advisor quality and short-term reaction, and in Chapter 3.5 we discuss sources of value 
creation, fees and differences in reputational exposure. Chapter 3.6 analyzes how winners are 
chosen. In Chapter 3.7 we examine the relationship between advisor quality and long-term bidder 
value creation. Chapter 3.8 summarizes various robustness tests and Chapter 3.9 presents our 
conclusions. 
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3.2 Advisor value creation and measures of advisor quality 
Servaes and Zenner (1996) suggest that investment banks may create value as financial 
advisors in acquisitions by providing three types of services to bidders. First, advisors help in 
selecting appropriate targets and structuring an acquisition, which decreases bidder transaction 
costs. Second, advisors may mitigate information asymmetries between bidders and targets. 
Third, advisors can alleviate agency conflicts that may arise between bidder management and 
shareholders, by providing third-party certification.  
Transaction costs arise for bidders during the identification and valuation process of 
potential targets as well as during the process of structuring and negotiating an acquisition. 
Information asymmetries exist because bidders are usually less informed about the quality of 
potential targets than the targets themselves. As specialized agents, advisors (and high-quality 
advisors in particular) tend to possess skills to screen the market, to collect information and to 
structure acquisitions at lower costs than bidders. Advisors thus tend to add value, especially in 
acquisitions that are characterized by large transaction costs and information asymmetries 
(Servaes and Zenner, 1996). 
Agency conflicts arise because the goals of bidder management, and shareholders tend to 
differ: while shareholders care about the value of their shares, value creation is not always the 
criterion on which managers base their decisions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). Jensen (1986) 
argues that free cash flow entails agency conflicts because the managers of firms with large free 
cash flow tend to “build empires”, i.e., to invest in negative NPV acquisitions. Lang et al. (1991) 
find empirical evidence that supports Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis in tender offers. While 
most bidders are not repeat players in the acquisition markets, investment banks are. As 
investment banks’ future income depends on their reputation, they are interested in protecting it. 
Allen et al. (2004) conclude that the reputation of investment banks can serve as a certification 
device in acquisitions. When investment banks as advisors repeatedly offer high-quality services 
by executing value-creating acquisitions, they build up reputation and are able to certify value 
(Bao and Edmans, 2011; Golubov et al., 2012).  
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Do high-quality advisors reduce transaction costs, asymmetric information costs and 
agency costs that are more than those of lower quality advisors? Do we, in turn, observe a higher 
value added in acquisitions in which bidders engage high-quality advisors? While the existing 
empirical evidence supports the view that advisors add value in acquisitions (see, e.g., Bao and 
Edmans, 2011), it fails to deliver clear conclusions about the link between advisor quality and 
value added.  
An important challenge that is faced by researchers is the identification of an appropriate 
measure of advisor quality. Early studies use measures that are related to the prestige of the 
advisor name (based on advisor appearance in tombstones in the financial press). Bowers and 
Miller (1990) do not find any relationship between a prestigious name and changes in bidder 
shareholder value, but they note that prestigious advisors are better at identifying synergetic 
acquisitions. In a related study, Michel et al. (1991) find, against their expectations, that a less 
prestigious advisor (Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc.) outperforms the most prestigious advisors. 
Building on the prior research, Servaes and Zenner (1996) sort advisors into quality tiers based 
on the prestige of their names, but they fail to demonstrate a relationship between tier rank and 
value creation.  
Rau (2000) is the first to use a variable that is based on advisor market share as a quality 
measure in acquisitions. Since then, ranking advisors on the basis of their market share has 
become standard in the assessment of their quality in the empirical research on acquisitions. Rau 
(2000) classifies the five advisors with highest market shares as “top-tier” and documents that 
they are associated not with higher but with lower CARs. Tender offers seem to be an exception. 
In such cases, he finds a positive link between top-tier advisors and CARs. Hunter and Jagtiani 
(2003) use both acquisition volumes and counts to sort advisors into different tiers. However, they 
are not able to document a positive relationship between top-tier advisors and value creation. 
Rather, they conclude that synergies decline when top-tier advisors are in play. Ismail (2010) 
shows that bidders with top-tier advisors lost over US$ 42 billion in shareholder value between 
1985 and 2004. In contrast, lower tier advisors seem to generate about US$ 13.5 billion in 
shareholder value. Wang and Whyte (2010) find that bidders that have strong managerial rights 
and that use investment banks are associated with lower value creation. However, it seems that 
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advisor market share alleviates this relationship. Golubov et al. (2012) demonstrate that there is a 
positive relationship between top-tier advisors and value creation in acquisitions that involve 
public targets. However, they do not find any relationship between top-tier advisors and CARs 
for bidders which acquire private or subsidiary targets. They explain the difference with the 
relatively larger reputational exposure that public compared to private and subsidiary targets 
might entail. In tender offers, Kale et al. (2003) find a positive relationship between bidder gains 
and bidder advisor quality relative to target advisor quality, proxied by their market share.  
It is clear from this overview that the evidence for the relationship between value creation 
and advisor name prestige or advisor market share is mixed. This raises the question of whether 
one can find another measure to assess the quality of advisors that would lead to more consistent 
results. In response to this question, we investigate whether advisor awards, which are broadly 
accepted by market participants and that aim to honor the highest-quality advisors, can serve as 
an alternative measure of advisor quality.  
 
3.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
We start this chapter by describing the data on advisor quality (3.3.1.) and follow with the 
presentation of the acquisition sample that we use in the study (3.3.2.). In the final part (3.3.3.), 
we provide descriptive statistics. We track the short-term and long-term performance of the 
bidders in North American acquisitions that were announced during the period from July 1st, 2001 
and December 31st, 2008, and we follow these bidders until December 31st, 2013.  
 
3.3.1 Advisor quality 
Two major advisor awards, the “Award for excellence” and the “World’s best investment 
bank”, are granted to the best financial firms in various categories and regions by Euromoney and 
GlobalFinance, two of the leading financial market magazines with a circulation of 63000 and 
50050 readers, respectively (Euromoney, 2015; GlobalFinance, 2015). In our analyses, we use 
the Euromoney award for the “best M&A house in the United States and Canada” and the 
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GlobalFinance award for the “best M&A bank in North America.” Both of the magazines choose 
winners annually, usually in April. The winners are announced in press releases as soon as the 
committee has come to a decision. We collect the relevant data and define an advisor as a winner 
as soon as a press statement is released about the final decision. This advisor retains the status of 
winner until the next winner is announced through a new press statement. We have obtained the 
winner data since 2001 for Euromoney and since 2003 for GlobalFinance from the magazines’ 
websites and from LexisNexis. Five investment banks have won one of these awards at least once: 
Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley. 
GlobalFinance chooses winners on the basis of the opinions of its own journalists and 
those of industry experts. The GlobalFinance committee considers each candidate’s market share, 
number and size of acquisitions, service quality, structuring capabilities, distribution network, 
innovation, and after-market performance (GlobalFinance, 2014). Euromoney does not disclose 
details about the relevant criteria. It only states that a team of Euromoney journalists conduct 
interviews with representatives of the candidates and perform their analyses. The final decision is 
made by the magazine’s editor, Clive Horwood. 
We contrast our quality measure, which is a dummy variable winner, with the commonly 
used measure, which is a dummy variable top-tier advisor. To obtain advisor market share and 
rank position we retrieve quarterly league tables from SDC Platinum. For each advisor, we 
calculate, on a rolling basis, its quarterly changing market share as the cumulated value of 
acquisitions in which that advisor is involved relative to the total acquisition value. The market 
share determines the advisor rank position in the relevant quarter. In line with Golubov et al. 
(2012), we classify the advisors in the top eight positions as top-tier.16 Table 3.1 depicts a list of 
winners and top-tier advisors during our sample period. 
 
                                                 
16 Fang (2005) employs a top-eight classification to capture high versus low quality in the market for bond 
underwriting. Rau (2000) uses a top-five classification. However, Golubov et al. (2012) show that their results are 
robust towards using a top-five, a top-eight or a top-ten classification. 
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Table 3.1: Top-tier advisors and winners 
Financial advisor Top-tier Euromoney GlobalFinance 
Bank of America YES NO NO 
Barclays YES YES NO 
Bear Stearns YES YES NO 
Blackstone Group YES NO NO 
Citi YES NO NO 
Credit Suisse First Boston YES NO NO 
Evercore Partners YES NO NO 
Goldman Sachs YES YES YES 
JPMorgan YES NO YES 
Lazard YES NO NO 
Lehman Brothers YES NO NO 
Merrill Lynch YES YES NO 
Moelis & Co YES NO NO 
Morgan Stanley YES YES NO 
Quadrangle Group YES NO NO 
Salomon Smith Barney YES NO NO 
UBS YES NO NO 
This table presents a list of award winners, which were chosen by the magazines Euromoney and GlobalFinance at 
least once during our acquisition sample period, and a list of top-tier advisors in the same period. The data on top-
tier advisors comes from SDC Platinum and winner data is hand-collected from Euromoney and GlobalFinance 
websites and from Lexis Nexis. 
 
 
3.3.2 Acquisition sample 
Our sample of acquisitions and their characteristics comes from SDC Platinum. To draw 
our sample, we apply the commonly used screening criteria (e.g., Rau, 2000; Bao and Edmans, 
2011; Golubov et al., 2012): we consider all (successful and unsuccessful) acquisitions that 
involve public bidders and public, private or subsidiary targets. We only include acquisitions that 
entail a change in control; that is, cases in which the bidder intends to hold more than 50% of the 
shares after the acquisition and does not hold more than 10% prior to the acquisition. We exclude 
from our sample all repurchases, liquidations, restructurings, leveraged buyouts, reverse 
takeovers, privatizations, bankruptcy acquisitions, and going-private acquisitions, as well as all 
acquisitions with an acquisition value that is smaller than US$ 1 million. We only consider 
acquisitions for which we obtain the acquisition value and payment method as well as the name 
of the advisor(s). 
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One problem with SDC Platinum is that it does not track mergers between advisors 
appropriately and reports merged advisors as separate entities even after a merger. To account for 
this problem, we track mergers between advisors during the period of interest. For merged 
advisors, we add the market shares of both entities and recalculate their ranking. Whenever we 
come across subsidiaries of advisors, we incorporate their market share in the parent firm market 
share.  
We complement the SDC Platinum data with bidder characteristics from Compustat. In 
addition, we add data on stock prices and indices, which are adjusted for dividends and stock 
splits, from CRSP for US bidders and from Datastream for Canadian bidders. 
 
3.3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.2 displays the full sample of 2674 acquisitions, the subsample of 206 acquisitions 
for which the winners offered their services and the subsample of 2468 acquisitions in which non-
winners were involved. The table also includes the results of the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney 
(WMW) tests and t-tests that we run to compare differences in the dependent and independent 
variables across both of the subsamples. All of the variables are defined in Table 3.10. 
To capture the short-term performance of bidders, we calculate their CARs around the 
acquisition announcements. We execute an event study using the market model that was 
introduced by Fama et al. (1969). Panel A in Table 3.2 reveals that the mean CAR[-2;+2] in our 
sample equals -0.22%. The median is -0.34%, which indicates that the majority of acquisitions do 
not create bidder shareholder value, which is in line with the findings of the previous studies (e.g., 
Roll, 1986; Lang et al., 1991; Moeller et al., 2005; Malmendier and Tate, 2008). The CARs of 
bidders who use the services of winners do not appear to be significantly different from the CARs 
in acquisitions in which bidders employ non-winners at conventional levels.  
We also compare total and bidder synergies. Kale et al. (2003) and Golubov et al. (2012) 
suggest that total synergies may indicate how good bidder advisors are in structuring an 
acquisition and identifying a good business combination (the better merger hypothesis). In 
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addition, these works suggest that the part of total synergies that accrues to the bidder captures 
the negotiation skill of the bidder’s advisor (the skilled negotiation hypothesis). We do not find 
any univariate differences in means or medians with regard to total synergies. Winners seem to 
be slightly better than non-winners in creating bidder synergies. The difference between the two 
groups in bidder synergies is significant at the 1% level, but only for means.  
In panel B we group the independent variables that we expect to be related to bidder 
shareholder value creation (see, e.g., Rau, 2000; Fuller et al., 2002; Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003; 
Moeller et al., 2004; Masulis et al., 2007; Ismail, 2010; Golubov et al., 2012; Harford et al., 2012) 
into three categories: advisor characteristics, deal characteristics and bidder characteristics. The 
mean advisor market share in our sample is 13.42%, and the median is 7.50%. Unsurprisingly, 
winners have significantly higher market shares with a mean of 42.41% and a median of 46.48% 
compared to non-winners, whose mean and median are 11.01% and 5.73%, respectively. 
Winners seem to be involved in cash only acquisitions more often than non-winners. 
Public firms make 41% of all acquisition targets, and their acquirers are more likely to be advised 
by winners than by non-winners. The mean and median acquisition values equal US$ 959.78 
million and US$ 166.98 million, respectively.  
We find that winners tend to advise larger bidders with mean and median sizes of US$ 
15.39 billion and US$ 5.62 billion, while the mean and median sizes are US$ 7.60 billion and 
US$ 0.80 billion when the bidder is advised by a non-winner. The mean sigma of the total sample 
equals 2.48%, whereas bidders that are advised by winners seem to have a lower sigma than 
bidders that are advised by non-winners. According to the WMW-test, bidders which are advised 
by winners seem to have a significantly lower book-to-market ratio than bidders who are advised 
by non-winners, and bidders which are advised by winners appear to be significantly higher 
levered than bidders which are advised by non-winners. We use the cash-flow-to-equity ratio, 
which equals 2.41 on average in our sample, to proxy for the empire-building behavior that 
managers may exhibit (see, e.g., Jensen, 1986). Bidders which are advised by winners seem to 
have a higher cash-flow-to-equity ratio than bidders which are advised by non-winners. The mean 
defense score, which reflects the strength of anti-takeover provisions, of companies that are 
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advised by winners amounts to 0.31, while that of companies that are advised by non-winners is 
0.29. The variable IB relationship indicates that winners tend to have stronger prior relationships 
with their clients than non-winners. A total of 84% of bidders which are advised by winners have 
analyst coverage, whereas only 62% of bidders which are advised by non-winners are covered by 
analysts, which indicates that winners focus on acquisitions with higher reputational exposure. 
In addition to short-term performance, we are also interested in bidder long-term 
performance. In panel C, we present the bidders’ buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) that 
announced an acquisition between July 2001 and December 2008, within the period between July 
2001 and December 2013. As benchmarks, we use the CRSP value-weighted market index return 
for the US bidders and the MSCI Canada value-weighted market return for the Canadian bidders. 
The period that we use to calculate BHARs starts on the second day after the acquisition 
announcement and ends either 12, 36 or 60 months later or on the earlier delisting date. Over all 
three periods, the bidders seem to underperform the market. For example, the mean and median 
60-months BHARs are highly negative at -36.42% and -48.51%, respectively. The bidders which 
used non-winners tend to underperform the bidders which employed winners. The difference in 
medians is significant for all three time horizons. 
Table 3.3 depicts pairwise correlations between all independent variables we use in the 
main analysis. It allows us to conclude that our regressions are not affected by multicollinearity. 
Only the correlation coefficients between advisor market share and winner as well as between 
advisor market share and log(size) are greater than 50%. We pay attention to this potential 
multicollinearity problem in Table 3.9, where we exclude the variable advisor market share from 
the main regression. This robustness check delivers qualitatively similar results as the main 
regression. 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics 
                                (2) - (3) 
    Full sample (1)    Winner (2)   Non-winner (3)    WMW test   t-test 
Variable Unit          median        mean         stdev         N            median        mean         stdev         N            median        mean         stdev          N            z-value            t-value 
Panel A: Short-term effects: Dependent variables                             
CAR [-2;+2] % -0.34 -0.22 8.83 2674           -0.64 -0.46 7.86 206           -0.31 -0.21 8.91 2468           1.00  0.44 
Advisor fees % 0.55 0.69 0.57 254           0.52 0.54 0.43 35           0.56 0.71 0.58 219           1.49  2.05* 
Total synergies US$ million 1.35 -111.21 1778.89 842           18.90 -313.07 2671.57 93           1.28 -86.14 1635.35 749           -0.33  0.80 
Bidder synergies % -8.17 -136.08 849.12 842           -6.97 -47.39 172.88 93           -8.40 -147.09 897.71 749           -2.67  -0.19*** 
Panel B: Short-term effects: Independent variables                             
Advisor characteristics                                   
Advisor market share % 7.50 13.42 14.67 2674           46.48 42.41 11.01 206           5.73 11.01 12.13 2468           -21.72***  -39.02*** 
Deal characteristics                                   
Friendly acquisition dummy 1.00 0.99 0.10 2674           1.00 0.98 0.14 206           1.00 0.99 0.10 2468           1.31  0.99 
Cash only  acquisition dummy 0.00 0.31 0.46 2674           0.00 0.36 0.48 206           0.00 0.30 0.46 2468           -1.77*  -1.70* 
Stock only acquisition dummy 0.00 0.16 0.37 2674           0.00 0.15 0.36 206           0.00 0.16 0.37 2468           0.44  0.45 
Partial stock acquisition dummy 0.00 0.45 0.50 2674           0.00 0.43 0.50 206           0.00 0.45 0.50 2468           0.57  0.57 
Public status dummy 0.00 0.41 0.49 2674           1.00 0.52 0.50 206           0.00 0.40 0.49 2468           -3.53***  -3.48*** 
Tender offer dummy 0.00 0.07 0.25 2674           0.00 0.09 0.29 206           0.00 0.06 0.24 2468           -1.62  -1.40 
Focused acquisition dummy 1.00 0.64 0.48 2674           1.00 0.67 0.47 206           1.00 0.64 0.48 2468           -0.78  -0.79 
Acquisition value US$ million 166.98 959.78 3883.09 2674           745.00 3037.10 6127.89 206           146.87 786.38 3581.44 2468           -13.65***  -5.20*** 
Relative acquisition value ratio 0.19 0.87 20.83 2674           0.19 0.43 0.74 206           0.19 0.91 21.68 2468           0.09  1.10 
Bidder characteristics                                   
Size US$ billion 0.95 8.20 27.35 2674           5.62 15.39 26.55 206           0.80 7.60 27.33 2468           -4.04***  -12.92*** 
Runup % -2.35 1.78 42.71 2674           -0.23 2.44 30.14 206           -2.49 1.72 43.60 2468           -1.00  -0.31 
Sigma % 2.04 2.48 1.50 2674           1.64 1.89 1.10 206           2.09 2.52 1.52 2468           6.87***  7.71*** 
Book-to-market ratio 0.47 1.12 22.52 2531           0.41 0.48 0.43 204           0.48 1.18 23.48 2327           4.04***  1.44 
Leverage % 17.06 20.60 19.28 2523           19.54 23.09 19.67 202           16.99 20.38 19.23 2321           -2.18**  -1.88* 
Cash-flow-to-equity ratio 5.23 2.41 40.18 2146           6.32 6.09 9.90 167           5.14 2.10 41.72 1979           -3.85***  -3.30*** 
Defense score ratio 0.28 0.29 0.12 2533           0.28 0.31 0.10 200           0.28 0.29 0.12 2333           -2.71**  -2.23** 
Experience ratio 1.00 0.80 0.40 2674           1.00 0.84 0.37 206           1.00 0.80 0.40 2468           -1.15  -1.22 
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Table 3.2 (continued): Descriptive statistics 
IB relation ratio 0.00 0.17 0.28 2674           0.01 0.19 0.28 206           0.00 0.16 0.28 2468           -2.80**  -1.34 
Analyst coverage dummy 1.00 0.64 0.48 2674           1.00 0.84 0.37 206           1.00 0.62 0.49 2468           -6.35***  -8.09*** 
Panel C: Long-term effects                                   
12-month BHAR % -11.75 -10.72 40.79 2674           -7.03 -6.85 27.52 206           -12.47 -11.04 41.70 2468           -2.61***  -2.00** 
36-month BHAR % -33.41 -25.55 64.25 2674           -27.23 -19.91 49.71 206           -34.09 -26.02 65.30 2468           -2.30**  -1.65 
60-month BHAR % -48.51 -36.42 81.23 2674           -40.83 -30.77 57.57 206           -48.77 -36.89 82.89 2468  -2.36**  -1.41 
This table presents sample summary statistics and the results of the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney (WMW) test and t-test that we run to compare dependent variables 
related to short-term effects (panel A), independent variables related to short-term effects (panel B) and variables related to long-term effects (panel C) between 
winners and non-winners. All of the variables that are defined in Table 3.10. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3.3: Correlation matrix 
  Winner Advisor 
market 
share 
Friendly 
acqui-
sition 
Cash only 
acqui-
sition 
Stock only 
acquisition 
Public 
status 
Tender 
offer 
Focused 
acquisition 
Log 
(Size) 
Runup Sigma Book-to-
market 
Leverage Cash-
flow-to-
equity 
Defense 
score 
Ex-
perience 
IB 
relation 
Winner 1.00                                
Advisor market share 0.57*** 1.00                              
Friendly acquisition -0.03 -0.04** 1.00                            
Cash only acquisition 0.03* 0.08*** -0.03* 1.00                          
Stock only acquisition -0.01 -0.05*** 0.02 -0.29*** 1.00                        
Public status 0.07*** 0.11*** -0.12*** -0.06*** 0.31*** 1.00                      
Tender offer 0.03 0.07*** -0.28*** 0.17*** -0.04** 0.31*** 1.00                     
Focused acquisition 0.02 -0.00 -0.03 -0.07*** 0.07*** 0.10*** -0.02 1.00                   
Log(Size) 0.24*** 0.52*** -0.07*** 0.20*** -0.13*** 0.15*** 0.13*** -0.08*** 1.00                 
Runup 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.04* 0.01 -0.01 0.04** 1.00               
Sigma -0.11*** -0.21*** 0.01 -0.15*** 0.21*** -0.09*** -0.03* 0.04** -0.50*** -0.04** 1.00             
Book-to-market -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.07*** -0.03 -0.09*** -0.02 0.01 1.00           
Leverage 0.04* 0.14*** -0.00 -0.03 -0.06*** -0.04** -0.03 -0.09*** 0.13*** 0.04** -0.21*** -0.02 1.00         
Cash-flow-to-equity 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.04* 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.12*** 0.07*** -0.24*** 0.00 -0.01 1.00       
Defense score 0.04** 0.04* 0.02 0.02 -0.07*** 0.01 -0.06*** -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.09*** -0.02 0.02 0.02 1.00     
Experience 0.02 0.13*** -0.00 0.09*** -0.07*** 0.04** 0.05** -0.04** 0.30*** 0.03 -0.15*** 0.01 0.03 0.04* -0.00 1.00   
IB relation 0.03 0.08*** 0.02 -0.04* 0.07*** -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.05** -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.04** 0.06*** 1.00 
This table presents a pairwise correlation matrix of the independent variables that we use in our main analysis. All variables are defined in Table 3.10. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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3.4 Short-term effects  
In this chapter we investigate whether winners are associated with higher acquisition 
announcement returns than non-winners (3.4.1.). We then consider the non-randomness in 
advisor-bidder matching (3.4.2.). We also contrast our new quality measure “winner” with the 
commonly-used quality measure “top-tier advisor.” 
 
3.4.1  Announcement returns 
In Table 3.4 panel A, we first regress the bidder announcement CAR[-2;+2] on the winner 
dummy and on several advisor, deal and bidder characteristics that we expect to be related to 
shareholder value creation. All of the announcement return specifications include year and 
industry fixed effects. Overall, our results suggest that, compared to non-winners, winners create 
more shareholder value for their clients.17 This effect is not rooted in the larger market shares of 
winners, which might partly reflect their quality, because we controlled for the advisor market 
share in all four regressions. Interestingly, we do not find a similar positive relationship between 
top-tier advisor and bidder shareholder value.  
In Specification 1 we include the winner dummy and all of the deal characteristics in the 
regression. In Specifications 2, we add bidder characteristics. The coefficient on winner is positive 
and highly significant in both specifications. In Specification 3, we include time-invariant 
dummies for advisors that won an award at least once during our sample period. This may be 
crucial, considering that Bao and Edmans (2011) demonstrate the importance of unobserved 
advisor fixed effects for acquisition announcement returns. The magnitude of the winner effect 
increases and is economically important: the CARs of bidders which are advised by winners are 
                                                 
17 The results are similar for subsamples that include only private and subsidiary targets or only public 
targets. We obtain qualitatively similar results for regressions with alternative event windows (three and eleven days) 
and with the S&P500 market index instead of the CRSP market index.  
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3 percentage points higher than those of bidders which are advised by non-winners. In 
Specification 4, we investigate whether the clients of winners outperform the clients of top-tier 
advisors. For that purpose, we perform the same regression as in Specification 3, but we restrict 
the sample to top-tier advisors and winners. We find that, even within a sample of top-tier 
advisors, winners are associated with a higher value creation.  
In Specifications 5 and 6, we regress bidder CARs on top-tier advisor (instead on winner) 
using the same control variables as in previous specifications. The coefficient on top-tier advisor 
is insignificant. When we include both quality measures in one regression at the same time, the 
winner dummy remains significant, and top-tier advisor is insignificant (the results are not 
presented here, but they are available upon request). These results suggest that our measure might 
capture the quality of advisors more accurately than the top-tier advisor variable does. We should 
note that control variables have similar effects across all Specifications 1 to 6.  
 
3.4.2 Endogeneity in advisor-bidder matching 
When bidders do not pick advisors randomly, the OLS results may be biased and 
inconsistent. To address the non-random matching between advisors and bidders, we use a 
Heckman two-stage regression approach (Heckman, 1979) and extend it with a switching 
regression model. Fang (2005) and Golubov et al. (2012) employ a similar model to analyze how 
advisor quality affects performance. The model allows the estimation of the unobserved outcome 
on the counterfactual and answers a “what-if” question: What would the (hypothetical) bidder 
CAR have been if a bidder had been advised by a winner instead of a non-winner? In the first-
stage (selection) regression, we estimate the probability of a bidder choosing a winner by running 
a probit regression where the dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 for acquisitions in 
which winners provide advice and zero for acquisitions in which non-winners provide advice. In 
the second stage, we estimate two linear regressions with the dependent variable CAR[-2;+2] for 
winners and non-winners separately. In both of these second-stage regressions, we correct for the 
non-random matching by incorporating the inverse of the Mills ratio obtained from the first stage 
as an additional independent variable. The two-equation system offers the possibility of specifying 
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the outcome separately for bidders which are advised by winners and for bidders which are 
advised by non-winners (Li and Prabhala, 2007). This approach has the advantage that of allowing 
us to relax the assumption of equality of the regression coefficients in the second-stage regression 
(e.g., Fang, 2005).  
As an exclusion restriction, we construct the variable scope, which captures the intensity 
of the relationship between a bidder and (any) winner. A similar variable has been used in related 
studies. For example, Golubov et al. (2012) employ the scope variable to capture the intensity of 
the relationships between bidders and top-tier advisors over a five-year period prior to a specific 
acquisition. Our scope variable reflects whether a bidder had relied on the services of any winner 
in the form of advice on acquisitions, equity issues or debt issues during the previous five years. 
We construct this variable on a rolling basis. For that purpose, we collect data on all acquisitions, 
debt and equity issues from SDC Platinum since 1995. Scope equals 1, 2 and 3, respectively, if a 
bidder employed a winner for one, two, or all three of the three types of services that are listed 
above. Finally, scope equals 0 if the bidder had no dealings with a winner over the previous five 
years.  
We expect that this variable is linked to the probability of a bidder choosing a winner 
because a bidder which has already used the services of a winner in the past is more likely to 
choose to work with a winner again than a bidder which has never worked with a winner before. 
At the same time, because we do not consider the relationship between a bidder and a specific 
advisor but between a bidder and any winner, it seems unlikely that this relationship could be 
linked to the bidder CAR in a particular acquisition. 
The results of the first-stage regression are displayed in Specification 7 of Table 3.4. The 
variable scope is highly significant and positive. This means that a bidder which has hired a winner 
once is likely to do so again in the future. Specifications 8 and 9 depict the results of the second-
stage regressions for winners and non-winners, respectively. Based on these results, panel B 
provides answer to the “what-if” question by showing the actual and the hypothetical bidder CARs 
for the winners and non-winners as well as the difference between the two and their t-values. 
Technically, we plug in the deal and bidder characteristics of acquisitions that were advised by 
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non-winners in the winner equation and vice versa (see, e.g., Golubov et al., 2012). For bidders 
which engaged winners, the hypothetical CAR shows what the CAR would be when these bidders 
hired a non-winner. If the bidders had been advised by non-winners instead of winners in the same 
acquisition, there would have been a significant deterioration of 1.40 percentage points in the 
CARs. In the opposite case, specifically if the bidders which had used non-winners had instead 
employed winners, their CAR would be significantly improved by 3.99 percentage points.18  
 
Table 3.4: Advisor quality and announcement returns 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (7)   (8) (9) 
Dependent variable CAR [-2;+2]   Winner   CAR [-2;+2] 
                    Winner Non-winner 
Winner 0.0122** 0.0169*** 0.0296** 0.0243**             
  (0.0048) (0.0064) (0.0145) (0.0090)             
Top-tier advisor        -0.0059 -0.0055          
         (0.0054) (0.0054)          
Advisor market share -0.0003*** -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0005* 0.0002 0.0002      -0.0012** -0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)      (0.0004) (0.0002) 
Scope             0.2379***       
              (0.0544)       
Friendly acquisition 0.0209 0.0131 0.0182 0.0080 0.0113 0.0130  -0.0046   0.0140 0.0160 
  (0.0141) (0.0154) (0.0184) (0.0163) (0.0140) (0.0153)  (0.3673)   (0.0422) (0.0159) 
Cash only acquisition 0.0045 0.0070 0.0073 0.0030 0.0058 0.0071  -0.0481   -0.0340** 0.0125** 
  (0.0038) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0079) (0.0045) (0.0046)  (0.0893)   (0.0115) (0.0049) 
Stock only acquisition -0.0068 -0.0127 -0.0129 -0.0237 -0.0080 -0.0124  0.0259   -0.0798*** -0.0076 
  (0.0071) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0146) (0.0078) (0.0078)  (0.0851)   (0.0170) (0.0085) 
Public status -0.0402*** -0.0397*** -0.0397*** -0.0363*** -0.0409*** -0.0397***  0.1134   -0.0434*** -0.0427*** 
  (0.0037) (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0068) (0.0043) (0.0045)  (0.1326)   (0.0124) (0.0052) 
Tender offer 0.0192** 0.0186** 0.0185** 0.0208* 0.0190** 0.0186**  -0.0035   0.0105 0.0186** 
  (0.0077) (0.0081) (0.0084) (0.0119) (0.0078) (0.0080)  (0.1230)   (0.0237) (0.0088) 
Focused acquisition 0.0015 -0.0011 -0.0012 0.0069 -0.0012 -0.0011  0.2157***   -0.0106 -0.0060 
  (0.0032) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0078) (0.0041) (0.0042)  (0.0706)   (0.0094) (0.0050) 
Log(size)   -0.0038*** -0.0040*** -0.0020 -0.0037** -0.0038***  0.2275***   -0.0219** -0.0099*** 
                                                 
18 An alternative scope variable leads to qualitatively similar results. The alternative scope variable is binary and 
equals 1 for each case in which a bidder has used the services of a winner in the previous five years at least once, 
independently of the type of the transaction (acquisition, debt offering, equity offering, or any combination of 
those) and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 3.4 (continued): Advisor quality and announcement returns 
    (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0015) (0.0013)  (0.0281)   (0.0074) (0.0034) 
Runup   -0.0244*** -0.0245*** -0.0256*** -0.0241*** -0.0245***  0.0372   -0.0134 -0.0261*** 
    (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0087) (0.0058) (0.0059)  (0.0759)   (0.0118) (0.0062) 
Sigma   -0.3803 -0.3574 -0.4065 -0.2164 -0.3801  0.7690   -0.1207 -0.5369* 
    (0.2918) (0.2920) (0.5631) (0.2683) (0.2913)  (2.9969)   (0.5564) (0.3122) 
Book-to-market   -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0054 -0.0002*** -0.0002***  -0.0425   -0.0242 0.0007 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0082) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.1103)   (0.0179) (0.0005) 
Leverage   0.0307** 0.0301** 0.0449* 0.0314** 0.0297**  -0.2967*   0.0581 0.0241* 
    (0.0151) (0.0150) (0.0229) (0.0150) (0.0149)  (0.1584)   (0.0745) (0.0138) 
Cash-flow-to-equity   0.0022 0.0034 0.0000 0.0026 0.0023  0.1045   0.0712** -0.0001 
    (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0039) (0.0057) (0.0058)  (0.1438)   (0.0304) (0.0058) 
Defense score   -0.0360** -0.0365** -0.0585**   -0.0351**  0.9343***   0.0032 -0.0567*** 
    (0.0160) (0.0161) (0.0263)   (0.0160)  (0.1958)   (0.0756) (0.0207) 
Experience   -0.0020 -0.0014 0.0085   -0.0024  -0.4285***   0.0000 0.0061 
    (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0104)   (0.0072)  (0.0820)   (0.0243) (0.0084) 
IB relation   -0.0050 -0.0054 -0.0087   -0.0053  0.1260   -0.0174 -0.0061 
    (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0108)   (0.0066)  (0.1430)   (0.0297) (0.0070) 
Inverse Mills ratio                 -0.0849*** -0.0221* 
                  (0.0236) (0.0129) 
Constant 0.0186 0.0668*** 0.0610** 0.0502 0.0465** 0.0663***  -3.5063***   0.4259*** 0.1614*** 
  (0.0175) (0.0235) (0.0254) (0.0340) (0.0201) (0.0233)  (0.4408)   (0.1045) (0.0582) 
Winner dummies NO NO YES NO NO NO  NO   NO NO 
Year and industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES  NO   YES YES 
N 2674 2034 2034 783 2138 2034   2051   159 1874 
R-sq/pseudo R-sq 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.10   0.15   0.37 0.10 
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Table 3.4 (continued): Advisor quality and announcement returns 
Panel B Winner   Non-winner 
CAR [-2;+2] mean N t-value   mean N t-value 
Actual 0.06% 159 0.13   -0.46% 1874 -6.85*** 
Hypothetical -1.33% 160 -5.54***   3.54% 1891 11.49*** 
Improvement -1.40% 159 -3.57***   3.99% 1874 13.00*** 
Panel A of this table presents coefficients from OLS regressions with the dependent variable bidder announcement 
CAR [-2;+2]). In addition to the winner dummy, Specification (1) includes deal characteristics. In Specifications (2), 
we add bidder characteristics. In Specification (3), we include winner dummies for advisors that have won an award 
during the sample period at least once. In Specification (4), we drop all acquisitions where neither top-tier advisors 
nor winners are involved. In Specifications (5) and (6), we use the top-tier advisor dummy instead of the winner 
dummy as our main variable of interest. We then execute a two-stage Heckman regression with an endogenous 
switching regression model. The first stage (Specification (7)) is a probit regression with the winner dummy as the 
dependent variable. In the second stage, we include the endogeneity correction from the first stage and run two 
separate OLS regressions with bidder announcement CAR [-2;+2] as the dependent variable for winners 
(Specifications (8)) and non-winners (Specifications (9)); panel B shows the results of the what-if analysis based on 
these estimates. All variables are defined in Table 3.10. Standard errors clustered on advisor level are provided in 
parentheses. We winsorize CARs at the 1% level. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
3.5 Sources of value creation, fees and reputational exposure 
We start by analyzing the channels through which winners may create value (3.5.1.) The 
previous studies suggest that advisor quality may be related to the level of total and bidder 
synergies that result from an acquisition (Kale et al., 2003; Golubov et al., 2012), including the 
speed (Rau, 2000), the premium and the probability of deal completion (Kale et al., 2003). Then, 
we investigate whether hiring a winner comes at a higher cost than hiring a non-winner (3.5.2.). 
Finally, we investigate whether value creation differs in acquisitions with different levels of 
reputational exposure (3.5.3.). 
 
3.5.1 Synergies and acquisition execution 
Table 3.5 sheds light on the relationship between advisor quality and the synergies that 
emerge in acquisitions. We find that winners are associated with greater total and greater bidder 
synergies. In Specification 1, we investigate whether high-quality advisors are associated with a 
greater amount of total synergies than their lower-quality counterparts. We regress the total 
amount of synergies on our main variable of interest, the winner, and a number of advisor, deal 
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and bidder characteristics. Moreover, we include year and industry fixed effects. In Specification 
2, we analyze whether winners are able to transfer a greater part of these synergies to their clients 
than non-winners, by regressing the bidder synergies on the same independent variables that we 
use in Specification 1. 
The results of Specification 1 suggest that winners are associated with a greater amount 
of synergies in the acquisitions in which they act as advisors. This indicates that winners may be 
able to screen the market more efficiently and pick better targets than non-winners. This finding 
supports the “better merger hypothesis”. The results of Specification 2 lend support to the 
conclusion that winners are able to capture a larger part of the total synergies on behalf of the 
bidder, which supports the view that they are more skilled in acquisition execution than non-
winners. This is in line with the “skilled negotiation hypothesis”. To examine whether this also 
applies to top-tier advisors, we perform the same regressions, but we replace the winner dummy 
with the top-tier advisor dummy. We present the results in Specifications 3 and 4. Top-tier 
advisors do not seem to identify more synergetic acquisitions than non-winners, although they 
appear to be associated with greater bidder synergies (significant only at the 10% level). However, 
when we include both quality measures in one regression at the same time, the winner dummy 
remains significant and the top-tier advisor dummy becomes insignificant in both regressions 
(results available upon request). 
In the remaining Specifications in Table 3.5, we execute Heckman two-stage regressions 
to control for non-random matching between advisor and bidder. The first-stage regression is the 
same as that in Chapter 3.4.2 (see Specification 7 in Table 3.4). We depict second-stage 
regressions for total synergies in Specifications 5 and 6 and for bidder synergies in Specifications 
7 and 8 for winner and non-winner, respectively. As the inverse Mills ratios are not significant, 
the results of the OLS regressions seem to be reliable.   
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Table 3.5: Advisor quality and synergies 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Dependent variable Total  Bidder  Total  Bidder  Total synergies    Bidder synergies  
  synergies  synergies  synergies  synergies  Winner Non-winner  Winner Non-winner 
Winner 384.0211**  270.0087***                 
  (152.8454)  (98.8912)                 
Top-tier advisor       -302.4296  250.3763*           
        (242.2135)  (132.9259)           
Advisor market share -4.8842  -5.1104**  6.8311  -6.4314*  -48.2310** -1.6756  -1.4743 -4.4568** 
  (4.6480)  (2.0244)  (7.7222)  (3.3807)  (13.7966) (4.6493)  (2.2389) (1.7018) 
Friendly acquisition -192.7633  59.6169  -208.9304  67.8971  5.6458 -217.7885  94.7250** 73.9012 
  (197.0762)  (70.3743)  (187.6234)  (77.4125)  (820.1730) (243.8955)  (33.9993) (91.3166) 
Cash only  acquisition 244.4207*  41.2854  246.5976*  56.1497  288.5333 308.8653*  98.0333 48.8607 
  (142.8438)  (101.0627)  (138.4968)  (105.4250)  (181.0178) (161.4889)  (118.3747) (114.5480) 
Stock only acquisition -411.1671**  85.3580  -392.9592**  94.4514  -1.19e+03*** -321.1191*  77.0186 105.8779 
  (179.2684)  (59.6887)  (173.2685)  (62.9660)  (254.3720) (174.5544)  (103.6736) (71.2945) 
Public status -820.5301*  -200.7032*  -775.2987*  -224.6897*  -2.82e+03*** -389.4948*  -299.2941* -200.2881* 
  (438.4469)  (105.1473)  (455.8500)  (124.1166)  (577.7899) (208.7069)  (146.8715) (107.6129) 
Tender offer 59.4104  76.1449  49.5485  78.7588  182.3613 107.0776  153.9528*** 78.9621 
  (221.2301)  (72.3424)  (216.8061)  (71.3915)  (181.0407) (255.8503)  (10.8063) (83.5820) 
Focused acquisition 267.2747  71.3209  268.5309  73.4827  -733.5311* 286.7215  50.9546 42.5630 
  (212.8820)  (61.4060)  (214.0721)  (61.9864)  (362.7571) (238.9457)  (48.2212) (58.7490) 
Log(size) -190.0254*  27.1689  -188.7845*  14.6244  -727.4544* -288.4672**  -62.1858 8.6777 
  (111.5142)  (18.8456)  (108.0480)  (19.1207)  (335.7064) (139.7449)  (52.8724) (36.5499) 
Runup -4.2288  11.4257  -6.1388  17.6474  -125.9627 -4.6670  34.9397 20.2636 
  (75.8039)  (59.3149)  (75.3392)  (61.9430)  (277.9222) (99.9515)  (52.0814) (65.6681) 
Sigma -12307.5600  4801.8192**  -13199.2700  4589.9046**  -8.88e+03 -1.44e+04  3187.7646** 4985.3522** 
  (12273.5100)  (2125.9392)  (12461.6000)  (2105.4930)  (1.30e+04) (1.50e+04)  (1099.1483) (2380.3583) 
Book-to-market -1.3420**  0.4807**  -1.4002**  0.4030**  -39.6236 -124.5779  -73.4597 19.3353 
  (0.5583)  (0.1965)  (0.5682)  (0.1930)  (688.2188) (84.5432)  (91.8257) (42.4850) 
Leverage -679.4750  183.7992  -692.0305  126.9896  -4.19e+03*** -637.4912  -382.0387* 238.4980 
  (527.9756)  (156.1515)  (516.0640)  (147.9416)  (1133.3643) (569.2476)  (177.1917) (172.7475) 
Cash-flow-to-equity 74.2776  2.5821  69.6708  -24.5301  976.3046** 28.6709  252.5734 4.1327 
  (142.1465)  (60.2063)  (143.2212)  (56.9414)  (379.8214) (146.1027)  (146.4342) (64.8372) 
Defense score 381.3399  456.7921*  442.1123  439.5052*  -2.81e+03* 16.2712  -344.7642 422.9875 
  (497.4220)  (252.0775)  (517.3581)  (232.9519)  (1361.9192) (507.7675)  (200.6308) (271.0704) 
Experience 89.6216  146.4063  97.1035  136.3924  -569.2381 183.5981*  -122.5397*** 177.3152 
  (85.5308)  (197.2337)  (84.0492)  (187.7947)  (625.7089) (107.8384)  (31.2503) (201.8006) 
IB relation 671.1373  212.4835***  646.1813  181.6285***  314.7644 512.9557  -223.9580 230.9938*** 
  (411.5242)  (67.1615)  (406.7348)  (67.8600)  (1377.1919) (399.9372)  (314.3903) (72.5612) 
Inverse Mills ratio             -2.72e+03 -298.7532  -301.9939 -82.0582 
              (1463.6994) (229.5361)  (270.2068) (161.7272) 
Constant 2471.8550**  -637.1717**  2465.3264**  -574.1854**  1.90e+04** 3506.0898**  1385.1140 -419.5724 
  (1207.2554)  (249.2914)  (1196.8157)  (230.4892)  (5927.8868) (1659.7349)  (1016.2614) (606.9430) 
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Table 3.5 (continued): Advisor quality and synergies 
Year and industry FE YES  YES  YES  YES  YES YES  YES YES 
N 634  634  634  634  74 559  74 559 
R-sq/ps.R-sq 0.08  0.06  0.08  0.06  0.52 0.08  0.44 0.07 
This table presents coefficients from OLS regressions with the dependent variables total synergies Specifications (1), 
(3), (5) and (6)) and bidder synergies (Specifications (2), (4), (7) and (8)). In addition to the winner dummy, 
Specifications (1) and (2) include deal and bidder characteristics. In Specifications (3) and (4), we use the top-tier 
advisor dummy instead of the winner dummy. In Specifications (5) and (6), we show the second-stage results from 
Heckman regressions for total synergies for winners and non-winners, respectively, and in Specifications (7) and (8), 
we depict the second-stage results from Heckman regressions for bidder synergies for winners and non-winners, 
respectively. For the first stage see Specification (7) in Table 3.4. All variables are defined in Table 3.10. Standard 
errors clustered on advisor level appear in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
To test whether winners are associated with faster, cheaper and more successfully 
completed acquisitions, we additionally regress (a) the time between announcement and 
completion, (b) the premium paid and (c) the success dummy (which reflects whether an 
acquisition was successfully completed) on our main variable winner and control variables. The 
results (available upon request) indicate that bidders who use the services of winners do not 
complete their acquisitions faster than other bidders. Furthermore, we do not find any differences 
in the premium paid or in the probability of success. We conclude that winner value creation 
comes mainly from greater synergy creation.  
 
3.5.2 Advisor fees 
Acquisition activity is an important source of income for investment banks. According to 
Thomson Reuters (2014), the advisor fees for acquisitions that involved either a North American 
bidder, a North American target or both equaled US$ 19.4 billion in 2014. Kolasinski and Kothari 
(2008) report that advisor fees from acquisitions by far exceeded advisor fees from underwriting 
services in every year between 1995 and 2002. Kale et al. (2003) suggest that quality, CARs and 
advisor fees are positively related. To investigate whether winners receive higher fees for their 
value-increasing advisory services compared to non-winners, we regress the advisor fees on the 
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winner dummy and several deal and bidder characteristics that have been used in the previous 
studies (e.g., Golubov et al., 2012).  
The fees (relative to acquisition value) that the winners charge their clients are higher by 
0.15–0.17 percentage points than the fees of the non-winners (results not depicted but available 
upon request). This is economically important because the median fee is 0.55 in our sample. We 
further test whether top-tier advisors also charge higher fees by replacing the variable winner with 
the variable top-tier advisor. The fees that the top-tier advisors obtain are higher by 0.35 
percentage points than the fees that are charged by the lower-ranking advisors although, as the 
findings that are presented above suggest, the top-tier advisors do not create more shareholder 
value for the bidders on average. Because neither bidders nor advisors are obliged to report their 
fees to the SEC (McLaughlin, 1990; Golubov et al., 2012), the number of observations in this 
analysis is far lower than in the previous analyses (35 for winners, 219 for non-winners). 
Therefore, we do not place much emphasis on these results.  
 
3.5.3 Reputational exposure and value creation 
The recent research suggests that advisors tend to put different levels of effort into 
different acquisitions (Golubov et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2014; Derrien and Dessaint, 2017). We 
expect that advisors channel resources to more visible acquisitions because the potential 
reputational gains are larger than they are in less visible acquisitions. Conversely, visible 
acquisitions involve the risk of severe reputational damage for advisors if they perform poorly 
(Rhee and Valdez, 2009).  
As a proxy for visibility and reputational exposure, we employ the variable analyst 
coverage, a dummy that equals 1 for bidders with analyst coverage at the time of the acquisition 
and 0 otherwise. Firms that are covered by analysts are exposed to the market due to regular 
analyst reports and news statements more than firms without analyst coverage. Therefore, we 
expect advisors to put more effort into acquisitions that involve bidders which are covered by 
analysts. Because we cannot observe advisor effort directly, we focus on shareholder value and 
synergy creation, and we expect higher effort to result in higher CARs and greater synergies. To 
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investigate whether high-quality advisors are associated with higher levels of CARs and 
synergies, particularly in acquisitions with higher reputational exposure, we interact the variable 
analyst coverage with the winner dummy and, alternatively, with the top-tier advisor dummy. 
Table 3.6 shows the results, which support the hypothesis that high-quality advisors tend 
to create larger CARs and greater total synergies in acquisitions with high reputational exposure. 
The interaction term between the winner variable and the variable analyst coverage in 
Specifications 1 and 3 has a positive and significant coefficient. In comparison, the effect of the 
interaction term between the top-tier variable and the variable analyst coverage, which we show 
in Specifications 2 and 4, becomes insignificant. We do not find differences in bidder synergies 
between acquisitions in which winner (or top-tier advisor) faces higher reputational exposure and 
other winner (or top-tier advisor) acquisitions (see Specifications 5 and 6).  
In Specification 7, we use fees as a dependent variable to obtain an indication as to whether 
the reputational gain is valuable to winners. The interaction term is significant and negative. This 
indicates that winners are willing to accept lower fees from more visible clients. In Specification 
8, we replace winner with top-tier advisor. The coefficient is again significant and negative, which 
also indicates that top-tier advisors may trade-off current fee income against an increase in their 
reputation, which might ensure them higher deal flow (and fees) in the future. However, because 
we lose many observations in these regressions, the results should be interpreted with care.  
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Table 3.6: Advisor quality, reputational exposure and short-term effects 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) (8) 
Dependent variable CAR [-2;+2]   Total synergies   Bidder synergies   Advisor fees 
Winner -0.0069    -1.0974     299.8221*     0.0045***   
  (0.0130)    (153.3978)     (153.9576)     (0.0007)   
Top-tier advisor   -0.0145     -39.9791     200.2705**    0.0055*** 
    (0.0132)     (178.5626)     (100.5902)    (0.0010) 
Analyst coverage 0.0007 -0.0004  -92.5492  68.9060  -1.4647  -50.9794  0.0003 0.0009 
  (0.0050) (0.0058)  (75.5235)  (95.2630)  (43.9995)  (72.6168)  (0.0007) (0.0010) 
Winner*analyst coverage 0.0407***    429.9187*     -33.5055     -0.0035***   
  (0.0080)    (233.3549)     (90.3473)     (0.0009)   
Top-tier*analyst coverage   0.0121     -336.1695     69.3113    -0.0031** 
    (0.0127)     (219.2867)     (89.0160)    (0.0014) 
Advisor market share 0.0000 0.0002  -4.5594  6.8246  -5.1145**  -6.4347*      
  (0.0003) (0.0002)  (4.6952)  (7.7121)  (2.0292)  (3.3859)      
Friendly acquisition 0.0188 0.0134  -199.7989  -232.4920  59.2198  68.9261  0.0011 0.0003 
  (0.0184) (0.0153)  (198.4585)  (186.5000)  (70.2420)  (79.0220)  (0.0012) (0.0013) 
Cash only acquisition 0.0072 0.0071  245.9148*  256.9131*  41.1490  54.0295      
  (0.0048) (0.0046)  (142.3855)  (136.8676)  (101.2843)  (105.5848)      
Stock only acquisition -0.0129* -0.0123  -408.6076**  -395.7801**  85.2291  95.2651      
  (0.0078) (0.0078)  (178.2910)  (174.1545)  (59.5913)  (63.6767)      
Public status -0.0396*** -0.0399***  -822.8056*  -759.5686  -201.8763*  -234.1578*      
  (0.0047) (0.0045)  (426.5172)  (464.4742)  (106.6849)  (130.5278)      
Tender offer 0.0183** 0.0188**  55.3413  39.6832  76.4150  80.6845  0.0022 -0.0004 
  (0.0084) (0.0080)  (222.1869)  (214.1277)  (72.7485)  (70.9407)  (0.0014) (0.0014) 
Focused acquisition -0.0010 -0.0009  274.0467  264.9582  71.0174  75.1761  -0.0008 -0.0009 
  (0.0045) (0.0043)  (213.6009)  (215.7925)  (62.2381)  (62.5386)  (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Log(size) -0.0043*** -0.0041***  -186.0092*  -184.0032*  27.6086  16.7290      
  (0.0014) (0.0013)  (111.8503)  (108.7137)  (19.5195)  (19.1052)      
Runup -0.0247*** -0.0248***  -7.9287  5.3936  11.6827  15.1954      
  (0.0059) (0.0059)  (75.0776)  (76.9751)  (59.3074)  (62.1098)      
Sigma -0.3674 -0.3743  -1.29e+04  -1.29e+04  4818.6509**  4420.3373**  0.1299*** 0.1222*** 
  (0.2920) (0.2907)  (1.25e+04)  (1.24e+04)  (2174.0075)  (2018.0218)  (0.0349) (0.0339) 
Book-to-market -0.0002*** -0.0002***  -1.3012**  -1.3827**  0.4857**  0.4340**      
  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.5604)  (0.5750)  (0.2077)  (0.2072)      
Leverage 0.0296** 0.0298**  -683.0069  -715.0445  182.5886  125.1199      
  (0.0147) (0.0149)  (527.4697)  (518.5611)  (156.4280)  (150.3070)      
Cash-flow-to-equity 0.0035 0.0026  91.4474  37.5305  2.7373  -11.7374      
  (0.0057) (0.0058)  (140.1888)  (132.8401)  (61.0700)  (59.5098)      
Defense score -0.0381** -0.0367**  392.6236  469.2018  459.9254*  450.3573*      
  (0.0162) (0.0162)  (504.0249)  (521.3217)  (257.5263)  (240.9581)      
Experience -0.0015 -0.0022  89.3826  90.6365  145.6023  134.1132      
  (0.0072) (0.0072)  (84.0085)  (82.9751)  (197.2037)  (188.0006)      
IB relation -0.0055 -0.0053  661.4500  635.8111  212.8450***  182.0582***      
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Table 3.6 (continued): Advisor quality, reputational exposure and short-term effects 
  (0.0066) (0.0066)  (409.3418)  (408.0207)  (67.0765)  (68.1465)      
Log(acquisition value)                  -0.0011*** -0.0015*** 
                   (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Relative acquisition value                  -0.0008*** -0.0007*** 
                   (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Partial stock acquisition                  -0.0004 -0.0009 
                   (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Constant 0.0628** 0.0678***  2508.4512**  2407.2274**  -638.0547**  -553.3605**  0.0083*** 0.0113*** 
  (0.0255) (0.0239)  (1220.0044)  (1186.5700)  (252.8495)  (225.2396)  (0.0024) (0.0026) 
Winner dummies YES NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO NO 
Year FE / industry FE YES / YES YES / YES  YES / YES  YES / YES  YES / YES  YES / YES  YES / NO YES / NO 
N 2034 2034  634  634  634  634  254 254 
R-sq 0.11 0.10  0.08  0.08  0.06  0.06  0.34 0.39 
This table presents coefficients from OLS regressions with the dependent variable bidder announcement CAR [-2;+2] 
in Specifications (1) and (2), total synergies in Specifications (3) and (4), bidder synergies in Specifications (5) and 
(6) and advisor fees in Specifications (7) and (8). All variables are defined in Table 3.10. Standard errors clustered 
on advisor level are provided in parentheses. We winsorize CARs at the 1% level. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
3.6 Choice of the winner  
Our results indicate that winners, not top-tier advisors, are associated with greater 
shareholder value and greater synergies. In other words, the league table position alone is not 
related to value creation. This calls for a closer look at how the performance and characteristics 
of advisors relate to the likelihood of winning an award. For this analysis, we aggregate our sample 
on the advisor–period level. For each advisor and period, we calculate the mean CAR, the share 
of bidders which are covered by analysts, the mean market share, the share of successfully 
completed acquisitions, the mean time that elapses between the announcement and completion of 
an acquisition, the mean synergy gain (for the bidder and the target) as well as the mean 
acquisition premium during the period that precedes the decision. The variables are defined in 
panel C of Table 3.10. 
In Table 3.7 we employ logit regressions and regress the variable winner choice on these 
advisor-period characteristics one at a time (Specifications 1 to 7). We control for mean deal 
characteristics as well as year fixed effects. The share of bidders which are covered by analysts, 
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mean advisor market share, share of completed acquisitions and mean synergies are positively 
related to the probability of an advisor receiving an award. Mean CARs and mean completion 
time do not seem to matter for winner choice. In addition, advisors that help their clients to pay 
lower premiums are more likely to become winners. In Specification 8, we include all of the 
advisor-period characteristics except for mean premium. We include this variable in Specification 
9.19 Except for mean completion time in Specification 8, which becomes significant, the results 
correspond to those from Specifications 1 to 7.  
Overall, it seems that the committees that choose winners do not base their choice only on 
advisor market shares but, in line with the guidelines of GlobalFinance, they consider a broader 
list of factors and performance measures.    
                                                 
19 We cannot include all of the variables in one specification because the model does not converge. 
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Table 3.7: Choice of the winner 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable Winner choice 
Ø CAR [-2;+2] 0.4509             -19.9801 -13.0742 
  (0.7763)             (12.6469) (12.5686) 
Ø analyst coverage   1.8487***           17.7227** 2.7014** 
    (0.1433)           (7.8686) (1.3326) 
Ø advisor market share     0.4302*         0.9126*** 0.4981** 
      (0.2252)         (0.2813) (0.2355) 
Ø compl. acquisition       1.6696***       122.4048*** 51.9877*** 
        (0.4961)       (30.6720) (19.5189) 
Ø compl. time         0.0006     0.1047** 0.0207 
          (0.0011)     (0.0409) (0.0164) 
Ø bidder synergies           0.0004***   0.0087***   
            (0.0001)   (0.0025)   
Ø target synergies           0.0004***   0.0060***   
            (0.0001)   (0.0020)   
Ø premium             -0.0282***   -0.1244* 
              (0.0041)   (0.0729) 
Ø friendly acquisition 0.8700* 1.4704*** 9.6712 -0.3676 -0.6197 1.6824* 0.9023 -33.2556** -29.5685 
  (0.4721) (0.5033) (11.7894) (0.5708) (0.8942) (0.9037) (0.5891) (14.5154) (19.2075) 
Ø cash only acquisition 0.2828 0.2556 -0.3784 0.3386 0.3873 0.4083 0.2780 5.1376 1.6470 
  (0.2647) (0.2898) (1.2132) (0.2320) (0.2509) (0.5364) (0.4092) (4.9450) (2.4095) 
Ø stock only acquisition -1.0942*** -0.9706** -24.0882 -1.1586*** -1.2090*** -1.6971*** -1.9048*** -38.4444** -26.8175 
  (0.2969) (0.4232) (16.5182) (0.3257) (0.3331) (0.6034) (0.4903) (17.1148) (20.8249) 
Ø public status 1.0506*** 1.0544*** 0.0038 1.1568*** 0.9929*** -1.2303*** -1.2595*** -3.2335 1.7381 
  (0.1578) (0.2659) (1.4622) (0.2056) (0.2089) (0.3559) (0.4137) (3.4661) (1.7437) 
Ø tender offer 0.1849 -0.0529 -37.8068* 0.0400 0.0281 -0.2934 0.1000 -81.7674*** -46.3830** 
  (0.3734) (0.4310) (21.2051) (0.4194) (0.4165) (0.5385) (0.3654) (24.0853) (22.1185) 
Ø focused acquisition -0.0060 -0.0290 -4.4075 -0.0306 -0.0224 0.2440 -0.1389 -16.5742** -6.6637 
  (0.2461) (0.2697) (5.0639) (0.2745) (0.2952) (0.5578) (0.5862) (6.4401) (5.1163) 
Constant -5.3758*** -6.8212*** -15.6828 -5.7122*** -3.7530*** -4.5281*** -2.6382** -117.9001*** -29.1408*** 
  (1.2255) (1.1854) (13.2336) (1.0438) (1.1329) (1.7223) (1.2469) (26.3036) (10.2613) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 769 769 769 769 679 392 434 376 416 
Pseudo R-sq 0.03 0.07 0.76 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.84 0.82 
This table presents coefficients from logit regressions with the dependent variable winner choice. We employ an 
advisor panel data set. The independent variables are aggregated advisor and deal characteristics per advisor over the 
period that is relevant for the choice of the winner. All variables are defined in Table 3.10 and standard errors clustered 
on advisor level are provided in parentheses. We winsorize CARs at the 1% level. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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3.7 Long-term effects 
Thus far, we have established a positive short-term reaction of bidders which are advised 
by winners. Next we test whether a positive “winner effect” also exists in the long term. 
Figure 3.1 displays the BHARs for bidders that employed winners and those that used 
non-winners, cumulated over a five-year period beginning on the second day after the acquisition 
announcement. The figure shows that, in line with the results from prior literature, bidders 
underperform the market in the long term. However, the clients of winners underperform less than 
those of non-winners.  
Figure 3.1: Winner vs. non-winner BHARs 
This figure depicts bidder buy-and-hold abnormal returns (market-adjusted using the CRSP index return) during the 
sample period 2000–2013. The subsamples consist of bidders advised by winners and bidders advised by non-
winners. The period for which we cumulate buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) starts on the second day after 
the acquisition announcement.  
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As BHARs are prone to poorly specified test statistics due to cross-sectional dependence 
problems within sample returns (Fama, 1998; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000), we use a calendar-
time analysis as our main approach.  We regress monthly calendar-time portfolio equal-
weighted excess returns on four risk factors (Fama, 1998; Lyon et al., 1999; Fama and French, 
2012):  
 
Formula 3.1: Monthly calendar-time portfolio excess returns 
Rit-Rft= αi+βi�Rmt-Rft�+siSMBt+hiHMLt+wiWMLt+eit .  
All of the variables are defined in panel D of Table 3.10. Table 3.8 shows the results that 
we obtain for the periods spanning 12, 36 and 60 months after an acquisition. Specifications 1 to 
3 show the outcomes for portfolios that consist of bidders which employed winners. Specifications 
4 to 6 show the results for portfolios of bidders which employed non-winners. Both groups of 
bidders underperform significantly in all three of the periods that we examine. However, the 
bidders which used the services of winners do better. The clients of winners have monthly alphas 
of -0.0075, -0.0067 and -0.0083 over the horizons of 12 months, 36 months and 60 months, while 
the clients of non-winners have alphas of -0.0135, -0.0129 and -0.0125, respectively. To assess 
whether the difference between the clients of winners and non-winners is significant, we build 
hedged portfolios. These consist of a long position in a portfolio that contains the clients of 
winners and of a short position in a portfolio that contains the clients of non-winners. We display 
the results with hedged portfolios in Specifications 7 to 9. The results support our conjecture that 
the clients of winners perform better in the long term than the clients of non-winners. The alphas 
equal 0.0060, 0.0057 and 0.0040 for periods of 12, 36 and 60 months, respectively, and they are 
all significant.  
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Table 3.8: Winners and long-term returns 
  Winner   Non-winner    Hedged portfolios 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
  12 months 36 months 60 months  12 months 36 months 60 months  12 months 36 months 60 months 
Intercept (α) -0.0075** -0.0067*** -0.0083***  -0.0135*** -0.0129*** -0.0125***  0.0060** 0.0057*** 0.0040** 
  (0.0033) (0.0023) (0.0017)  (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0011)  (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0017) 
RMRF 1.1860*** 1.2004*** 1.2279***  1.1430*** 1.1087*** 1.1229***  0.0481 0.0635 0.1014** 
  (0.0867) (0.0592) (0.0439)  (0.0474) (0.0351) (0.0284)  (0.0718) (0.0550) (0.0446) 
SMB 0.2403* 0.3497*** 0.3745***  0.5879*** 0.6292*** 0.6512***  -0.3511*** -0.2870*** -0.2697*** 
  (0.1403) (0.1047) (0.0799)  (0.0774) (0.0632) (0.0519)  (0.1162) (0.0972) (0.0813) 
HML 0.0886 0.2679*** 0.3623***  0.1266* 0.2342*** 0.2377***  -0.0391 0.0550 0.1250* 
  (0.1299) (0.0967) (0.0739)  (0.0719) (0.0577) (0.0483)  (0.1076) (0.0897) (0.0752) 
WML -0.1174 -0.1422*** -0.1212***  -0.0628 -0.1249*** -0.1156***  -0.0507 -0.0244 -0.0063 
  (0.0719) (0.0523) (0.0403)  (0.0393) (0.0314) (0.0263)  (0.0595) (0.0486) (0.0410) 
                     
Adjusted R-sq 0.78 0.87 0.91  0.92 0.95 0.96  0.06 0.05 0.08 
This table presents a calendar-time analysis based on a four-factor model with monthly equal-weighted portfolio 
excess returns for 12, 36 and 60 months. Specifications (1) to (3) display the abnormal returns for the portfolio of 
acquisitions where winners acted as advisors, while (4) to (6) relate to a portfolio where non-winners were involved. 
In Specifications (7) to (9) the dependent variable is the return for acquisitions in which winners were involved minus 
the return for acquisitions where non-winners were involved. All variables are defined in Table 3.10 and standard 
errors are provided in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
3.8 Robustness tests 
Table 3.9 shows the results of the further analyses that we perform to check whether our 
main results are robust towards alterations. We first make various adjustments to our sample. In 
Specification 1, we check whether the results are influenced by withdrawn acquisitions, which 
might have different characteristics. To do that, we exclude the acquisitions that have been 
withdrawn from the sample. In Specification 2, we only include the US bidders and the US targets 
because the US market may be more indicative of the trends that we are investigating due to its 
large volume. In Specifications 3 and 4, we exclude the variable advisor market share, which is 
highly correlated with the variable winner and top-tier advisor, to investigate how the exclusion 
of this variable affects the winner and top-tier advisor variables.  
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To further address potential endogeneity concerns, in Specification 5, we use propensity 
score matching. For each of the 159 bidders which are advised by winners, we find the most 
similar bidders that are advised by a non-winner. To match the bidders, we consider size, industry 
and year of the acquisition announcement, and we match the bidders on a one-to-one basis without 
replacement. The coefficient on the variable winner remains statistically significant. The 
magnitude is within 2.8 percentage points, which is comparable to the result in the regression with 
advisor fixed effects.  
The results in Specifications 1 to 5 do not alter our main conclusion, and they support the 
view that winners are associated with significantly higher CARs. 
 
 
Table 3.9: Robustness tests 
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
Dependent variable CAR [-2;+2] 
Winner   0.0346**   0.0280*   0.0297**      0.0278* 
    (0.0143)   (0.0149)   (0.0143)      (0.0146) 
Top-tier advisor              -0.0037    
               (0.0054)    
Advisor market share   0.0000   0.0001          -0.0005 
    (0.0003)   (0.0003)          (0.0003) 
Friendly acquisition   0.0041   0.0096   0.0182  0.0171   -0.0005 
    (0.0365)   (0.0295)   (0.0184)  (0.0179)   (0.0312) 
Cash only acquisition   0.0070   0.0056   0.0073  0.0071   -0.0141 
    (0.0047)   (0.0050)   (0.0047)  (0.0047)   (0.0084) 
Stock only acquisition   -0.0119   -0.0143   -0.0129  -0.0127   -0.0415*** 
    (0.0078)   (0.0089)   (0.0078)  (0.0078)   (0.0143) 
Public status   -0.0373***   -0.0403***   -0.0397***  -0.0396***   -0.0308*** 
    (0.0042)   (0.0049)   (0.0046)  (0.0046)   (0.0098) 
Tender offer   0.0161*   0.0201**   0.0185**  0.0178**   0.0146 
    (0.0088)   (0.0086)   (0.0083)  (0.0081)   (0.0160) 
Focused acquisition   -0.0017   0.0004   -0.0012  -0.0013   -0.0074 
    (0.0044)   (0.0044)   (0.0044)  (0.0043)   (0.0088) 
Log(size)   -0.0046***   -0.0034**   -0.0041***  -0.0037***     
    (0.0014)   (0.0015)   (0.0013)  (0.0013)     
Runup   -0.0257***   -0.0237***   -0.0245***  -0.0243***   -0.0325** 
    (0.0060)   (0.0060)   (0.0059)  (0.0059)   (0.0133) 
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Table 3.9 (continued): Robustness tests 
Sigma   -0.4555   -0.3742   -0.3572  -0.3642   0.5059* 
    (0.2961)   (0.3035)   (0.2920)  (0.2910)   (0.2807) 
Book-to-market   -0.0002***   -0.0002***   -0.0002***  -0.0002***   -0.0179 
    (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)  (0.0000)   (0.0117) 
Leverage   0.0319**   0.0301*   0.0300**  0.0299**   0.0589* 
    (0.0161)   (0.0157)   (0.0148)  (0.0150)   (0.0335) 
Cash-flow-to-equity   0.0042   0.0040   0.0034  0.0032   0.1284** 
    (0.0059)   (0.0059)   (0.0058)  (0.0058)   (0.0551) 
Defense score   -0.0354**   -0.0366**   -0.0365**  -0.0354**   0.0256 
    (0.0159)   (0.0159)   (0.0161)  (0.0160)   (0.0353) 
Experience   -0.0041   0.0002   -0.0014  -0.0018   -0.0162 
    (0.0072)   (0.0062)   (0.0072)  (0.0072)   (0.0127) 
IB relation   -0.0066   -0.0085   -0.0054  -0.0050   -0.0062 
    (0.0072)   (0.0077)   (0.0065)  (0.0066)   (0.0231) 
Constant   0.0821**   0.0689*   0.0611**  0.0606**   0.0115 
    (0.0341)   (0.0385)   (0.0252)  (0.0244)   (0.0320) 
Winner dummies   YES   YES   YES  YES   NO 
Year FE   YES   YES   YES  YES   NO 
Industry FE   YES   YES   YES  YES   NO 
N   1948   1780   2034   2034   318 
R-sq/pseudo R-sq   0.10   0.11   0.10   0.10   0.17 
This table presents coefficients from OLS regressions with the dependent variable bidder announcement CAR[-2;+2]. 
In Specifications (1) and (2), we restrict the sample to completed acquisitions and US acquisitions respectively. In 
Specifications (3) and (4), we exclude advisor market share. In Specification (5), we use all acquisitions that involve 
a winner and a matched control sample of non-winner acquisitions. All variables are defined in Table 3.10. Standard 
errors clustered on advisor level are provided in parentheses. We winsorize CARs at the 1% level. *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
3.9 Summary and conclusion 
Is there a positive relationship between the quality of advisors and the value that they 
create for bidders in acquisitions? This question has recurred in the acquisitions literature for over 
two decades. However, researchers continue to struggle to find a clear answer. Indeed, the existing 
literature shows mixed results. What most of the existing studies have in common is that they rely 
on the advisor market share to proxy for advisor quality. We propose an alternative measure of 
quality that captures whether an advisor has won an award. We believe that this measure may 
assess advisor quality more accurately because it is not exclusively based on advisor market 
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shares. Rather, it considers more advisor characteristics that may be beneficial to bidders, such as 
the ability to identify more synergetic acquisitions and to negotiate and structure an acquisition.  
We test this measure and obtain consistent results, which support the view that advisors 
that have won an award add value to the acquisitions in which they are involved. We find that 
winners are associated with higher bidder returns, both in the short and the long term. We further 
show that value creation comes from greater amounts of total synergies in the acquisitions in 
which winners not only act as advisors but also are able to capture a greater part of the total 
synergies for their clients. Our results are in line with the conjecture that winners tend to put more 
effort into acquisitions with higher reputational exposure. In addition to our main tests, we 
perform the same analyses for the commonly used quality measure, which identifies top-tier 
advisors on the basis of their market shares. We do not find a positive relationship between top-
tier advisors and value creation.  
We caution researchers, practitioners and policy makers to be careful when they assess the 
quality of an advisor. Rather than relying exclusively on league tables, which are based on market 
shares, they might consider taking into account additional advisor characteristics. In conclusion, 
we believe that our results support the practice of distinguishing the best advisors publicly with 
an award because this process seems to identify high-quality advisors.  
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Table 3.10: Variable definitions and sources 
Variable name Unit Definition Source 
Panel A: Short-term effects: Dependent variables 
CAR [-2;+2] % Cumulative abnormal announcement return of the bidder stock during 
a 5-day event window. We employ an estimation window of 240 to 41 
trading days before the acquisition announcement and calculate CARs 
using the market model. Market returns come from the CRSP value-
weighted index for US firms and the MSCI Canada value-weighted 
index for Canadian firms. 
CRSP for US and 
Datastream for Canada 
Advisor fees % Total bidder advisor fees divided by the total acquisition value. SDC Platinum 
Total synergies US$ million Sum of the expected bidder and target synergies that were created 
during an acquisition. The synergies are calculated as the product of 
the bidder (target) market value of equity 88 days prior to the 
acquisition announcement and the bidder (target) 5-day event window 
CAR. 
SDC Platinum, CRSP 
for US and Datastream 
for Canada 
Bidder synergies % Bidder synergies divided by the total synergies when the total 
synergies are > 0, and divided by 1-total synergies when the total 
synergies are <= 0. The ratio is multiplied by 100 in both cases. 
SDC Platinum, CRSP 
for US and Datastream 
for Canada 
Panel B: Short-term effects: Independent variables 
Advisor characteristics     
Winner dummy 1 for acquisitions in which the bidder is advised by a winner and 0 
otherwise. 
Euromoney, Global-
Finance, LexisNexis 
Top-tier advisor dummy 1 for acquisitions in which the bidder is advised by an advisor which is 
among the top eight advisors of a league table and 0 otherwise. 
Euromoney, Global-
Finance, LexisNexis 
Advisor market share % Market share of the bidder advisor with the highest market share of all 
advisors listed for an acquisition. The advisor market share is the 
cumulated value of acquisitions in which that advisor is involved 
relatively to the total acquisition value and is calculated based on the 
three quarters preceding the quarter of the acquisition announcement 
and on the quarter of the acquisition announcement.  
SDC Platinum 
Deal characteristics       
Friendly acquisition dummy 1 for friendly acquisitions and 0 for hostile acquisitions. SDC Platinum 
Cash only acquisition dummy 1 for cash only acquisitions and 0 for all other acquisitions. SDC Platinum 
Stock only acquisition dummy 1 for stock only acquisitions and 0 for all other acquisitions. SDC Platinum 
Partial stock acquisition dummy 1 for partial stock acquisitions and 0 for all other acquisitions. SDC Platinum 
Public status dummy 1 for public targets and 0 otherwise. SDC Platinum 
Tender offer dummy 1 for tender offers and 0 otherwise. SDC Platinum 
Focused acquisition dummy 1 if the bidder and the target are in the same industry according to the 
2-digit SIC code and 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
Acquisition value US$ million Total value of the acquisition. SDC Platinum 
Relative acquisition value % Total acquisition value divided by the bidder market value of equity 88 
trading days prior to the acquisition announcement. 
SDC Platinum, CRSP 
for US and Datastream 
for Canada 
Bidder characteristics     
Size US$ billion Bidder market value of equity 88 trading days prior to the acquisition 
announcement. 
CRSP for US and 
Datastream for Canada 
Runup % Market-adjusted buy-and-hold return of the bidder stock from 205 to 6 
days prior to the acquisition announcement. We use the CRSP value-
weighted index for US firms and the MSCI Canada value-weighted 
index for Canadian firms. 
SDC Platinum, CRSP 
for US and Datastream 
for Canada 
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Table 3.10 (continued): Variable definitions and sources 
Sigma # Standard deviation of market-adjusted daily bidder stock returns from 
205 to 6 days prior to the acquisition announcement. We use the CRSP 
value-weighted index for US firms and the MSCI Canada value-
weighted index for Canadian firms. 
SDC Platinum, CRSP 
for US and Datastream 
for Canada 
Book-to-market # Bidder book value of total equity at the end of the fiscal year prior to 
the acquisition announcement divided by the bidder market value of 
equity 88 trading days prior to the acquisition announcement. 
CRSP for US and 
Datastream for 
Canada, Compustat 
Leverage % Sum of the bidder long-term debt and the bidder debt in current 
liabilities (total financial debt) divided by the bidder book value of 
total assets at the end of the fiscal year prior to the acquisition 
announcement. 
Compustat 
Cash-flow-to-equity # Numerator equals the bidder income before extraordinary items and 
depreciation minus dividends on common stock minus dividends on 
preferred stock. Denominator equals the bidder number of shares 
outstanding times the stock closing price. The ratio is calculated at the 
end of the fiscal year prior to the acquisition announcement. 
Compustat 
Defense score # Defense score measures the strength of a firm's takeover defense 
which is determined by assigning values to various aspects of the anti-
takeover provisions it has implemented. The accumulation of all of 
these points is averaged into weighted points with the resulting score 
ranging between 0 and 1, where a higher number indicates stronger 
takeover defenses. 
Capital IQ 
Experience # 1 for bidders that have successfully completed an acquisition in the 
previous 5 years and 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
IB relation # Reflects the intensity of the relationship between the bidder and the 
advisor of the current acquisition over the previous 5 years. The 
numerator is the sum of the transaction value of equity transactions 
and debt transactions and acquisitions in which the bidder used the 
current advisor over the previous 5 years. The denominator is the sum 
of the transaction value of all equity transactions and debt transactions 
and acquisitions the bidder was involved in the previous 5 years. 
SDC Platinum 
Scope # 1 if a bidder used the services of a winner for one of the three advisory 
services (either an acquisition or a debt issue or an equity issue) in the 
previous 5 years. The variable equals 2 if a bidder used a winner for 
two of the three services and 3 if a bidder used a winner for all three 
services. The variable equals 0 otherwise (the alternative scope 
variable is binary and equals 1 for each case where a bidder has used 
the services of a winner in the previous five years at least once, 
independently of the type of the transaction, and equals 0 otherwise). 
SDC Platinum 
Analyst coverage dummy 1 for bidders that are covered by one or more analysts at the time of 
the acquisition and 0 for all other bidders. 
Capital IQ 
Panel C: Choice of winners (advisor-period level; during the period prior to the choice of the winner) 
Winner choice dummy 1 for advisors which were chosen as winners and 0 otherwise. Euromoney, Global-
Finance, LexisNexis 
Ø CAR [-2;+2] % Mean cumulative abnormal announcement return of the bidder. CRSP for US and 
Datastream for Canada 
Ø analyst coverage ratio Ratio of bidders covered by at least one analyst to all bidders. Capital IQ 
Ø advisor market share % Mean advisor market share. SDC Platinum 
Ø compl. acquisition ratio Ratio of completed to all acquisitions. SDC Platinum 
Ø compl. time days Mean time to resolution for all completed acquisitions. SDC Platinum 
Ø bidder synergies US$ million Mean bidder synergies. SDC Platinum, CRSP 
for US and Datastream 
for Canada 
Ø target synergies US$ million Mean target synergies. The target synergies are calculated as the 
product of the target market value of equity 88 days prior to the 
acquisition announcement and the target 5-day event window CAR. 
SDC Platinum, CRSP 
for US and Datastream 
for Canada 
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Table 3.10 (continued): Variable definitions and sources 
Ø premium % Mean acquisition premium. The premium is calculated as the 
difference between the offer price and the target stock price 1 week 
prior to the acquisition announcement divided by the latter. We 
winsorize the variable at the 10% level. 
SDC Platinum 
Ø friendly acquisition ratio Ratio of friendly to all acquisitions. SDC Platinum 
Ø cash only acquisition ratio Ratio of cash only to all acquisitions. SDC Platinum 
Ø stock only acquisition ratio Ratio of stock only to all acquisitions. SDC Platinum 
Ø public status ratio Ratio of public to all acquisitions. SDC Platinum 
Ø tender offer ratio Ratio of tender offers to all acquisitions. SDC Platinum 
Ø focused acquisition ratio Ratio of focused to all acquisitions. SDC Platinum 
Panel D: Long-term effects 
12, 36 and 60-month BHAR % Buy-and-hold abnormal return of the bidder stock, calculated on the 
basis of the CRSP value-weighted index for US firms and the MSCI 
Canada value-weighted index for Canadian firms. We calculated 
BHARs over a 12, 36 and 60-month window, starting on the second 
day after the acquisition announcement. 
CRSP for US and 
Datastream for Canada 
 
 
 
# Captures the equal-weighted excess return for portfolio i in the 
calendar time analysis. 
- 
 # Equal-weighted excess return for portfolio i in month t of bidders that 
are advised by winners or bidders that are advised by non-winners. 
Kenneth R. French 
website~ 
 
 
 
# Risk-free rate in month t. Kenneth R. French 
website~ 
 # Return on the market on all firms which are covered in CRSP for the 
North American market in month t. 
Kenneth R. French 
website~ 
 
 
 
# Monthly difference between the equal-weighted return on three small 
stock portfolios and the equal-weighted return on three big stock 
portfolios for the North American market in month t. 
Kenneth R. French 
website~ 
 
 
 
# Monthly difference between the equal-weighted return on two high 
B/M portfolios and the equally weighted return on two low B/M 
portfolios for the North American market in month t. 
Kenneth R. French 
website~ 
 
 
 
# Monthly difference between the equal-weighted return on two winner 
stock portfolios and the equal-weighted return on two loser stock 
portfolios for the North American market in month t. 
Kenneth R. French 
website~ 
~http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
In this table we define dependent (panel A) and independent (panel B) variables that relate to the short-term effects 
and sources of value creation, variables on advisor-period level (panel C) and variables that relate to the long-term 
effects (panel D) and provide the sources from which we derive them. 
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Chapter 4  
Going public via special purpose acquisition 
companies: Frogs do not turn into princes 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The external capital that firms raise when they go public is of major interest to many 
growing businesses. Going public is also an important event for existing firm shareholders who 
may want to sell their holdings. Apart from the conventional method of IPOs, firms may access 
public markets via a non-traditional route. The most popular non-traditional route is a reverse 
merger. As a result of this, private firms get listed not through their own IPO but because they are 
acquired by publicly listed natural- or cash-shell companies (Feldman, 2010). Natural shells are 
listed companies that have either gone bankrupt or sold a large part of their assets. In contrast, 
cash shells raise funds when they go public via a traditional IPO. Their sole intention is to acquire 
an operating firm, which obtains a public listing through this acquisition.  
Before the recent financial crisis, a type of cash shell called a SPAC became popular in 
the US (Cumming et al., 2014). 161 SPACs went public in the US between 2003 and 2008, raising 
a total of more than US$ 22 billion in the course of their IPOs (Jenkinson and Sousa, 2011) and 
representing more than 13% of all IPOs (see Figure 4.1). In the peak year, 2007, 66 SPACs 
reached a public listing (almost 22% of all IPOs). SPAC IPO activity dropped in 2009 and 2010, 
but has started to recover again since 2011. In 2015, we observed 20 SPAC IPOs (and 145 non-
SPAC IPOs) in the US. SPACs, which are founded and managed by SPAC sponsors, are firms 
with “no or nominal operations and either no or nominal assets, assets consisting solely of cash 
and cash equivalents, or assets consisting of any amount of cash and cash equivalents and nominal 
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other assets” (SEC, 2005). It is worth noting that they are the only form of shell companies that 
Ritter (2016) mentions in his latest IPO report. Within the sample period (2003-2015), we identify 
236 SPAC IPOs with stronger SPAC IPO activity in bull than in bear markets.  
 
Figure 4.1: Number of non-SPAC IPOs, SPAC IPOs and SPAC acquisitions 
This figure presents the number of non-SPAC IPOs, SPAC IPOs and the number of SPAC acquisitions that were 
executed in the period 01/2003–12/2015. Source: Morgan Josef TriArtisan, EDGAR, Ellenoff Grossman & Schole, 
Capital IQ. 
 
 
In this article, we examine private operating firms that SPACs acquire after their own IPO 
and compare them to IPO firms. We identify 130 such acquisitions within our sample period. The 
number of SPAC acquisitions is much lower than the number of SPAC IPOs because some SPACs 
fail in finding an appropriate target and some of the recently listed SPACs are still in the process 
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of searching at the end of 2015. In 2008, the peak year of SPAC acquisition activity (relative to 
IPO activity), 36% of firms went public via a SPAC acquisition rather than via an IPO. We focus 
on understanding why SPACs reach popularity among private firms that target a public listing as 
an alternative to traditional IPOs. We first investigate in what way market, deal and firm 
characteristics are related to the route through which firms go public. Second, we analyze how 
firms that are acquired by SPACs (“SPAC firms” hereafter) and IPO firms perform in the long 
term. 
For private firms that target a public listing, SPACs offer numerous advantages over IPOs. 
At the time that they confer the public listing status to a private firm, SPACs have money at their 
disposal. Therefore, it is likely that SPAC acquisitions will depend less on the current market 
environment than IPOs. The readily available liquidity may also provide existing SPAC firm 
shareholders the possibility of cashing out their holdings immediately at the SPAC acquisition. In 
addition, this route is expected to be relatively fast and cheap because SPAC firms do not have to 
undergo the lengthy and costly process of SEC registration; the SPAC vehicle has already gone 
through this process. Moreover, SPAC firms do not have to organize road shows and they usually 
face lower underpricing (Rodrigues and Stegemoller, 2014).  
However, going public via a SPAC acquisition also has disadvantages for private firms. 
Although these firms do not have to convince a large group of investors (as it would be the case 
with an IPO), the shareholders of the SPAC vehicle have to approve the SPAC acquisition, which 
attaches uncertainty to SPAC acquisitions. Moreover, private firms’ existing shareholders might 
fear a dilution of their holdings when using a SPAC acquisition due to the use of “in the money” 
warrants held by SPAC sponsors (Lakicevic et al., 2014). Investors might distrust SPACs and 
SPAC firms because they lack transparency (see, e.g., Cumming et al., 2014). As Arthur Levitt, 
a former SEC Chairman states, “I have never found any blank-check investment vehicle attractive. 
No matter what the reputation or what the sponsor might be. [. . .] They are the ultimate in terms 
of lack of transparency.”20 
                                                 
20 http://www.investingdaily.com/10914/special-purpose-acquisition-companies-spacs-will-investors-live-long-and-
prosper/. 
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Our findings contribute to the emerging, but still limited, research on SPACs and their 
acquisitions. First, we add to the literature that addresses the drivers behind SPAC acquisitions. 
Recent research on SPACs, which helps to better understand the SPAC structure and its 
underlying mechanisms, is conducted by Cumming et al. (2014).21 They analyze factors which 
affect the shareholder approval probability of SPAC acquisitions. To the best of our knowledge, 
we are the first to consider the relation between the attractiveness of a SPAC acquisition 
(compared to an IPO) and the market environment as well as the cash-out opportunities of existing 
SPAC firm shareholders. We also examine further firm characteristics, such as venture capital 
(VC) and private equity (PE) backing,22 which are not investigated in prior literature that 
addresses SPAC acquisitions vs. IPOs (e.g., Datar et al., 2012). Our results lend support to the 
conjecture that SPAC acquisitions tend to occur more often in volatile markets and that they offer 
existing SPAC firm shareholders the option to convert a larger fraction of their shares into cash 
immediately. Our findings furthermore indicate that SPACs provide smaller, more levered and 
low-growth firms, which may not succeed in IPOs, with the opportunity to enter public markets. 
These findings are robust towards alternative variable definitions, sample adjustments and 
towards matching.  
Second, we enhance the literature on the performance of SPACs by analyzing the long-
term performance of SPAC firms. We focus on the long-term wealth effects of up to 60 months 
following the SPAC acquisition, whereas prior SPAC research only analyzes SPAC acquisition 
announcement returns, SPAC acquisition completion returns or post-deal performance of SPACs 
for shorter time periods (Lewellen, 2009; Floros and Sapp, 2011; Jenkinson and Sousa, 2011; 
Datar et al., 2012; Lakicevic and Vulanovic, 2013; Rodrigues and Stegemoller, 2014). In addition, 
besides buy and hold abnormal returns, which are employed in prior literature, we use factor 
regressions to account for the exposure to risk factors and to address the cross-sectional 
dependence problem. The aim of these analyses is to discover whether SPAC sponsors are able 
to detect some hidden qualities in the firms they acquire that are not reflected in their financial 
                                                 
21 Older studies in this area include Berger (2008) and Lakicevic and Vulanovic (2011). 
22 We thank an anonymous referee for making us aware of the importance of PE backing in firms acquired by 
SPACs. 
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characteristics at the time of the acquisition. We posit that if SPAC sponsors “kiss frogs” that 
“turn into princes,” then SPAC firms should show a superior stock-market performance as soon 
as their qualities become visible to the market. Our results indicate that firms that go public via a 
SPAC acquisition are associated with severe long-term underperformance vis-à-vis the market, 
industry and firms of similar sizes and book-to-market ratios. Long-term underperformance is 
also documented for IPO firms in many studies, starting with the seminal paper by Ritter (1991) 
and including this study. However, we find that SPAC firms do significantly worse than IPO 
firms.  
Third, we add to the existing SPAC literature by extending the investigation period and 
increasing the number of observations. While prior studies, such as Lewellen (2009), Floros and 
Sapp (2011), Jenkinson and Sousa (2011), Datar et al. (2012) and Cumming et al. (2014) mostly 
focus on the period between 2003 and 2010, we also add data from the period between 2011 and 
2015. We complement our SPAC sample (we include 127 SPAC acquisitions in our main 
regression) with a sample of 1128 IPOs. Compared to that, Datar et al. (2012), the study that is 
most closely related to our investigations, employ only 35 SPAC acquisitions and 389 IPOs in 
their main analysis. Including more recent SPACs and their acquisitions is important because the 
SPAC market underwent substantial changes during our sample period (Lakicevic et al., 2014). 
Cumming et al. (2014) suggest that moves in market liquidity and investor needs during the 
financial crisis transformed the SPAC market. In addition, the “tender offer regulation” in 
2009/2010 might influence the attractiveness of SPAC acquisitions relative to IPOs. The reform 
changes the structure of SPACs (see, e.g., Rodrigues and Stegemoller, 2011; Lakicevic et al., 
2014) and may contribute to the resurrection of SPAC activity. Figure 4.1 shows that there is only 
one SPAC IPO in 2009, but 74 SPAC IPOs between 2010 and 2015. Our results indicate that 
SPAC firms receive venture capital backing more often and that it takes less time to complete a 
public listing via a SPAC acquisition after the reform than before.  
Fourth, we provide a contribution to the venture capital literature. We are not aware of any 
other study that considers SPAC acquisitions in the light of VC exits. VCs are repeated players in 
the IPO market, and the question arises whether VCs accept alternative vehicles and benefit from 
their potential advantages. On the one hand, SPAC acquisitions may offer VCs the possibility to 
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convert a larger part of their holdings into cash immediately. On the other hand, VCs might want 
to increase their reputational capital in the new issue market and therefore would prefer the 
traditional IPO route. Additionally, VCs may serve as a credible signal of firm quality and thus 
reduce agency costs that arise in IPOs, making IPOs more likely. Our results suggest that VCs 
prefer IPOs to SPAC acquisitions and thus lend support to the latter argumentation.  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: in Chapter 4.2, we discuss the 
literature on IPOs and SPACs as well as factors that may be related to the route through which 
firms go public. In Chapter 4.3, we present our data and descriptive statistics. In Chapter 4.4, we 
investigate in what way market, deal and firm characteristics are related to the route that firms 
take in going public. In Chapter 4.5, we analyze the long-term performance of SPAC and IPO 
firms. We conclude in Chapter 4.6. 
 
4.2 IPOs versus SPACs 
The common method of going public for most firms is through an IPO, which involves 
selling new and existing shares. IPO activity is cyclical and depends on market conditions (Ritter, 
1991). In the course of an IPO, existing shareholders usually realize only a partial exit, while a 
large fraction of their shares remains locked up (Brau et al., 2003). Indeed, Brav and Gompers 
(2003) report that most existing shareholders do not sell their holdings at the IPO. Firms that go 
public have to fulfill stringent legal requirements to become registered with the SEC.23 
Furthermore, the IPO process involves various direct and indirect costs. The direct costs include 
an underwriting spread and other types of fees. The indirect costs arise from underpricing and 
from the fact that the top management has to spend time on marketing the IPO, organizing a 
roadshow, completing the book-building process and allocating the shares (Benveniste and 
Spindt, 1989; Ritter and Welch, 2002) at the expense of the daily operations and core activities of 
the business.  
                                                 
23 Since April 2012, the JOBS Act has relaxed some requirements, making IPOs easier. We turn to this issue later. 
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According to Gleason et al. (2005), reverse mergers, in which a publicly listed natural or 
cash shell acquires a private firm, are independent of market conditions and can be executed in 
both hot and cold IPO markets because the firms that are acquired by that method do not have to 
convince a large number of external investors. Aydogdu et al. (2007) note that reverse mergers 
may offer the firm they acquire a faster public listing at lower costs than an IPO would. Because 
shell companies are already listed on a stock exchange, their private targets obtain a public listing 
without having to go through the lengthy process of SEC registration. In addition, a reverse merger 
does not involve time-consuming procedures, such as marketing the shares, book-building or 
share allocation. For these reasons, shell companies and their private targets need to meet 
relatively low legal requirements and face lower costs. Gleason et al. (2005) note that the reverse 
merger fees equal only 2.7% of the transaction value on average, while Lee et al. (1996) find that 
the gross spreads for IPOs are 7.2%. Furthermore, Gleason et al. (2008) note that underpricing is 
substantially lower for reverse mergers than for IPOs. Greene (2016), however, shows that the 
wealth of private firm owners is larger when they exit through an IPO instead of a reverse merger 
because firms which choose an IPO tend to have a higher growth potential. 
This article focuses on “new-generation” SPACs, which went public in the US in the 
period from 2003 until 2015, and their acquisitions. The first of these SPACs went public in 
August 2003 and performed its acquisition in August 2004. SPACs have several features that 
make them more transparent vehicles than natural-shell companies. While natural-shell 
companies typically arise from firms that are without assets or have gone bankrupt, SPACs are 
cash shell companies that are founded and equipped with funds for a single purpose: to acquire a 
private firm within a specified period. Moreover, SPACs undergo the listing process during their 
IPO. In addition to fulfilling the standard listing requirements for firms that go public, SPACs 
have to comply with additional regulations that were introduced after several cases of fraud 
involving shell vehicles during the 1980s. New-generation SPACs arose after the introduction of 
the Rule 419 Blank Check Offering Terms (Cumming et al., 2014), which aims to improve 
transparency, shareholder protection and the alignment of interests between shareholders and 
SPAC sponsors. Whereas in the 1980s SPACs were often classified as “penny stock” shell 
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companies, all new-generation SPAC offerings are larger than US$ 5 million, which exempts 
them from the penny stock rule (SEC Rule 3a-51-1). 
We depict the SPAC structure in Figure 4.2. To found a SPAC, the SPAC sponsors make 
a private placement for a nominal fee of US$ 25000—the so-called sponsors’ promote (Lakicevic 
et al., 2014). If an acquisition is successful, the sponsors’ promote is worth approximately 20% 
of the SPAC’s equity (Cumming et al., 2014). In addition, the sponsors usually provide 3% of the 
total SPAC funds to obtain warrants in exchange (Berger, 2008). Warrants carry the right to buy 
shares in the firm at a predetermined price after a successful acquisition. These warrants are, in 
general, “in the money”. If the SPAC is liquidated, the sponsors lose their invested funds (e.g., 
Jog and Sun, 2007). The reason for placing the sponsors’ capital at risk is to strengthen their 
incentives to look for promising targets.  
The private placement is followed by an IPO of the SPAC, during which it raises the 
majority of the funds that are necessary for a future acquisition. At the IPO, the SPAC typically 
issues units that can be traded and consist of public shares (common shares that carry voting 
rights) and warrants. At least 85% of the proceeds from a SPAC IPO must be placed in a trust 
account (which is invested in risk-free securities) and can only be released if the SPAC acquires 
a firm or is liquidated. According to Rodrigues and Stegemoller (2013), the proportion of the 
proceeds that is kept in the trust account increased from 85% in 2003 to 97% in 2010 and 100% 
in 2011.  
Following the SPAC listing, the SPAC sponsors have a fixed amount of time, during 
which they do not obtain a salary or any other type of compensation, to find an appropriate 
acquisition target. The “screening for a target” period usually lasts between 18 and 24 months and 
is defined in the S-1 filing (Hale, 2007). Normally, SPACs focus on a specific region or industry 
in which the SPAC sponsors, who are often high-profile business persons with established 
networks, have a high degree of expertise (Lewellen, 2009). The expertise of the SPAC sponsors, 
which is an important SPAC asset, is disclosed in the SPAC IPO prospectus. 
As soon as SPAC sponsors identify a potential target firm, they make an announcement 
to shareholders who own SPAC shares. In the period after the acquisition announcement date, 
4.2 IPOs versus SPACs 
105 
SPAC sponsors perform an extensive due diligence, negotiate the structuring of the acquisition 
and wait for the SEC review of the disclosure documents relating to the SPAC acquisition. This 
process ends with the proxy vote in which the shareholders vote for or against the acquisition. A 
few days later, usually an 8K filing is issued that confirms the SPAC acquisition. On this date, the 
public listing of the SPAC firm is completed. If the shareholders reject the acquisition, the SPAC 
sponsors have the right to look for another acquisition target. If the SPAC sponsors are not 
successful in acquiring a firm within the set time frame, the SPAC is liquidated and the proceeds 
and accrued interest from the trust account are distributed among the shareholders (Rodrigues and 
Stegemoller, 2013). 
 
Figure 4.2: SPAC lifecycle 
This figure shows the structure and the lifecycle of a SPAC. 
 
 
In the following, we discuss the market, deal and firm characteristics that are likely to be 
relevant to the route through which firms go public.  
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4.2.1 Market characteristics 
The first variable we examine is market volatility. Previous research on IPOs shows that 
market timing is key to the successful execution of an IPO (Ritter, 1991) and that high volatility 
decreases its chances of success. For example, Schill (2004) finds that above-average market 
volatility reduces the frequency of IPOs by 13% and IPO proceeds by 21%. We assume that SPAC 
acquisitions are less vulnerable to turbulent market conditions than IPOs because SPACs already 
possess liquidity at the time of the acquisition. Thus, in turbulent market environments, firms may 
increase their chances of becoming publicly listed by looking for an appropriate SPAC instead of 
aiming at an IPO.  
The second variable that may be related to the route through which firms go public is cost 
of debt. As Lewellen (2009) observes, SPACs sometimes use not only the cash from the trust 
account but also raise debt to acquire firm shares. For that reason, he calls them “single-shot 
private equity funds” (see also Cumming et al., 2014). As long as SPACs raise debt to finance 
their acquisitions, one might expect that SPAC acquisitions are more frequent during periods 
characterized by cheap debt than during periods characterized by expensive debt because debt 
does not play a major role in IPOs. 
 
4.2.2  Deal characteristics 
Existing shareholders might see the going-public event as a chance to reduce their stake 
in the firm and to cash out some of their holdings (Barry et al., 1990). Liquidating holdings in 
IPOs often entails difficulties that are related to lock-up agreements and negative signaling 
(Bradley et al., 2001). Therefore, the existing shareholders usually only realize partial exits (Brau 
et al., 2003). By contrast, SPACs have cash available in the trust account, which they use to pay 
out the existing SPAC firm shareholders. We expect that, compared to IPOs, SPAC acquisitions 
offer the existing shareholders the option to convert a larger fraction of their shares into cash 
immediately in the course of the going-public event. 
We conjecture that SPAC and IPO firms differ in time to resolution, i.e., the time they 
need to complete the transaction after its announcement date. For IPOs, we take the date of the 
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going public announcement. For SPAC acquisitions, we use the date when the SPAC announces 
the prospective target to SPAC shareholders. We do not use the SPAC IPO date because we are 
not interested in measuring how long a SPAC needs to identify an appropriate target firm. Instead, 
we take the viewpoint of an operating firm that wants to go public. For this firm, the date that it 
matches with the SPAC is relevant. Floros and Sapp (2011) suggest that reverse mergers are 
executed faster than IPOs. However, traditional reverse mergers do not require a proxy vote as 
SPACs do, which may slow down the acquisition process. Moreover, SPAC acquisition 
documents are subject to SEC review. Therefore, it is unclear whether executing an IPO is more 
or less time-consuming than executing a SPAC acquisition. Interestingly, with the “tender offer 
regulation” many SPACs abandoned the proxy vote in favor of a tender offer. This structural 
change might reduce time to resolution for SPACs in recent years.  
 
4.2.3 Firm characteristics 
The first two variables we employ help to assess the question of whether low-quality firms 
use SPACs as a “back door” (e.g., Brown et al., 2013) to enter public markets. To capture the 
quality, we look at the current profitability and at growth opportunities. We use return on assets 
as a measure for current profitability. To proxy for growth opportunities, we employ Tobin’s q, 
which we approximate with the market-to-book asset ratio, as suggested by Chung and Pruitt 
(1994). Chung and Pruitt (1994) show that their approximate Tobin’s q, which requires only basic 
accounting information, is highly correlated to a Tobin’s q calculated with a theoretically more 
exact technique. Given our data limitations, we stick to Chung and Pruitt (1994) measure in our 
analysis. 
Our third variable in this category is debt ratio. On the one hand, highly levered firms may 
be too risky for IPO investors, so these firms may have to use the SPAC route. On the other hand, 
highly levered firms are unattractive for SPAC sponsors who want to use debt for the acquisition 
because this debt would further increase the firm’s debt ratio. If the target firm already has a high 
debt level, additional debt could substantially increase the risk of bankruptcy and the cost of 
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capital. This makes it difficult to predict how debt ratio is related to the likelihood of a firm 
choosing the SPAC route.  
Fourth, we employ size. We expect that smaller firms prefer to employ SPAC acquisitions 
because, for these firms, it will be difficult to find a high-quality underwriter willing to manage 
the process of going public and to increase the chances of a successful listing (Fang, 2005). Even 
if such firms find an underwriter, the IPO will still be prohibitively costly due to the high (fixed) 
direct costs (Lee et al., 1996). Moreover, small firms may be too obscure and thus attract little 
interest from investors (Adjei et al., 2008).  
Finally, we conjecture that VC involvement is also related to the route through which firms 
go public. IPOs are considered by VCs to be an important exit channel (Bascha and Walz, 2001; 
Bayar and Chemmanur, 2011). Due to the limited lifetime of their funds, VCs tend to be under 
pressure to cash out and realize returns quickly (Gompers, 1996; Giot and Schwienbacher, 2007).24 
Because they want to avoid sending negative signals about the value of a portfolio firm to potential 
investors, VCs typically keep most of their holdings during an IPO and their shares remain locked 
for a specified period after the IPO (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). By contrast, due to readily 
available liquidity, SPAC acquisitions make it possible for VCs to cash out immediately. On these 
grounds, we would expect that VCs prefer SPAC acquisitions over IPOs. However, VCs may 
prefer using the IPO route over the SPAC route despite the cash out advantage that SPAC 
acquisitions offer for at least two reasons. The first reason might be VC reputation, which is a 
crucial factor in the business model of VCs (Megginson and Weiss, 1991). VCs might prefer to 
maintain or extend their reputation through successful IPOs (Nahata, 2008) over cashing out. The 
second reason might be VC ability to signal. If VCs are able to send creditable signals, they can 
effectively reduce information asymmetries between an IPO firm and new investors and thus 
decrease costs and increase the likelihood of a successful IPO (Megginson and Weiss, 1991). We 
                                                 
24 The pressure to cash out, to which VCs are exposed, is not the same across all portfolio firms, but will depend, 
for example, on the length of the holding period or the number of financing rounds. In our investigations, however, 
we capture the average effect and do not distinguish for the heterogeneity within the subsample of VC-backed 
firms.   
4.3 Sample and descriptive statistics 
109 
expect that similar arguments hold for PE involvement because PEs also are under pressure for 
fast cash outs, are repeated players and profit from a good reputation. As PEs do not tend to exit 
via IPOs as often as VCs (Phalippou and Gottschalg, 2009), we expect the PE effect to be weaker 
than the VC effect.  
 
4.3 Sample and descriptive statistics 
 
4.3.1 SPAC and IPO sample 
We gather our data on SPAC IPOs and SPAC acquisitions during the new-generation 
SPAC wave from the report issued by Morgan Joseph TriArtisan (SPAC market update March 
2014),25 from the Electronic Data Gathering and Retrieval (EDGAR) database maintained by the 
US Securities and Exchange Commission, from press statements issued by Ellenoff Grossman & 
Schole LLP and from Capital IQ. Between 2003 and 2015, we identify 236 SPAC IPOs and 130 
SPAC acquisitions in the US. The first recorded SPAC IPO, which started this wave, is that of the 
Millstream Acquisition Corporation in August 2003. The first SPAC acquisition—in which 
Millstream Acquisition Corporation acquired NationsHealth Inc.—took place in August 2004. 
Our final sample, which we restrict to firms for which deal and firm characteristics are available, 
contains 127 SPAC firms. Although all SPACs are traded in the US, they acquired firms 
incorporated worldwide. 
To retrieve the control sample of non-SPAC IPOs, we use Capital IQ. A query for all 
public offerings on US exchanges that are closed, effective or successful and larger than US$ 5 
million in the sample period yields 3149 IPO firms. Because we want to compare SPAC 
acquisitions of operating firms with IPOs of operating firms, we exclude shell companies, carve-
outs, demutualizations, direct listings, mutual funds, bank conversions, best-effort basis 
agreements, unit offerings and offerings including warrants from the control sample. As in the 
case of SPAC firms, it does not matter whether some of the IPO firms in the control sample are 
                                                 
25 http://mjta.com/i/SPAC_Monthly.pdf 
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incorporated in other countries; however, we do not consider firms that are incorporated in 
continents where no SPAC firms exist. We also exclude IPO firms from industries in which no 
SPAC acquisitions occur. Having filtered the original IPO sample and only kept IPOs for which 
we have deal and firm characteristics, we are left with a final control sample of 1128 IPO firms.   
Figure 4.1 indicates that after the first SPAC acquisition in August 2004, the number of 
SPAC IPOs and SPAC acquisitions increased dramatically. In the peak year, 2007, SPAC IPOs 
accounted for approximately 22% of all US IPOs. These SPACs led to increased acquisition 
activity in subsequent years with SPACs becoming very popular as a vehicle for going public 
between 2007 and 2009. When we compare the SPAC acquisitions to the number of IPOs, we 
find a peak year in 2008. In this year, 36% of firms went public through this route. A year later, 
the share of SPAC acquisitions remained high at almost 29%, while only one SPAC went public. 
The SPAC IPOs started to recover in 2011. In 2015, we register 20 SPAC IPOs and 9 SPAC 
acquisitions compared to 145 non-SPAC IPOs.  
Table 4.1 shows the composition of our sample of SPAC firms and IPO firms in different 
regions and industries. Although all SPACs are traded in the US, they acquire firms incorporated 
worldwide. Of the 127 SPAC firms, 83% are located in North America (of which 96% are located 
in the US), 13% in Asia and 4% in Europe. Similarly, 82% of all IPO firms are incorporated in 
North America (of which 99% are located in the US), 12% in Asia and 5% in Europe. Moreover, 
based on 2-digit SIC codes, 30% of all SPAC firms operate in the manufacturing industry, 24% 
in the services industry and 16% in the transportation and utilities industries. Manufacturing firms 
account for 33% of IPO firms in our sample, while 27% are involved in the service industry and 
17% belong to the finance, insurance and real estate industries.  
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Table 4.1: Sample overview 
Category Subcategory SPAC acquisitions IPOs Total 
    frequency percent frequency percent frequency percent 
Regions (no. of transactions) North America 105 82.68 923 81.83 1028 81.91 
  Europe 5 3.94 58 5.14 63 5.02 
  Asia 16 12.60 132 11.70 148 11.79 
  Latin America / Caribbean 1 0.79 15 1.33 16 1.27 
  Total 127  1128  1255  
Industries (no. of transactions) Manufacturing 38 29.92 371 32.89 409 32.59 
  Transportation & Public Utilities 20 15.75 86 7.62 106 8.45 
  Retail Trade 9 7.09 69 6.12 78 6.22 
  Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 13 10.24 194 17.20 207 16.49 
  Services 30 23.62 305 27.04 335 26.69 
  Other 17 13.39 103 9.13 120 9.56 
  Total 127  1128  1255  
This table provides information on the sample composition of SPAC acquisitions and IPOs executed in the period 
01/2004–12/2015 by region and industry. 
 
 
4.3.2 Market, deal and firm characteristics 
We complement our data on IPOs and SPAC acquisitions with market, deal and firm 
characteristics drawn primarily from Capital IQ, Compustat US and SDC Platinum. We obtain 
additional data from the EDGAR database and from the websites of individual firms. Table 4.2 
presents the definitions of variables we use in the main regression and the sources from which we 
derive them.  
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Table 4.2: Variable definitions and sources 
Variable name Unit Definition Source 
Market characteristics     
Market volatility Thousand US$ Average lagged six-month variance on S&P 500 index 
on the announcement date*.  
Capital IQ 
Cost of debt % 10 year T-bill rate on the announcement date*.  Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
(FRED) 
Deal characteristics       
Cashout % Cash as the percentage of the total SPAC acquisition 
value; IPO proceeds that went to existing shareholders 
as percentage of the market equity value. 
SDC Platinum, Capital IQ, EDGAR 
Time to resolution Months Time period from the announcement date* to the 
completion date (for SPACs) or to the pricing date (for 
IPOs). 
Capital IQ, EDGAR, firm websites 
 Firm characteristics (end of quarter after the completion date)   
Return on assets % EBIT divided by total assets (quarter values). Compustat US, Capital IQ 
Market to book asset ratio Ratio Market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities 
divided by the book value of equity and book value of 
total liabilities (quarter values). 
Compustat US, SDC Platinum, Capital 
IQ 
Debt ratio % Total liabilities divided by total assets. Total liabilities 
contain accounts payable, accrued expenses, short-term 
borrowings, current portion of long-term debt, long-term 
debt, minority interest and other liabilities (quarter 
values). 
Compustat US, Capital IQ 
Size Million US$ Total assets (quarter values). Compustat US, Capital IQ 
VC involvement Dummy The variable equals 1 if a VC is involved and 0 
otherwise on the completion date. 
Capital IQ, EDGAR, Thomson One 
Private Equity 
PE involvement Dummy The variable equals 1 if a private equity fund is involved 
and 0 otherwise on the completion date. 
Capital IQ, EDGAR, Thomson One 
Private Equity 
*for SPACs: the date when the SPAC sponsors announce a potential private target to their shareholders; for IPOs: 
the date of the going public announcement. 
In this table we define the market, deal and firm characteristics we use and provide the sources from which we derive 
these variables. 
 
 
Table 4.3 presents summary statistics for our variables. To see if there are any differences 
between the characteristics of SPAC acquisitions and IPOs, we run Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney 
tests and t-tests. With respect to the market characteristics, we note that in turbulent market 
environments firms tend to use SPAC acquisitions rather than IPOs to go public. The variance of 
the S&P 500 total return index during the six months preceding the deal announcement, which 
serves as a proxy for market volatility, is significantly higher for SPAC acquisitions than for IPOs 
at the 1% level. In non-tabulated results, we find a positive correlation between the monthly 
number of SPAC IPOs and the lagged market return, suggesting that investors are willing to 
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provide their money to these vehicles in bull rather than bear markets. Cost of debt does not seem 
to be related to the route through which firms go public.  
While looking at deal characteristics, we observe that, in general, the existing firm 
shareholders realize a larger cash out ratio through SPAC acquisitions than through IPOs. The 
difference is significant at the 1% level. Generally, SPAC acquisitions take an average of 6.7 
months from the announcement of the potential target firm to the completion of the SPAC 
acquisition, while the time to resolution from the going-public announcement to IPO completion 
amounts to only 3.9 months. This difference is significant at the 1% level.  
The first firm characteristic is return on assets: the mean SPAC firm return on assets equals 
1.4% and the mean IPO firm return on assets equals 3.2% on average. However, only the 
Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test is significant at the 1% level. Growth opportunities of SPAC firms 
seems to be lower than those of IPO firms; in our sample the mean market to book asset ratio for 
SPAC firms equals 1.8 while for IPO firms it is 3.3. The difference is significant at the 1% level. 
At 60.7%, the debt ratio is significantly higher for SPAC firms compared to 46.6% for IPO firms 
at end of the quarter after the effective date. Both the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test and the t-
test are significant at the 1% level. As expected, SPAC firms are substantially smaller: the mean 
size (measured as total assets) amounts to US$ 334.9 million, compared to US$ 923.1 million in 
the case of IPO firms. This difference is also significant at the 1% level. When we examine VC 
involvement, we find that VCs have stakes in 33.1% of all IPO firms but only in 14.2% of all 
SPAC firms. This difference is highly significant at the 1% level, suggesting that when VCs take 
their portfolio firms public they prefer the traditional IPO route to the SPAC route. In line with 
our expectations, PE involvement seems to be less important than venture capital backing in our 
sample. 12.6% of SPACs are backed by PEs, whereas 20.8% of IPOs obtain private equity.  
 
 
Chapter 4 Going public via special purpose acquisition companies: Frogs do not turn into princes 
114 
Table 4.3: Summary statistics for SPAC acquisitions and IPOs 
  Full sample   SPAC acquisitions/SPAC firms   IPOs/IPO firms   WMW test   t-test 
Variable          median         mean          stdev          N                     median         mean          stdev          N                     median         mean          stdev          N                    z-value                  t-value 
Market characteristics                                   
Market volatility 5.33 6.86 7.72 1255           6.06 10.37 14.98 127           5.26 6.47 6.31 1128           2.66***           2.90*** 
Cost of debt 3.83 3.63 1.01 1255           3.83 3.68 1.07 127           3.82 3.62 1.00 1128           0.81           0.58 
Deal characteristics                                    
Cashout 1.48 7.97 15.89 1255           15.11 29.96 34.43 127           1.26 5.50 9.37 1128           5.54***           7.98*** 
Time to resolution 3.30 4.21 3.50 1255           6.13 6.65 3.79 127           3.17 3.94 3.35 1128           9.03***           7.72*** 
Firm characteristics (end of quarter after the effective date)                     
Return on assets 6.40 2.99 24.79 1255           2.74 1.40 23.12 127           6.71 3.17 24.98 1128           -2.44***           -0.81 
Market to book asset ratio 2.20 3.16 2.85 1255           1.21 1.76 1.75 127           2.36 3.31 2.91 1128           -9.30***           -8.76*** 
Debt ratio 42.27 48.05 31.85 1255           58.93 60.68 30.90 127           40.84 46.63 31.65 1128           4.87***           4.85*** 
Size 230.56 863.54 1857.06 1255           143.94 334.86 941.21 127           242.68 923.06 1924.37 1128           -4.65***           -5.81*** 
VC involvement 0.00 0.31 - 1255           0.00 0.14 - 127           0.00 0.33 - 1128           -4.36***           -5.54*** 
PE involvement 0.00 0.20 - 1255           0.00 0.13 - 127           0.00 0.21 - 1128           -2.20**           -2.58** 
This table presents sample summary statistics, the values of the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney (WMW) test and t-test that we run to compare the market, deal and 
firm characteristics between SPAC acquisitions and IPOs executed in the period 01/2004–12/2015. All variables are defined in Table 4.2. We winsorize all deal 
and firm characteristics at the 2% level. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.4 shows pairwise correlation coefficients between each pair of variables that we 
use in the main analysis. The highest correlation of -40% is between the variables market volatility 
and cost of debt, so multicollinearity should not destroy our multivariate tests. In this context, it 
might be interesting to note that if we excluded market volatility from our multivariate 
regressions, the results would not change much. 
 
Table 4.4: Correlation matrix 
  Market 
volatility 
Cost of debt Cashout Time to 
resolution 
Return on 
assets 
Market to 
book asset 
ratio 
Debt ratio Log(size) VC invol- 
vement 
PE 
invol- 
vement 
Market volatility 1.00                  
Cost of debt -0.40*** 1.00                
Cashout -0.02 0.10*** 1.00              
Time to resolution 0.01 0.14*** 0.12*** 1.00            
Return on assets -0.01 0.14*** 0.14*** -0.02 1.00          
Market to book asset ratio -0.01 -0.05* -0.15*** -0.13*** 0.01 1.00        
Debt ratio 0.02 -0.05* 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.14*** -0.01 1.00      
Log(size) 0.03 -0.07** 0.07** 0.01 0.27*** -0.37*** 0.33*** 1.00    
VC involvement -0.00 0.08*** 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.10*** 1.00  
PE involvement -0.06** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.06** 0.20*** -0.09*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.06* 1.00 
This table presents a pairwise correlation matrix of the variables that we use in the analysis of the SPAC acquisitions 
and IPOs that were executed in the period 01/2004–12/2015. All variables are defined in Table 4.2. We winsorize all 
deal and firm characteristics at the 2% level. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
4.4 Likelihood of a SPAC acquisition 
 
4.4.1 The model and its specifications 
To model the likelihood of a SPAC acquisition, we employ a logistic regression model 
with the dependent variable P(SPAC)i, which is binary and equals 1 for SPAC firms and 0 for 
IPO firms.26  
                                                 
26 Most existing studies use a maximum likelihood estimator and a simple binary regression model for 
similar problem settings. To measure the relative attractiveness of IPOs in comparison to mergers and sellouts, Brau 
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The main specification is:  
 
Formula 4.1: Likelihood of a SPAC acquisition 
P(SPAC)i=1/(1+e^(α+ β1Market volatilityi+β2Cost of debti+ β3Cashouti + β4Time to resolutioni+ 
β5Return on assetsi+β6Market to book asset ratio+ β7Debt ratioi+β8Log(size)i+β9VC involvementi + 
β10PE involvementi+ ∑ βjYear fixed effectsi,j
21
j=11 + ∑ βkRegion fixed effectsi,k
24
k=22 + 
∑ βlIndustry fixed effectsi,l
27
l=25 +ui)),  
 
where individual firms are indexed by i. We present the definitions of all variables of 
interest in Table 4.2. In addition, we use year fixed effects, which capture the year in which the 
deal is executed, to control for any unobservable time-specific developments that may be related 
to some of the regressors and to the route through which firms go public. We also include region 
fixed effects to control for potential unobservable differences in market, deal and firm 
characteristics due to regional factors that may affect the method of going public. To generate 
these variables, we aggregate SPAC firms and IPO firms on the basis of four different world 
regions, namely, Asia, Europe, North America and Latin America (Caribbean). Finally, industry 
fixed effects reflect potential differences across industries that may be related to the route through 
which firms go public. We include fixed effects for the three largest industries (i) manufacturing, 
(ii) services and (iii) finance, insurance and real estate. The remaining industry classifications 
represent the reference category.  
 
4.4.2 Main results 
In Table 4.5, we present the average marginal effects and their standard errors, which we 
cluster by year and country to adjust for possible correlations within the clusters. We present our 
main results in Specification 1. Examining the market characteristics, we note that in turbulent 
                                                 
et al. (2003) and Poulsen and Stegemoller (2008) use a logistic regression model. Brown et al. (2013) employ a probit 
model and Adjei et al. (2008) a logistic model to distinguish between firms that decide to go public via an IPO and 
firms that choose a reverse merger.  
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market environments firms tend to prefer SPAC acquisitions to IPOs. The variable market 
volatility is positive and significant at the 5% level, which suggests that, compared to SPAC 
acquisitions, it may be more difficult to access the public market through IPOs when market 
conditions are harsh. With a one-standard-deviation increase in market volatility, the probability 
of going public through a SPAC acquisition increases by 0.77 percentage points. In contrast to 
the univariate test, the regression analysis indicates that the variable cost of debt matters. More 
expensive debt is associated with a lower likelihood of SPAC acquisitions (significant at the 5% 
level), which supports the view that SPAC firms consider current debt terms when they choose 
the way that they access the public market.  
The first deal characteristic, cash out, is significantly higher (at the 1% level) when firms 
use SPAC acquisitions. This suggests that the existing firm shareholders who want to cash out 
some of their holdings can do this more easily through SPAC acquisitions. The variable time to 
resolution is positive and significant (at the 1% level), which indicates that SPAC acquisitions 
take longer to be executed than IPOs. We suppose that this is because proxy voting causes 
substantial delays in the process of acquiring a firm. Both of these deal characteristics are also 
economically important: with a one-standard-deviation increase in cash out and time to resolution, 
the probability of going public through a SPAC acquisition increases by 4.04 percentage points 
and 2.38 percentage points, respectively.  
Firm characteristics show, in line with prior studies (e.g., Datar et al., 2012), that SPAC 
firms tend to be firms of lower quality. Return on assets, which reflects the current profitability, 
is negative but insignificant. The variable market-to-book asset ratio has a negative sign, which 
supports the view that SPAC firms are associated with relatively weak growth opportunities. The 
positive marginal effect of the debt ratio variable suggests that more levered firms are more likely 
to use the SPAC route than the IPO route. Additionally, in line with our expectations, the size of 
SPAC firms is smaller than that of firms involved in IPOs. The dummy variable VC involvement 
is negatively related to the probability of a SPAC acquisition. This result supports the argument 
that VCs might prefer the IPO route over the SPAC route for reputational and signaling reasons, 
even though the latter route may allow them to cash out faster. The weakly significant negative 
coefficient on PE involvement suggests that PEs prefer IPOs over SPAC acquisitions to sell their 
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stakes as well. Firm characteristics have an economically important relation to the route through 
which firms go public. With a one-standard-deviation increase in debt ratio, the probability of 
going public through a SPAC acquisition increases by 4.37 percentage points. It decreases by 9.35 
percentage points and by 7.34 percentage points with a one-standard-deviation increase in the 
market-to-book asset ratio and size, respectively. The likelihood of a SPAC acquisition is 4.38 
percentage points lower with VC involvement and 3.64 percentage points lower with PE 
involvement. In line with our expectations, the PE effect is significantly smaller than the VC 
effect. 
To sum up, our analysis in Specification 1 shows that SPAC acquisitions are a viable 
alternative to IPOs for firms that wish to access the public markets in turbulent times when IPOs 
may be difficult to accomplish. Although there is a cash out advantage associated with SPAC 
acquisitions, they do not seem to attract profitable and prestigious firms. Rather, our results 
support the conjecture that firms of lower quality are more likely to use SPAC acquisitions than 
IPOs. More precisely, our findings indicate that small firms that have lower growth opportunities 
and high leverage and in which VCs and PEs are not involved are more likely to access the public 
market through the SPAC route. 
 
4.4.3 Announcement date data  
One problem with our first regression is that we generate firm characteristics from the first 
data that became available after the completion date. The advantage of this procedure is that we 
are able to obtain all relevant firm-specific information for almost all sample firms. However, as 
we are interested in comparing the firm characteristics of potential SPAC firms and IPO firms 
before they use a particular going-public route, we would prefer using data available at the 
announcement date. Because most SPAC firms and some IPO firms are not covered by 
commercial databases before they go public, we have to hand collect the firm characteristics at 
the announcement date from individual SEC (proxy statement) filings. We obtain full information 
for only 81% of our SPAC firms. The IPO sample size drops by 10%.  
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In Specification 2, we perform the same regression as in Specification 1 but with the 
announcement date data (and, consequently, a smaller sample). The results on market and deal 
characteristics do not differ much. The magnitude of firm characteristics changes, but they all 
keep their signs and remain, with one exception (PE involvement), statistically significant. 
Already in Specification 1, PE involvement was only significant at the 10% level. Thus, we have 
to be careful in our interpretations of how PE involvement is related to the likelihood of a SPAC 
acquisition. All in all, the results make us confident that using completion date data in the main 
analysis is a reasonable decision. 
 
4.4.4 Expected cash out and expected time to resolution 
So far, we use the realized values of the cash out ratio and time to resolution. However, 
firms may build their preferences regarding the exit route based on expected values of these 
variables. In Specification 3, we therefore employ a proxy for expected ratios for both deal 
characteristics. To model the firm expectations, we use a simple setting where firms base their 
expectations on historical values. We construct the alternative cash out variable (exp. diff. cash 
out) for each firm i as the difference in the mean cash out ratio (relative to total assets) between n 
SPAC acquisitions and m IPOs during the year preceding the particular transaction: 
 
Formula 4.2: Alternative cash out variable 
Exp. diff. cashout i=
1
n
��
SPACcashout 
SPAClog_total_assets
�
j
n
i=1
-
1
m
��
IPOcashout 
IPOlog_total_assets
�
k
m
i=1
. 
 
We calculate the alternative time to resolution variable (exp. diff. time to resol.) for each 
firm i as the difference in time to resolution between n SPAC acquisitions and m IPOs during the 
year preceding the particular transaction: 
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Formula 4.3: Alternative time to resolution variable 
Exp. diff. time to resol. i=
1
n
�(SPACtime to resol. )jn
i=1
-
1
m
�(IPOtime to resol. )km
i=1
. 
 
The positive effect of exp. diff. cash out indicates existing shareholders favor SPAC 
acquisitions over IPOs because they expect to sell their holdings more easily. Exp. diff. time to 
resol. has a positive sign, which suggests that existing firm shareholders expect SPAC acquisitions 
to take more time until completion in comparison to IPOs. All key variables, except one, have 
similar effects as in the main regression. Cost of debt, the only exception, becomes insignificant, 
which suggests that the effect of this variable on the likelihood of a SPAC acquisition should be 
interpreted with care.  
 
4.4.5 Matching   
In our main analysis, we use all SPAC firms and all IPO firms with available data. As we 
can see in Table 4.3, an average IPO firm is not comparable to an average SPAC firm. The 
characteristics of many IPO firms are very different from those of SPAC firms.27 We address this 
concern in Specification 4.  
We select those IPO firms that are most similar to our SPAC firms in terms of size, age 
and industry. More specifically, to each of our 127 SPAC firms, we match the closest IPO firm 
using a propensity score matching model (without replacement).  
Within the SPAC sample and the matched IPO sample, we are able to examine differences 
in the relevant variables (on which we do not match) while addressing the concerns regarding 
comparability of IPO firms and SPAC firms. We do not use the matching approach in our main 
analysis because we are interested, among other things, in firm characteristics (such as size, 
industry and age) that are related to the way that firms enter public markets. When we match on 
                                                 
27 We thank an anonymous referee for raising this concern. 
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these variables, we eliminate these effects. This is also the reason that these variables are not 
included in Specification 4. 
We find our results confirmed: all effects we show in the main analysis remain significant. 
In addition, the variable return on assets, which was insignificant, turns significant at the 5% level. 
When we compare firms of similar size and age and within same industries, more profitable firms 
tend to prefer IPOs.  
 
4.4.6 Regulation  
The “tender offer regulation” which influences SPACs became effective after the financial 
crisis and the near dry-out of the SPAC IPO market. SPACs under this reform may choose to 
abandon the proxy vote in favor of a tender offer. SPAC shareholders who are not satisfied with 
the acquisition proposal can redeem their shares using the tender offer mechanism. However, 
there is a certain limit, stated in the SPAC IPO filing, on how many shares can be redeemed during 
the tender offer (e.g., in the first SPAC under the new structure, 57th Street Acquisition Company, 
a maximum of 88% could be redeemed). This reform led to a higher certainty for potential SPAC 
firms regarding the acquisition outcome. The “tender offer regulation” may speed up the SPAC 
acquisition process (i.e., reduce time to resolution). For this reason and because the “tender offer 
regulation” mitigated the uncertainty regarding the acquisition outcome, SPACs might become 
more attractive to VCs and PEs. To investigate these issues, we interact VC involvement, PE 
involvement and time to resolution with a regulation dummy. This dummy equals one for the 
period in which the “tender offer regulation” is effective and zero for the period before. The cut-
off date is November 16th 2009, which is the filing date of the first SPAC IPO (57th Street 
Acquisition Company) that used a tender offer instead of a proxy vote.28  
We include the interaction terms one-by-one into our main regression and show the results 
in Specifications 5 to 7. To calculate marginal effects of the interaction terms, we use the 
                                                 
28 Results are similar when we use different cut-off dates, such as: the IPO date of the first SPAC using a tender 
offer (05/2010), the date when NASDAQ accepted the change to tender offers (12/2011) and the date when AMEX 
accepted the change to tender offers (01/2011). 
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technique Ai and Norton (2003) suggest for non-linear models. The VC interaction term in 
Specification 5 indicates that, after the “tender offer regulation”, VCs might consider SPAC 
acquisitions as a more attractive cash out opportunity than before, albeit this effect is only 
significant at the 10% level. For PEs this effect is insignificant (Specification 6). Specification 7 
suggests that, in line with our expectations, abandoning the proxy vote in favor of a tender offer 
speeds up the SPAC acquisition process. Again, this interaction term is only significant at the 
10% level.  
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Table 4.5: Likelihood of a SPAC acquisition 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Main 
specification 
Announcement 
date 
Expected 
ratios 
Matching (size, 
industry, age) 
Regulation VC Regulation PE Regulation 
time 
Market volatility 0.0010** 0.0013** 0.0027*** 0.0094* 0.0013* 0.0013* 0.0015*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0055) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
Cost of debt -0.0305** -0.0463*** -0.0177 -0.1154* -0.0616*** -0.0612*** -0.0572*** 
  (0.0124) (0.0139) (0.0127) (0.0639) (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0177) 
Cashout 0.2543*** 0.2760***  0.7121*** 0.2601*** 0.2602*** 0.2545*** 
  (0.0204) (0.0171)  (0.1438) (0.0265) (0.0263) (0.0258) 
Time to resolution 0.0068*** 0.0079***  0.0105** 0.0083*** 0.0083*** 0.0104*** 
  (0.0025) (0.0027)  (0.0051) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0030) 
Return on assets -0.0071 0.0125 0.0307 -0.2107** -0.0214 -0.0203 -0.0239 
  (0.0188) (0.0175) (0.0208) (0.0830) (0.0178) (0.0188) (0.0210) 
Market to book asset ratio -0.0328*** -0.0059** -0.0719*** -0.0369*** -0.0328*** -0.0329*** -0.0319*** 
  (0.0089) (0.0024) (0.0143) (0.0102) (0.0097) (0.0099) (0.0096) 
Debt ratio 0.1371*** 0.0277** 0.2219*** 0.3978*** 0.1276*** 0.1283*** 0.1305*** 
  (0.0221) (0.0115) (0.0306) (0.0679) (0.0228) (0.0233) (0.0235) 
Log(size) -0.0528*** -0.0351*** -0.0703***   -0.0491*** -0.0492*** -0.0478*** 
  (0.0085) (0.0070) (0.0094)   (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0097) 
VC involvement -0.0438*** -0.0680*** -0.0367** -0.1492*** -0.0537*** -0.0505*** -0.0505*** 
  (0.0137) (0.0174) (0.0179) (0.0513) (0.0167) (0.0154) (0.0166) 
PE involvement -0.0364* -0.0049 -0.0518*** -0.1766*** -0.0304* -0.0271* -0.0281* 
  (0.0207) (0.0240) (0.0186) (0.0612) (0.0177) (0.0157) (0.0170) 
Exp. diff. cashout    1.2154***         
     (0.3058)         
Exp. diff. time to resol.    0.0141*         
     (0.0081)         
Regulation         -0.1388*** -0.1346*** -0.0883* 
          (0.0427) (0.0427) (0.0528) 
VC involvement*regulation         0.0748*    
          (0.0547)    
PE involvement*regulation          0.0304   
           (0.0438)   
Time to resolution*regulation           -0.0179* 
             (0.01053) 
Year fixed effects YES YES NO YES NO NO NO 
Region fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES NO YES YES YES 
N 1255 1125 1131 254 1255 1255 1255 
N (SPAC acquisitions) 127 103 126 127 127 127 127 
N (IPOs) 1128 1022 1005 127 1128 1128 1128 
Pseudo R-sq 0.59 0.51 0.40 0.58 0.55 0.55 0.56 
Chi-sq 4817.30 3418.69 154.91 203.16 810.74 1420.43 1531.58 
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Table 4.5 (continued): Likelihood of a SPAC acquisition 
This table presents the average marginal effects of logistic regressions. We use a sample of SPAC acquisitions and 
IPOs that were executed in the period 01/2004–12/2015. The dependent variable is a binary variable which equals 1 
for SPAC acquisitions and 0 for IPOs. Specification (1) includes our main specification. In Specification (2), we use 
data derived on the announcement date instead of data after the completion date. In Specification (3), we input 
expected values for the deal characteristics. In Specification (4), we match IPO firms to SPAC firms based on size, 
industry and founding date. In Specifications (5) to (7), we include a dummy for the period after the “tender offer 
regulation” and its interaction term with VC involvement, PE involvement and time to resolution. All variables are 
defined in Table 4.2 and standard errors clustered by country and year are provided in parentheses. We winsorize all 
deal and firm characteristics at the 2% level. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
 Another important regulatory reform during the sample period that affects IPOs and 
SPACs is the JOBS act. The JOBS act is designed to make it easier and cheaper for young firms 
(classified as emerging growth companies) to access the public markets through IPOs by relaxing 
filing and reporting requirements. However, the JOBS act not only made non-SPAC IPOs easier; 
it also provides SPACs with advantages. SPACs can classify themselves as emerging growth 
companies and use the advantages that the JOBS act offers. SPACs can not only reduce IPO costs 
due to lower filing requirements before the SPAC IPO, but they are also burdened with less 
reporting requirements after the SPAC acquisition (see, e.g., Rodrigues, 2012). Because the JOBS 
act influences non-SPAC IPOs, SPAC IPOs and SPAC acquisitions in a positive way, the 
resulting effect on the likelihood of an IPO vs. a SPAC acquisition is unclear. 
 
4.5 Long-term performance 
In this chapter, we investigate how SPAC firms and IPO firms perform in the long term. 
The evidence so far is consistent with the view that lower-quality firms tend to use SPAC 
acquisitions to enter the public market, while high-quality firms usually tend to go public via an 
IPO. Sponsors may push for low-quality firms because if the SPAC becomes liquidated, they lose 
their promote and their warrants become worthless. It should be noted that SPAC sponsors are 
allowed to buy SPAC shares with voting rights in the open market prior to the proxy vote, so they 
may be able to directly influence the outcome of the proxy vote (Jenkinson and Sousa, 2011). The 
large amount of at-risk capital and the large financial gains in case of a successful acquisition 
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make this a profitable strategy for SPAC sponsors. According to Jog and Sun (2007), SPAC 
sponsors earn an average of 1900 percent annualized returns with SPACs for which the outcome 
is known (success or failure) during the period 2003 to 2006. Jenkinson and Sousa (2011) show 
that low-quality acquisitions are approved on a regular basis because some SPAC shareholders, 
such as hedge funds, promise a positive proxy vote in exchange for additional consideration 
(Rodrigues and Stegemoller, 2013), particularly before the “tender offer regulation”. Finally, 
some short-term investors may not care about the quality of the target firm, but be only interested 
in potential profits from bets on the differences between the value of common shares and the value 
of funds deposited in the trust account.  
In general, if low-quality firms enter the public market via a SPAC acquisition, we expect 
SPAC firms to underperform. Alternatively, it could be the case that SPAC sponsors identify 
promising targets thanks to their extensive knowledge of the industry, professional experience 
and valuable business networks (Lewellen, 2009) despite the fact that the selected firms have a 
poor financial profile at the time of the acquisition. If sponsors can indeed identify firms with 
hidden potential, i.e., “frogs” that will turn into “princes” in the future, these firms should show 
superior performance as soon as investors recognize their true quality.  
We use two alternative methods to measure long-term performance: event-time analysis 
and calendar-time analysis. For the event-time analysis, we use buy and hold abnormal returns 
(Kothari and Warner, 1997). For the calendar-time portfolio analysis, we employ five-factor 
regression models, which overcome the cross-sectional dependence problem that the event-time 
approach may entail (Fama, 1998; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; Datta et al., 2015). 
 
4.5.1 Event-time buy and hold abnormal returns  
We calculate buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs) of SPAC firms and of IPO firms 
adjusted (i) for the market (Russell 2000 index), (ii) for size and book-to-market and (iii) for the 
industry. We employ equal-weighted portfolios but value weighting leads to qualitatively similar 
results. We draw end-of-day stock prices and indices, which include dividends and are adjusted 
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for stock splits, from Capital IQ. We retrieve the return data of 100 size and book-to-market 
portfolios, 49 industry portfolios and data on book equity and market equity breakpoints from 
Kenneth R. French’s website.29 To match our data to these portfolios, we sort SPAC firms, as 
well as IPO firms, either into 100 different portfolios according to their size and book-to-market 
breakpoint data or into 49 different portfolios according to their four-digit SIC codes. For size and 
market equity, we use the month-end market capitalization, and for book-to-market we use the 
quarter-end book equity after the SPAC acquisition completion or IPO pricing date. 
We measure BHARs for periods of 6, 12, 24 and 60 months using the following formula: 
 
Formula 4.4: Buy and hold abnormal returns 
BHAR (t1,t2)= ∏ [(1+Rit)]t2t=t1 - ∏ [(1+Rbt)]t2t=t1  ,   
where Rit is the return on a SPAC firm or an IPO firm and Rbt is the return on the 
benchmark portfolio in t. We start calculating BHARs at t1, which is the first day of trading for 
IPO firms or the first day after the completion date for SPAC acquisitions. We only include in the 
analysis SPAC firms or IPO firms for which return data are available in t1. We calculate BHARs 
until t2, which is either the end of our measurement period or the earlier delisting date. In addition 
to the whole IPO sample, we calculate BHARs for the matched IPO sample, which we describe 
in Chapter 4.4.5. 
We depict the BHARs for SPAC firms, all IPO firms and matched IPO firms in Table 4.6. As it 
is commonly reported in the literature, we also find that the IPO firms significantly underperform 
the market, the size and book-to-market as well as the industry-matched portfolios (Ritter, 1991; 
Loughran and Ritter, 1995) in all reported periods. This also holds for firms that go public via a 
SPAC acquisition. For example, over a 24-month period, SPAC firms underperform the 
benchmark portfolios by 59%, 96% and 85% on average. Interestingly, the underperformance of 
SPAC firms is even stronger than that of IPO firms, and the differences are statistically and 
                                                 
29 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
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economically significant. Over a 24- month period, matched IPO firms underperform their 
respective portfolios by “only” 34%, 43% and 45%. Moreover, we observe that performance 
deteriorates over time: for SPAC firms, the six-month market-adjusted BHAR equals -29% while 
the 60-month market-adjusted BHAR amounts to -102%.  
The “tender offer regulation” and the JOBS act that we describe in Chapter 4.4.6 might 
have a positive influence on the long-term performance of SPAC firms. The JOBS act could 
decrease operating costs due to reduced reporting requirements, which in turn might positively 
influence the long-term performance of SPAC firms. In non-tabulated tests, we compare pre-
regulation SPAC BHARs with post-regulation SPAC BHARs but do not find any significant 
differences for periods of 6, 12 and 24 months. We cannot compare the performance over 60 
months because the first SPAC acquisition in the post-regulation subsample occurs on May 5th 
2011.  
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Table 4.6: Buy and hold abnormal returns 
          Whole sample   Matched sample 
  SPAC BHARs   IPO BHARs WMW test   t-test   IPO BHARs WMW test   t-test 
           median         mean          N              median         mean          N  z-value   t-value            median         mean         N z-value   t-value 
6 months                                   
Market adjusted -0.28*** -0.29*** 109           -0.07*** -0.06*** 1112 5.89***           6.48***  -0.13*** -0.06 113 3.92***           4.50*** 
Size & btm adjusted -0.30*** -0.32*** 92           -0.10*** -0.07*** 1046 5.56***           5.57***  -0.16*** -0.09* 104 3.49***           3.96*** 
Industry adjusted -0.31*** -0.34*** 109           -0.10*** -0.08*** 1100 6.36***           6.66***  -0.17*** -0.09* 111 4.04***           4.64*** 
12 months                                  
Market adjusted -0.46*** -0.46*** 109           -0.15*** -0.08*** 1082 7.40***           8.29***  -0.17*** -0.12** 110 4.75***           4.96*** 
Size & btm adjusted -0.58*** -0.57*** 92           -0.16*** 0.10*** 1021 7.53***           7.59***  -0.18*** -0.14** 101 4.88***           5.14*** 
Industry adjusted -0.51*** -0.57*** 109           -0.18*** -0.13*** 1070 7.91***           8.59***  -0.23*** -0.15* 108 5.13***           5.59*** 
24 months                                  
Market adjusted -0.56*** -0.59*** 104           -0.30*** -0.21*** 969 6.22***           7.11***  -0.35*** -0.34*** 108 3.36***           3.23*** 
Size & btm adjusted -0.92*** -0.96*** 87           -0.39*** -0.30*** 914 7.27***           6.88***  -0.43*** -0.43*** 99 4.71***           4.77*** 
Industry adjusted -0.88*** -0.85*** 104           -0.44*** -0.36*** 958 7.01***           7.17***  -0.54*** -0.45*** 106 4.29***           4.34*** 
60 months                                  
Market adjusted -0.90*** -1.02*** 88           -0.58*** -0.20 704 7.47***           4.01***  -0.69*** -0.37* 84 4.87***           3.82*** 
Size & btm adjusted -2.07*** -2.48*** 76           -1.05*** -0.79* 666 9.14***           5.88***  -1.29*** -1.01** 78 6.01***           5.56*** 
Industry adjusted -1.72*** -1.80*** 88           -1.25*** -0.98** 695 5.62***           3.75***  -1.25*** -1.13*** 83 3.79***           3.58*** 
This table presents median and mean (log) BHARs of SPAC acquisitions and IPOs executed in the period 01/2004–12/2015 over 6, 12, 24 and 60 months and 
their significances. It also shows the values and significances of the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney (WMW) test and t-test we run to compare BHARs between SPAC 
acquisitions and all as well as matched IPOs. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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4.5.2 Calendar-time five-factor model analysis 
To apply the calendar-time approach, we download monthly values of the three Fama–
French factors (Fama and French, 1993) and a momentum factor (Carhart, 1997) from Kenneth 
R. French’s website.30 We supplement these data with an aggregated liquidity factor (Pastor and 
Stambaugh, 2003; Gao and Jain, 2011) retrieved from Lubos Pastor’s website.31 We then regress 
monthly calendar-time portfolio excess returns on these five risk factors according to the 
following specification: 
 
Formula 4.5: Monthly calendar-time portfolio excess returns 
Rit-Rft= αi+βi�Rmt-Rft�+siSMBt+hiHMLt+miMOMt+liLIQt+eit ,   
where Rit is the return on a portfolio comprising SPAC firms and Rft is the T-bill return, 
αi captures the portfolio excess return, Rmt is the market return on all NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq firms, SMBt is the difference between the return on a portfolio of small firms and a portfolio of large 
firms, HMLt is the difference between the return on high book-to-market and low book-to-market 
stocks, MOMt is the difference between the return on high-prior-return portfolios and low-prior-
return portfolios and LIQt is the difference between the return on low-turnover portfolios and 
high-turnover portfolios. We use equal-weighted returns. A three-factor model and/or value-
weighted returns yield qualitatively similar results. The results for periods of 6, 12, 24 and 60 
months are depicted in Table 4.7 in Specifications 1 to 4. Consistent with the BHAR analyses, 
these results show that SPAC firms underperform the market after going public. They have 
significant and negative alphas in all periods under consideration.  
We perform the same analyses for both all and matched IPO firms and present the results 
in Specifications 5 to 8 and 9 to 12, respectively. Both all and matched IPO firms underperform 
as well, but the underperformance of SPAC firms is again larger. For example, over a 24-month 
                                                 
30 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
31 http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/lubos.pastor/research. 
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period, SPAC firms have a monthly alpha of -5.2%, whereas the monthly alphas for all and 
matched IPO firms reach -1.2% and -1.7%, respectively.  
Finally, in Table 4.8 we present results for hedged portfolios. A hedged portfolio consists 
of a long position in an IPO equal-weighted portfolio and a short position in a SPAC equal-
weighted portfolio. Specifications 1 to 4 depict the results for the whole IPO sample and 
Specifications 5 to 8 for the matched IPO sample. The results confirm that SPAC firms 
significantly underperform IPO firms in all periods.  
Looking at the long-term performance of SPAC firms appears to confirm the picture that emerges 
during the first part of our empirical analysis; namely, that SPACs attract lower-quality firms. In 
the months and years following the SPAC acquisition, investors seem to recognize the lower 
quality of SPAC firms and punish these firms in the long term. Consequently, long-term investors 
that put their money in SPACs at the completion date systematically underperform the market, 
industry and similar non-SPAC firms as well as IPO firms. 
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Table 4.7: Factor regressions - market portfolio 
  All SPACs   All IPOs   Matched IPOs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8)   (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  6 months 12 months 24 months 60 months   6 months 12 months 24 months 60 months   6 months 12 months 24 months 60 months 
Intercept (α) -0.0510*** -0.0533*** -0.0521*** -0.0416***   -0.0116*** -0.0114*** -0.0120*** -0.0134***  -0.0071 -0.0102* -0.0169*** -0.0195*** 
  (0.0096) (0.0076) (0.0067) (0.0056)   (0.0035) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0024)  (0.0071) (0.0054) (0.0051) (0.0044) 
RMRF 1.3087*** 0.8408*** 0.7596*** 1.0636***   0.9823*** 1.0016*** 1.1291*** 1.1523***  0.9892*** 0.8990*** 1.2216*** 1.2840*** 
  (0.2471) (0.1999) (0.1749) (0.1479)   (0.0908) (0.0746) (0.0710) (0.0624)  (0.2003) (0.1444) (0.1333) (0.1160) 
SMB 0.3655 0.1291 -0.0828 -0.1603   0.8377*** 0.8407*** 0.7723*** 0.8164***  0.9201*** 0.8999*** 0.7117*** 0.6651*** 
  (0.4241) (0.3384) (0.2950) (0.2495)   (0.1532) (0.1258) (0.1197) (0.1052)  (0.3204) (0.2419) (0.2249) (0.1956) 
HML -0.2819 -0.0858 -0.1562 -0.2774   -0.5898*** -0.4749*** -0.5020*** -0.1960*  -0.4745 -0.5642** -0.0503 0.0449 
  (0.4160) (0.3345) (0.2933) (0.2481)   (0.1523) (0.1251) (0.1191) (0.1046)  (0.3477) (0.2415) (0.2236) (0.1945) 
MOM 0.1516 -0.1551 -0.1471 -0.2561**   0.1028 -0.0108 -0.1467** -0.1728***  0.1365 0.0126 -0.0899 -0.2357** 
  (0.2085) (0.1683) (0.1474) (0.1246)   (0.0765) (0.0629) (0.0598) (0.0526)  (0.2016) (0.1530) (0.1123) (0.0977) 
LIQ -0.0175 0.1535 0.1095 0.1072   0.1595*** 0.1444*** 0.1145*** 0.1003***  0.2066* 0.1209 0.1146 0.0231 
  (0.1366) (0.1096) (0.0960) (0.0812)   (0.0499) (0.0409) (0.0390) (0.0342)  (0.1081) (0.0778) (0.0732) (0.0637) 
Adjusted R-sq 0.23 0.19 0.17 0.38   0.66 0.75 0.80 0.85   0.32 0.41 0.57 0.66 
This table presents calendar-time analysis of SPAC acquisitions and IPOs that were executed in the period 01/2004–12/2015 using a five-factor model. The 
dependent variable is the monthly equal-weighted portfolio excess return for SPAC acquisitions in Specifications (1) to (4), IPOs (whole sample) in Specifications 
(5) to (8) or IPOs (matched sample) in Specifications (9) to (12) for calendar-time periods of 6, 12, 24 and 60 months. Independent variables include the monthly 
market premium on all NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq firms (RMRF), the difference between the monthly return on small firms and large firms (SMB), the difference 
between the monthly return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks (HML), the difference between the return on high prior 
return portfolios and low prior return portfolios (MOM) and the difference between the return of low-turnover portfolios and high-turnover portfolios (LIQ). 
Standard errors are provided in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.8: Factor regressions - hedged portfolio 
  All IPOs - All SPACs   Matched IPOs - All SPACs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  6 months 12 months 24 months 60 months   6 months 12 months 24 months 60 months 
Intercept (α) 0.0395*** 0.0422*** 0.0400*** 0.0281***   0.0422*** 0.0414*** 0.0352*** 0.0221*** 
  (0.0094) (0.0075) (0.0059) (0.0049)   (0.0115) (0.0089) (0.0071) (0.0059) 
RMRF -0.3596 0.1650 0.3695** 0.0887   -0.2092 0.0921 0.4620** 0.2204 
  (0.2414) (0.1954) (0.1547) (0.1279)   (0.3210) (0.2368) (0.1879) (0.1559) 
SMB 0.5190 0.7004** 0.8550*** 0.9767***   0.2277 0.7026* 0.7945** 0.8254*** 
  (0.4144) (0.3308) (0.2609) (0.2156)   (0.5249) (0.3987) (0.3168) (0.2629) 
HML -0.3219 -0.3867 -0.3458 0.0814   -0.2713 -0.3847 0.1059 0.3223 
  (0.4065) (0.3270) (0.2595) (0.2144)   (0.5644) (0.3950) (0.3151) (0.2615) 
MOM -0.0492 0.1473 0.0005 0.0834   0.0574 0.2334 0.0572 0.0204 
  (0.2037) (0.1645) (0.1304) (0.1077)   (0.3362) (0.2511) (0.1583) (0.1314) 
LIQ 0.1921 -0.0076 0.0050 -0.0069   0.1694 -0.0341 0.0051 -0.0841 
  (0.1335) (0.1071) (0.0849) (0.0702)   (0.1750) (0.1274) (0.1031) (0.0856) 
R-sq 0.04 0.07 0.17 0.18   0.02 0.05 0.15 0.15 
This table presents calendar-time analysis of SPAC acquisitions and IPOs that were executed in the period 01/2004–
12/2015 using a five-factor model. The dependent variable is the monthly equal-weighted portfolio return for IPOs 
minus the monthly equal-weighted portfolio return for SPAC acquisitions. In Specifications (1) to (4), we use the 
whole IPO sample and in Specifications (5) to (8) we use the matched IPO sample. Independent variables include the 
monthly market premium on all NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq firms (RMRF), the difference between the monthly return on 
small firms and large firms (SMB), the difference between the monthly return on a portfolio of high book-to-market 
stocks and low book-to-market stocks (HML), the difference between the return on high prior return portfolios and 
low prior return portfolios (MOM) and the difference between the return of low-turnover portfolios and high-turnover 
portfolios (LIQ). Standard errors are provided in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
4.6 Summary and conclusion 
Cash-shell companies suffered a poor reputation after several cases of fraud involving 
these vehicles during the 1980s. This led to the introduction of new legislation that aimed to 
increase the transparency of cash-shell companies, improve their shareholder rights and motivate 
their sponsors to act in the interests of the shareholders. These changes might contribute to a wave 
of new-generation SPACs, which started in the second half of 2003. The purpose of this article is 
to shed light on these new-generation SPACs, to investigate whether SPAC acquisitions are a 
viable alternative to IPOs for private firms aiming to achieve a public listing and to assess their 
performance.  
4.6 Summary and conclusion 
133 
Our findings indicate that SPAC acquisitions allow firms to enter public markets in 
difficult times when it is hard to access the IPO channel. They also turn out to be beneficial to the 
existing SPAC firm shareholders that realize higher cash out ratios than they would obtain through 
an IPO. However, the results support the view that the firms that SPACs attract are not as 
appealing as those that chose an IPO. More specifically, our results lend support to the hypothesis 
that firms that enter public markets via a SPAC acquisition have lower growth opportunities, are 
more highly levered and smaller than IPO firms. They are also less likely to receive investments 
from VCs and private equity funds. Moreover, our findings suggest that SPAC acquisitions may 
take longer to execute than IPOs—at least, this seems to be the case until the SPAC structure was 
modified in 2010.  
Looking at the long-term performance of SPAC firms, we find that they severely 
underperform the market, industry and firms of similar sizes and book-to-market ratios as well as 
IPO firms. This result is consistent over different methodologies and time horizons. On that basis, 
we therefore conclude that the “frog turned prince” scenario does not apply in the case of SPAC 
firms: these firms remain “frogs” in the long term.  
Over the last few years, SPAC activity has caught up again and, in April 2016, Ellenoff 
Grossman & Schole, a law firm that specializes in this vehicle, stated, “SPACs are back”.32 In the 
first three months in 2016, three SPACs with a total volume of US$ 569 million went public, 
whereas the total IPO volume only equaled US$ 444 million.33 In April 2016, CF Corporation 
filed for a US$ 600 million SPAC IPO, which would make it the largest SPAC IPO since 2008. 
Major investment banks show interest in SPACs. As an example, Goldman Sachs advised its first 
SPAC IPO, Silver Run Acquisition Corporation, in February 2016, which is also Goldman’s 
largest IPO assignment in 2016 by end of March.34 These developments are astonishing given the 
poor long-term performance and the relatively low quality of SPAC firms, which we document 
in this article. We therefore believe that further research is needed to understand why SPACs are 
                                                 
32 http://www.egsllp.com/news/resources/spacs. 
33 Source: Capital IQ. 
34 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-banks-spacs-dealtalk-idUSKCN0WQ0C0. 
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getting popular again. Such research would, for example, investigate the role of intermediaries, 
such as investment banks or law firms. 
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Chapter 5  
Conclusion 
 
The introduction to this thesis notes the importance of acquisitions for corporate finance 
research and for the overall economy. Moreover, I argue that shareholder value creation in 
acquisitions is still a puzzle and that the sources of value creation are debated and of elusive 
nature. The overarching question raised in this thesis is whether and how financial stakeholders 
and shareholders profit from acquisitions in different scenarios, i.e.: 
• Do bidder shareholders profit when financial advisors are involved in corporate 
acquisitions, and does the quality of financial advisors matter? Does the variable advisor 
help to explain value creation? Do high-quality advisors create more bidder shareholder 
value than lower quality advisors? 
• Do firms and SPAC shareholders profit from SPAC acquisitions? How do these firms 
(SPAC target firms) perform in comparison to firms that use an IPO to go public?  
The first article, which is presented in Chapter 2, focuses on the European market and asks 
whether the involvement of advisors in corporate acquisitions matters for bidder value creation. 
Although theoretical frameworks predict a positive relationship between advisor involvement and 
shareholder value creation, empirical evidence (from the US market) struggles to confirm it (see, 
e.g., Servaes and Zenner, 1996; Wang and Whyte, 2010). My results suggest that advisors provide 
value to their clients only when both the bidder and the target are located in the UK. Moreover, a 
DiD analysis, using a major European regulatory reform, indicates that advisors matter for 
shareholder value creation in acquisitions. 
Chapter 3 presents the second article, which builds on the first one and focuses not only on 
the question of whether an advisor is involved in an acquisition but also on whether the quality of 
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the advisor plays a role. The theoretical and empirical situation is similar to that described 
regarding the first article. In theory, high-quality advisors should be able to create more 
shareholder value for their clients than lower-quality advisors (see, e.g., Golubov et al., 2012). 
However, different authors find an insignificant, negative or positive relationship between advisor 
quality and value creation. Since these studies rely on advisor market shares or related measures 
to assess advisor quality and since evidence suggests that advisor market shares are not a good 
predictor of advisor performance (Bao and Edmans, 2011), we develop a new proxy to capture 
advisor quality. We define high-quality advisors as advisors that won an award of excellence (i.e., 
best M&A house) and focus on the North American market. The results suggest that there is a 
positive relationship between award winners and value creation. Moreover, clients of award 
winners seem to outperform clients of non-award winners in the long term and seem to realize 
greater synergies. The results hold when we consider the endogenous choice of an advisor. 
Finally, it seems that award winners put more effort into acquisitions that are more visible. 
The last article, which is presented in Chapter 4, focuses on SPAC acquisitions and compares 
firms that use SPAC acquisitions to access the public market to firms that use IPOs to access the 
public market. Analyzing SPAC acquisitions more closely is important for several reasons. First, 
external capital plays a crucial role for growing firms, and the IPO route is not always available 
to some of these. Second, initial investors such as venture capital or private equity investors have 
a high interest to cash out their holdings after a certain period of time, for which IPOs offer many 
restrictions. Third, SPACs are popular and equaled about one-third of the IPO market in 2008 and 
in the first three months of 2016 SPAC activity even exceeded IPO activity. Finally, SPACs are 
criticized for being non-transparent and costly for long-term shareholders. The results of our study 
suggest that SPAC acquisitions profit firms that are small, highly levered and have low growth 
opportunities in times with turbulent market environments. It seems that venture capital and 
private equity investors rather stick to the traditional way, the IPO, to bring their portfolio firms 
to the public market. Furthermore, firms that access the market via SPAC acquisitions 
underperform the market and similar IPO firms in the long run. 
There are certain limitations to this thesis that are at the same time potential avenues for future 
research. First, the analyses in Chapters 2 and 3 rely on bidders that are publicly listed firms. 
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However, in acquisitions that involve private targets and private bidders, asymmetric information 
costs between the target and the bidder as well as transaction costs might be even greater. Thus, 
it could be worth developing an alternative measure to CARs to capture the value that advisors 
create in private–private acquisitions.  
Second, Chapters 2 and 3 mostly focus on domestic acquisitions or cross-border acquisitions 
between bidders and targets from countries that are similarly developed. In the stream of literature 
that looks at cross-border acquisitions that include bidders and targets from countries with 
different economic development as well as corporate governance regimes (Rossi and Volpin, 
2004; Goergen et al., 2005; Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008), results 
suggest that differences between the bidder’s and target’s corporate governance have an effect on 
shareholder returns. Martynova and Renneboog (2008) analyze international acquisitions and find 
that the party with the better governance regime imposes the poorer governance regime on the 
other party, which results in large improvements for shareholders. It seems that the larger the 
distance in corporate governance between the bidder and the target, the larger are the synergetic 
gains for the party with the previously poorer governance regime. Thus, it might be interesting to 
study what role advisors play in acquisitions that are executed between parties with different 
economic development and corporate governance.  
Third, this thesis focuses only on financial advisors. It would be interesting to examine the 
role that legal advisors or auditors play in acquisitions and whether they help their clients to create 
shareholder value. In SPAC acquisitions, for example, legal advisors are crucial because SPACs 
have a relatively new corporate and governance structure, which requires constant legal advice. 
The results of Louis (2005), DeMong et al. (2011), Krishnan and Masulis (2013), Xie et al. (2013), 
Karsten et al. (2015) and Cai et al. (2016) support the view that legal advisors and auditors play 
an important role in corporate acquisitions in general, but whether their involvement is directly 
associated to value creation remains inconclusive. To provide further evidence, it might be worth 
using, similar to this thesis, legal advisor or auditor awards to assess their quality in a more 
accurate manner. 
Chapter 5 Conclusion 
138 
Fourth, SPACs are becoming more and more popular internationally, especially in Europe and 
Canada. This thesis, however, focuses only on US SPACs, and it might be worthwhile to study 
SPAC markets in other countries, as participants in non-US markets might have learned lessons 
from the US. The comparison between US SPACs and non-US SPACs therefore might help 
researchers to better understand the SPAC phenomenon, i.e., why SPACs remain popular 
although their long-term performance hurts shareholders. 
Fifth, the “new-generation” SPACs are a quite recent phenomenon, and the article in Chapter 
4 is limited to a time period of eleven years. For the future, it will be interesting to see how the 
SPAC market develops and whether during the next years market participants change their view 
regarding SPACs. Moreover, investment banks that act as financial and legal advisors and as 
underwriters continue to innovate the SPAC structure. The underwriter Loeb & Loeb, for 
example, has updated the SPAC structure and called the new vehicle the Innovated Public 
Acquisition Company (IPACs). Loeb & Loeb argues that the new structure helps to close SPAC 
acquisitions in a shorter period of time. It could be interesting to examine how that vehicle 
compares to the SPACs analyzed in this thesis and whether the improved structure results in better 
performance for shareholders.  
Finally, this thesis relies mainly on performance measures related to stock prices such as 
CARs, BHARs and Fama-and-French alphas and therefore assumes that markets are (semi-strong) 
efficient. Another way to measure performance that is somewhat independent of the market 
efficiency assumption and could be interesting for future research might be to concentrate on 
profitability ratios such as return on assets and EBIT to sales.  
In the introduction, I raise the question about factors that contribute to value creation in 
acquisitions. This thesis provides some evidence that financial advisors do play a crucial role and 
that shareholders might profit from their involvement. Moreover, innovations in financial markets 
that promise to improve the protection of shareholder interests, i.e., SPAC acquisitions, should be 
analyzed by the market participants with great care. On the one hand, they might provide value 
for certain firms (that are not able to access the public markets via an IPO); on the other hand, 
they seem to hurt shareholders that are interested in long-term gains.  
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